20140927_NIU_CJ7_TREX_SFA guide 3.1

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b) In August 2013, the MoD, MoI, and NDS chiefs signed the initial Air Charter
which was intended to streamline the SMW’s C2, moving them from under MoI
to MoD. Unfortunately, neither the language in the initial charter, nor in a subsequent
charter signed by the same ministries in May 2014, codified clear command
and control of the unit. This inhibited its development because of limited gains
in personnel and support. Coalition mentors continue to focus their efforts to
find an acceptable Afghan solution to this predicament. Despite the C2 issues,
the SMW continues to advance its capabilities and is preparing for delivery of
its additional aircraft and its future expansion to Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif.
SMW is making operational progress, working with Afghan SOF units from both
MoI and MoD. It requires MoI and MoD cooperation for command and control,
personnel assignment and equipment delivery. The SMW SOAG advises the SMW
leadership on both training and operations.
5.31 Gaps. In the near term, the Afghan
police will remain a counter-insurgency
focused force. They will need continued
development and focused advising in intelligence
capabilities and evidence-based
operations. The police will have gained
credibility in the eyes of the Afghan people,
but will not yet have all the effective
systems in place to ensure self-sustainability.
Gender integration and female
recruitment necessary to handle the
security needs of the female population
and detect counter-insurgents disguised as
women are also slow and deficient.
Photo: Cpl. Clay Beyersdorfer
Capability gaps in areas such as C-IED, integrated layered security, and sustainment will
prevent them from expanding their operational reach.
5.32 Operations Coordination Group (OCG) and Ktah Khas Afghan (KKA). The
OCG is an operational-level organization made up of representatives from the Ministry
of Defense, Ministry of the Interior, and the National Directorate of Security that
provide legal validation, battle space owner and governmental de-confliction, and
post-mission review of KKA operations. The KKA is an Afghan light infantry Special
Operations Battalion. The KKA consist of three 170-man rifle companies, a 29-man
reconnaissance unit and several sections that enable and support the Strike Forces.
The KKA Military Intelligence Company provides target area analysis and supports
collection efforts on the objective. The KKA headquarters company contains the staff
sections and command group and the Support Company that provides transportation,
maintenance, and food services. The KKA 4th Company contains instructors and 50
student slots for new KKA Soldiers who undergo a Basic Operator Training module to
provide foundational skills for service in a rifle company.
KKA platoons and companies are trained to conduct precision raids, tactical callouts,
and vehicle interdictions against high value targets utilizing both ground and air
mobility platforms. The KKA C2 relationship places them directly under the MoD G3
in order to make them rapidly responsive to national-level targets throughout Afghanistan.
The OCG and KKA’s geographic flexibility, rapid ability to gain mission approval
and legal justification, and precision in execution distinguish them from their special
operations counterparts within the MoD and MoI. Developing the KKA’s operational-level
command, sustainment, intelligence and recruitment structures is the current
focus of the US KKA SOAG.
Chapter 5
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