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20140927_NIU_CJ7_TREX_SFA guide 3.1

20140927_NIU_CJ7_TREX_SFA guide 3.1

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UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />

This document is not approved for public release<br />

c) As one of COMISAF’s Critical Information Requirements (CIR) and a legal<br />

obligation of LOAC, advisors are required to report suspected HRV in the<br />

following manner:<br />

1) When aware of a possible HRV, gather information describing the incident;<br />

and,<br />

2) Immediately report that information to the your commander or intelligence<br />

operations officer. Incident description should include: who (alleged<br />

perpetrator), which unit, what, where, when, why, how, witnesses, and other<br />

pertinent information (context).<br />

<strong>3.1</strong>2 Corruption. Corruption across Afghanistan’s public and private sectors<br />

represents a threat to the success of ISAF’s/RS’s mission and the legitimacy of the<br />

Afghan government. It serves as a barrier to Afghanistan’s economic growth by<br />

robbing the state of revenue and preventing the development of a stable economy.<br />

Corruption also threatens the process of transition, as institutions weakened by<br />

corruption are less able to take over responsibility for security and governance.<br />

a) Corruption, defined by the World Bank as the abuse of public office for private<br />

gain, undermines the effectiveness of Afghanistan’s government and security<br />

forces, allows criminal networks to fill power vacuums left by weak governance,<br />

fuels discontent among the population, and contributes to both active and passive<br />

support for the insurgency. The impact of corruption includes an increased risk<br />

of state failure, increased support to the insurgency, decreased support from the<br />

International Community, and increased negative Afghan views of GIRoA.<br />

b) ISAF/RS’s Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (TAO) (EF 2) mission<br />

is to support Afghanistan’s development of the security ministries (MoD and<br />

MoI), which must be viewed as legitimate and credible government institutions to<br />

set the conditions for self-regulating oversight of the ASI and ANSF. COMISAF<br />

has three desired effects for the TAO mission across the theater: protecting<br />

international donor funds while ensuring the Coalition does not fuel corruption,<br />

ensuring transparency and accountability of funding to the ANSF, and combating<br />

predatory/egregious corruption.<br />

c) The advisor may observe corruption, such as the abuse of entrusted power<br />

for personal gain. Corrupt acts could include an Afghan senior leader showing<br />

favoritism based<br />

upon family/<br />

tribal affiliation<br />

(nepotism),<br />

misusing<br />

government<br />

property and<br />

revenue, theft<br />

of public assets,<br />

fraud, and bribery.<br />

Bribery involving<br />

promotions,<br />

assignments,<br />

contracts, or<br />

training is the<br />

most prevalent<br />

type of corruption<br />

30<br />

UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO

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