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Steve Stewart-Williams (possible) exception of sceptical philosophers, we all assume that objects continue to exist when beyond the range of our senses. Logically, solipsism is as valid an interpretation of our sensory experience as the view that there are objects existing independently of perception. Given that our experience is consistent with solipsism, the assumption of object permanence could not be derived solely from experience. This suggests that there must be an innate contribution. It might be argued, though, that the assumption that objects persist is a more useful interpretation of the evidence than the solipsist’s interpretation, and that this is why people favour realism over solipsism. Without denying that it is a more useful interpretation, it is not clear that this proposal could be correct. A working understanding of object permanence has been established in a variety of nonhuman animals (WYNNE 2001). Furthermore, research suggests that as soon as infants are old enough to be tested (around three months), they represent the continued existence of objects beyond their field of view (BAILLARGEON 1999; BAILLARGEON/SPELKE/ WASSERMAN 1985; CAREY/SPELKE 1994; SPELKE 1990; although see HAITH 1998). 4 But it does not seem reasonable to suggest that nonhuman animals or human infants reason their way to the most useful interpretation of the evidence. These considerations lend some support to the notion that the assumption of object permanence—one of the key elements in the understanding of the mind-independence of objective reality—has an innate origin. Assuming Objectivity Over Subjectivity: An Adaptive Bias According to evolutionary psychologists, humans have evolved a number of adaptive cognitive biases. For instance, in the identification of threats, people (and other animals) tend to err on the side of making false positives (LEDOUX 1996). Similarly, people err on the side of making animistic or anthropomorphic interpretations of ambiguous stimuli (GUTHRIE 1994). The evolutionary rationale for these biases is that it is less costly to make false positives than to make false negatives—for instance, it is less costly to judge that a tiger is present when it is not than to judge that it is not present when it is—and that selection will favour a tendency to err on the side of the less costly error (HASELTON/BUSS 2000). If the tendency to tag aspects of experience as objective or subjective has an evolutionary origin, it would be predicted that we possess another adaptive bias: Where there is any doubt or ambiguity, we will assume the objectivity of our perceptual experience. Admittedly, mistaking mere imagery for veridical perception would not be a fitness-enhancing strategy. However, mistaking perception for imagery would probably be an even greater threat to the inclusive fitness of our hunter–gatherer ancestors. WISNIEWSKI (1998) puts the point simply: “a person contemplating the veracity of their percepts might be eaten by an approaching tiger” (p57). This leads to the prediction that, under conditions of uncertainty, we will tend to err on the side of assuming that our sensory–perceptual experiences are veridical. The same argument applies to other judgements about the world. RUSE (1986) sums up the position: “A tendency to objectify is the price of reproductive success” (p172). Preliminary evidence for the existence of this bias can be found in your own experience: Which has more common for you, mistaking a dream for reality or mistaking reality for a dream In support of the view that the objectivity bias extends beyond perceptual states to other judgements, the anthropologist Donald BROWN (1991) reports that people in all cultures overestimate the objectivity of thought. One example is that we tend to view matters of taste as having objective validity. KANT (1952) noted that aesthetic subjectivism (the idea that beauty is solely in the eye of the beholder) clashes with common sense. GARDNER (1995) elaborates this point: “Common sense is unequivocal that ‘the music is beautiful’ means more than, even if it presupposes, ‘the music gives me pleasure’. If those two thoughts were the same, one could not regard one’s aesthetic judgement as something that another person might take issue with, and in support of which reasons— other than the fact of one’s liking it—may be given. But we do think that a judgement that the music is beautiful clashes with the judgement that it is ugly or sentimental: it does so because—as its grammatical form suggests—it aims to say something about the music, not about oneself” (p592). Similarly, people tend to attribute objective validity to their moral judgements, even though no one has yet been able to construct a plausible argument in favour of moral objectivism (JOYCE 2001; MACKIE 1977; NOZICK 1981). Although targeted empirical evidence is needed, these considerations at least render plausible the notion that we possess an adaptive bias toward assuming the objectivity of our perceptions and other judgements. This supports an evolutionary interpretation of the objective–subjec- Evolution and Cognition ❘ 128 ❘ 2003, Vol. 9, No. 2
Darwin and Descartes’ Demon tive distinction, which in turn supports the view that the belief in an objective external reality can be traced to innate aspects of mind. Conclusion Author’s address Steve Stewart-Williams, School of Psychology, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand. E-mail: anonymous1@xtra.co.nz HUME (1955) said: “The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with other objects” (Section XII, Part I, Paragraph 12). But despite the fact that perception alone reveals nothing about the objectivity or mind independence of the world, the common sense assumption for the majority of people is metaphysical realism. Evolutionary considerations and various lines of evidence raise the possibility that this assumption traces to innate aspects of the human mind, namely, the capacity to distinguish mental events that have objective referents from those that do not, and the capacity to represent the continued existence of unperceived parts of the world. These capacities plausibly enhanced the inclusive fitness of our ancestors. The ability to distinguish the subjective from the objective may relate to the production of appropriate behaviour in response to subjective versus objective aspects of mental experience, and may be associated with an adaptive bias toward assuming the objectivity of our perceptual and other judgements. The conscious understanding that unperceived parts of the world continue to exist may relate to tracking environmental regularities, and may be a necessary ingredient in the generation of novel adaptive behaviour. At this stage, these views are highly speculative, and the arguments and evidence provided certainly do not constitute an unassailable proof. Nonetheless, it is my view that they justify further research and discussion on this topic. Author Note This paper was supported by a Bright Future Top- Achiever Doctoral Scholarship, administered by FRST. Thanks go to Dr. Stephen HILL and Dr. John PODD (School of Psychology, Massey University), and to James BATTYE (School of History, Philosophy, and Politics, Massey University), for helpful suggestions and stimulating discussion concerning this paper. Notes 1 As noted, it is unlikely that the use of sensory imagery in thought is nearly as common. This has an interesting implication. An ability shared by a number of species may trace to a common ancestor. The more widespread the ability is, the longer ago the common ancestor must have lived and the more ancient the ability. Therefore, assuming that the ability to track objects is more common than the use of sensory imagery in thought, this would argue that the former ability evolved long before the latter. 2 This, at least, is the case for evolutionary products unrelated to reproduction. In the case of evolved psychological mechanisms related to reproduction, there may be important differences between the sexes (BUSS 1999). 3 This idea is now challenged by some theoretical interpretations of quantum phenomena, which may help to explain the reputation this area of inquiry has for being counterintuitive. 4 This research challenges PIAGET’s (1954) early claim that infants prior to two years of age have no conception of a world beyond their subjective experience. References Baillargeon, R. (1999) The object concept revisited: New directions in the investigation of infant’s physical knowledge. In: Margolis, E./Laurence, S. (eds) Concepts: Core readings. MIT Press: Cambridge MA, pp. 571–612. Baillargeon, R./Spelke, E. S./Wasserman, S. (1985) Object permanence in five-month-old infants. Cognition 20: 191–208. Baron-Cohen, S. (1995) Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind. MIT Press: Cambridge MA. Berkeley, G. (1982) Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Hackett: Indianapolis. Originally published in 1710. Breland, K./Breland, M. (1961) The misbehavior of organisms. American Psychologist 16: 681–684. Breland, K./Breland, M. (1966) Animal Behavior. Macmillan: New York. Brown, D. E. (1991) Human Universals. McGraw-Hill: New York. Buss, D. M. (1999) Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind. Allyn & Bacon: Needham Heights MA. Carey, S./Spelke, E. (1994) Domain-specific knowledge and conceptual change. In: Hirschfeld, L. A./Gelman, S. A. Evolution and Cognition ❘ 129 ❘ 2003, Vol. 9, No. 2
Page 1 and 2: Contents Arthur S. Reber 102 Some P
Page 3 and 4: Some Perhaps Surprising Consequence
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Of Brains and Minds signs of locali
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Of Brains and Minds References Ayal
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Steven M. Platek An Evolutionary Mo
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