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Contents - Konrad Lorenz Institute

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A Test for Comprehension of False Belief in Chimpanzees<br />

Correct Responses (%)<br />

Correct Responses (%)<br />

80<br />

70<br />

60<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

0<br />

90<br />

80<br />

70<br />

60<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

0<br />

current<br />

previous<br />

other<br />

3-yr 4-yr 5-yr 6-yr Autistics Chimps<br />

3-yr 4-yr 5-yr 6-yr Autistics Chimps<br />

Figure 4. Percentage of choices made for the previous and current<br />

peg positions and the other two positions (combined) in<br />

the mechanical analogue task. Top: True belief version. Bottom:<br />

false belief version.<br />

SMIRNOV tests, P = 0.104 and P = 0.083 respectively;<br />

however, as a check, we ran a non-parametric<br />

ANOVA, but the results were the same: P = 0.042<br />

and P = 0.003 respectively.) Bonferroni post hoc tests<br />

confirm that six-year-olds score significantly higher<br />

(P ≤ 0.027 2-tailed) than all other groups of subjects<br />

except the chimpanzees (for whom P = 0.48 2-<br />

tailed) on the false belief tasks, but not on the true<br />

belief tasks (except against the chimpanzees, where<br />

P = 0.058 2-tailed). Conversely, the chimpanzees<br />

differ significantly (P ≤ 0.058 2-tailed) from all the<br />

human subjects (except the five-year-olds and autistic<br />

subjects, for whom P ≥ 0.38) on truth belief tasks,<br />

but not on the false belief tasks.<br />

An alternative way of considering the results is to<br />

compare the number of occasions when subjects selected<br />

the previous and current positions of the pegs<br />

in the true belief and false belief trials. Subjects<br />

should choose the current position in true belief trials<br />

and the previous position in false belief trials.<br />

Figure 4 plots the mean percentage of choices for<br />

the four drawers (summing the scores for the two<br />

“other” choices). It is clear from these results that<br />

only the 6-year-olds showed the correct switch from<br />

current to previous peg position between the two<br />

types of trials. Younger children and the autistic<br />

adults all exhibited a strong tendency to select the<br />

previous position of the peg in both types of trial.<br />

Significantly, perhaps, chimpanzees exhibited a<br />

weak tendency to switch choices correctly with trial<br />

type, even though they made many more incorrect<br />

decisions (“other” drawers) than any of the human<br />

subjects. However, only one chimpanzee (Josie) selected<br />

the previous peg position on false belief trials<br />

and the current one on true belief trials significantly<br />

more often than expected by chance (“other”<br />

choices discounted: 2 × 2 χ 2 = 21.88, df = 1,<br />

P < 0.001). Matched pairs t-tests confirmed that, as a<br />

group, only the 6-year-olds chose the previous peg<br />

position significantly more often in the false belief<br />

trials (t = 2.42, df = 9, p < 0.05) and the current peg<br />

position significantly more often in the true belief<br />

trials (t = 2.87, df = 9, p < 0.02); all other comparisons<br />

were non-significant. This suggests that, even<br />

though their performance was far from perfect, the<br />

chimpanzees had a better grasp of the false belief<br />

task than either the autistic adults or the younger<br />

children.<br />

Learning and task performance in chimpanzees<br />

The chimpanzees were given extended trials on<br />

both the true belief and false belief tests in order to<br />

ascertain the extent to which learning might play a<br />

role in their responses to the tasks. Regression analyses<br />

of the results using successive blocks of 10 trials<br />

on each test type are summarised in Table 3.<br />

Pooling results using Fisher’s procedure (with 1-<br />

tailed P-values in a positive direction to test for an<br />

underlying trend for scores to improve with time)<br />

yields χ 2 = 4.56 (df = 2 × 4 = 8, P = 0.80) for the true<br />

belief task and χ 2 = 7.35 (df = 8, P = 0.50) for the<br />

false belief task, indicating that there is no underlying<br />

trend in either case. Indeed, the mean slope on<br />

Subject slope r2 t df* P<br />

(a) True belief trials:<br />

Pepe –0.004 0.00 –0.035 11 0.959<br />

Josie 0.600 0.14 0.707 4 0.530<br />

Flynn –0.100 0.01 –0.141 4 0.897<br />

Beckie 0.114 0.01 0.231 4 0.829<br />

(b) False belief trials:<br />

Pepe –0.025 0.01 –0.273 11 0.717<br />

Josie 0.600 0.53 0.187 4 0.164<br />

Flynn –0.800 0.46 –1.589 4 0.210<br />

Beckie –0.400 0.38 –1.572 4 0.191<br />

Table 3. Regression statistics for a linear trend in correct scores<br />

with blocks of trials for chimpanzees to test for a learning effect.<br />

*blocks of 10 test trials.<br />

Evolution and Cognition ❘ 137 ❘ 2003, Vol. 9, No. 2

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