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Ingo Brigandt Induction ^ gestalt perception The preceding discussion has already pointed to the fact that LORENZ’s views on induction justify the use of Gestalt perception. Induction has the function of confirming scientific claims. But as it is shortsighted, Gestalt perception as a mechanism that finds unforeseen lawfulness is needed to carry out successful inductive science. Gestalt perception leads induction the way (1948, pp56, 64). LORENZ’s account of how the rational and ratiomorphic processes operate makes clear that induction can hardly do without Gestalt perception. Induction ^ observation The claims about induction justify directly the approach to observation. LORENZ emphasizes that the nomothetic stage can only be reached after the hypothesis-free idiographic phase (1948, p216; 1950, p129). The crucial function of the idiographic stage is to provide an inductive basis that is as broad as possible including all relevant features (1948, p213; 1950, p131). New explanatory principles can only be abstracted from a sufficiently broad base (1958, p250). Furthermore, the premature formation of a hypothesis can distort the inductive basis. When a researcher has a specific theory in mind it is likely that the data of the idiographic stage are biasedly evaluated so that the scientist sees his or her own hypothesis supported (1948, pp31, 71). This gives a justification for the idea that observation has to provide a large body of data, that it includes all features of the organism and its environment, and in particular that it has to be conducted in hypothesis-free way (1959, p281). Induction ^ experiment Induction also implies the need for experiments. An important part of scientific induction is to provide an account of the details of the object under study, to give a causal analysis, as well as to confirm hypotheses. As has already been discussed the main function of ethological experiments is to establish claims about the specific components of behavior and to examine their (causal) relationship. Experiment ^ Gestalt perception I argued above that the inductive approach justifies the use of Gestalt perception because successful induction presupposes Gestalt perception. The analogous relation that experiment is subordinated to observation might suggest that the conduct of experiments justifies the need for observations. Some of LORENZ’s remarks to the effect that experiments do not make sense without observation seem to amount to a direct justification of observation by experiment. However, it hardly amounts to a justification of the specific characteristics of LORENZ’s observational approach. I prefer the interpretation that the need for experiments mainly justifies the use of Gestalt perception, which in turn calls for observation (as we will se below). In other words, the necessity of experiments justifies the specific aspects of the observational approach only indirectly, namely insofar as Gestalt perception is the tool for conducting observations. The use of Gestalt perception follows from the need of doing experiments because experiments are useful only if the substructures and functions of a system are known to a certain degree (1981, pp53, 65). Gestalt perception is the best cognitive mechanism to tackle this question (1981, p47). It can break down a complex system into meaningful parts on which an experiment can focus. Gestalt perception ^ observation The following quotations illustrate how self-evident it is for <strong>Konrad</strong> LORENZ that observation and Gestalt perception go together: “… in the observation of complex animal behaviour patterns, one can literally see the same process thousands of times without noticing the inherent principle until—quite abruptly—on the following occasion the Gestalt is distinguished from the background of accidental features …” (1959, p306) “At the other extreme are the died-in-the-wool behaviourists who deny that Gestalt perception— and thus observation of organisms in their natural environment—has any value or even scientific character.” (1959, p319) In fact, the use of Gestalt perception actually justifies the ethological approach to observation. First, the effectiveness of Gestalt perception in finding important regularities and principles is proportional to the amount of data of which Gestalt perception can make use (1948, p63; 1959, p305; 1981, p46). An advantage of this ratiomorphic process is its retentive memory and the large amount of data it can take into account (1959, pp309, 314f; 1981, p44). Gestalt formation can suddenly occur after a long period of data collection (1959, p306; 1981, p45). This lends support to the habit of observing animals over a long span of time (1959, p315; 1981, Evolution and Cognition ❘ 166 ❘ 2003, Vol. 9, No. 2
Gestalt Experiments and Inductive Observations p45). In addition, Gestalt perception deals with the whole (1948, p139; 1959, p306; 1981, p46). It is able to get an overview of a multitude of aspects of a system and can extract a lawful relationship out of it (1948, p64). For this reason, effective use of Gestalt perception can be made if all behavioral patterns of organisms are observed in their natural context. As a perceptual mechanism Gestalt perception has qualitative information as input. This justifies the qualitative approach to observation (1948, p64). Finally, Gestalt perception does not need a hypothesis (1948, p63). It works best when the researcher is relaxed and contemplates his object of study while unconsciously collecting data (1959, p316; 1981, pp45f). In fact, rational reasoning about details of the object negatively influenced the operation of Gestalt perception (1959, pp314, 317). In this case, the features of Gestalt perception show that observation has to be conducted without rational influences based on theories or hypothesis. To sum up, LORENZ tries to make clear that the distinctive aspects of the ethological observational approach is chosen in accordance with a cognitive enterprise that relies on Gestalt perception. Observations yield effectively knowledge because this powerful ratiomorphic mechanism is employed. The idea that Gestalt perception is predominantly used for ethological observations (as well as for systematics) can be found throughout LORENZ’s writings (1948, pp61f, 213ff; 1954, pp197ff; 1958, pp251ff, 278; 1959, pp306ff, 311, 315; 1963a, pp8f; 1981, pp40ff). Conclusion A A A Entirety B B B Gestalt Perception Ethological Approach to Observation Induction Experiment The necessity of B is conceptually contained in A; accepting A means also doing B B fulfills ideally the demands of A The cognitive mechanism A is a powerful tool for obtaining knowledge from the biological method B Figure 1: Overview of LORENZ’s justificatory system. I have argued that on LORENZ’s view the observation–experiment relation is largely analogous to the Gestalt perception–induction relation. Experiment needs foregoing observation so that it can be conducted meaningfully. Similarly, induction needs Gestalt perception that leads induction the way. Observation and Gestalt perception discover new principles, whereas experiment and induction have to give an analytic confirmation. Gestalt perception is the crucial cognitive tool for ethological observation, while rational induction is important for experimental analysis and confirmation. LORENZ makes clear that the relation between Gestalt perception and induction is very complex. However, he does not give a concrete account of the interplay between these two cognitive mechanisms and their relation to the biological approach. For this reason, while the Gestalt perception–induction relation can be largely mapped onto the observation–experiment relation, it is not clear in detail what the actual role of rational processes in observation is and to which extent Gestalt perception is also important for ethological experiments. The result of my reconstruction of LORENZ’s justificatory relationships between the ideas of entirety, Gestalt perception, induction, observation and experiment are illustrated in Figure 1. 7 LORENZ’s work exhibits a justificatory system in which all of his relevant ideas are logically related. What becomes clear is the fact that the ideas about entirety/systemic entity (Ganzheit) and the claims about induction and inductive science function as primitive principles. They are not justified by other items, but both are used to justify the need for Gestalt perception as a cognitive tool and the necessity of observations in an ethological manner. Furthermore, three different items lend support to the use of Gestalt perception as a cognitive tool: the views about entirety, induction, and experiments. It is not very surprising that Gestalt perception is justified from different perspectives. While this cognitive mechanism is very important for LORENZ’s epistemology, it is hardly endorsed by other post-war biologists. On LORENZ’s account Gestalt perception has very strong capacities, e.g., finding scientific hypotheses. LORENZ needs to justify the use and need of this non-rational (albeit ratiomorphic) process that he uses to stress as a tool for scientific inquiry. Finally, my analysis shows that the primary aim of LORENZ’s justificatory efforts is the ethological approach to observation. Even though LORENZ associates Gestalt perception with observation, it is not the case that the specific features about the observational approach are used to justify the use of Gestalt perception. Rather, the ideas about Gestalt perception justify the way observations were carried out by Evolution and Cognition ❘ 167 ❘ 2003, Vol. 9, No. 2
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Page 89 and 90: Steven M. Platek An Evolutionary Mo
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