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Contents - Konrad Lorenz Institute

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Theresa S. S. Schilhab<br />

in that the distinction is operationally unclear (e.g.,<br />

BERRY 1996; FRENSCH 1998). It is clearly impossible<br />

to show that lack of report is due to non conscious<br />

awareness of learning. For one, silence with respect<br />

to the learned material could come about as a result<br />

of the subject’s inclination to withhold information<br />

he/she is not confident of (for discussions on methodological<br />

artifacts in implicit tests see BUCHNER/<br />

WIPPICH 2000) 2 . Moreover self-report is by no means<br />

an exhaustive criterion of consciousness (SCHILHAB<br />

2001). (On discussions of self-report and consciousness,<br />

see also DAVIS 1997; GOLDMAN 2000; VELMANS<br />

1996).<br />

Irrespective of operational considerations, perhaps<br />

it is time to get past the conundrum of consciousness<br />

and ask in what way consciousness predicts<br />

the function of the different learning systems.<br />

Though one cannot argue for one process being superior<br />

to another (RAAB 2003), the question of what<br />

is achieved by using one strategy rather than the<br />

other seems theoretically important (see for instance<br />

TAYLOR 2001, WILSON/SCHOOLER 1991). Specifically,<br />

what assets and drawbacks characterise implicit<br />

versus explicit learning In what respect are<br />

they unique and how they might possibly supplement<br />

each other<br />

To REBER, implicit learning is phylogenetically<br />

more original than explicit learning in the sense,<br />

that the former antedates the latter and is in general<br />

dedicated to ensuring survival. Among other things<br />

he predicted distinctive characteristics of implicit<br />

learning such as robustness of the memory as well as<br />

age and IQ independence.<br />

Here, following the approach recommended by<br />

REBER, I characterise implicit and explicit learning<br />

within a phylogenetic framework and go one step<br />

further to analyse the epistemological qualities<br />

(modes of knowledge) specific to each. To characterise<br />

implicit and explicit learning epistemologically<br />

is to explore which functions they were developed<br />

to fulfil. My primary focus will be on contextual<br />

matters in learning. The paper focuses on the issue<br />

of detachment from reality by using either mode of<br />

learning. Specifically, how explicit learning condenses<br />

reality will be considered. Based on this discussion<br />

I will introduce the notion of vertical and<br />

horizontal learning to capture the specific attributes<br />

of implicit and explicit learning respectively. Vertical<br />

learning (i.e., depth) refers to implicit learning<br />

understood as contextual learning based on relational<br />

aspects, such as the connectivity of available<br />

information in learning situations. Horizontal<br />

learning (i.e., width) refers to explicit learning as<br />

context free, abstract learning. The concept of vertical<br />

and horizontal learning clarifies what separates<br />

implicit and explicit learning as regards evolutionary<br />

adaptation. To qualify claims on the consciousness-based<br />

distinction of implicit and explicit learning<br />

REBER (1992, 1993) recently argued for an<br />

evolutionary stance on the different qualities of the<br />

learning systems.<br />

To Be Explicit is to Be Context-Free<br />

Explicit learning is stored as knowledge that can be<br />

represented deliberately by words or other symbols.<br />

The symbolic character of explicit learning makes it<br />

possible to ‘translate’ knowledge obtained in one<br />

‘language’ into different vocabularies by being context<br />

free (DEACON 1998).<br />

To exemplify; we can talk of the capital of France<br />

as Paris, as a red mark on a map, as a fixed letter<br />

string, as the location which accommodates the<br />

Eiffel Tower and the Triumphal Arc or as the city in<br />

which the final stage of the Tour de France ends<br />

(among other designations). All of these designations<br />

have Paris as their referent. Though Paris is determined<br />

differently from one conception to the<br />

other, by disregarding the information specific to<br />

any particular interpretation, one finds the referent<br />

‘Paris’ to be intrinsic to all. 3<br />

Hence ‘Paris’ is implied in all of the above-mentioned<br />

descriptions, and can replace any of them<br />

without changing the meaning of the sentence.<br />

This transparency entails that we are equally capable<br />

of treating the notion in the language of geography<br />

as in the language of professional bike racing.<br />

Thus, the symbolic nature of explicit knowledge<br />

shows extensive manipulability by being detached<br />

from context.<br />

Two Senses of<br />

‘Detachment from Context’<br />

What is meant by detachment from context Taken<br />

at face value, the assertion is false. Paris is always defined<br />

as part of a greater whole, (the bicycle race,<br />

capital of France, scene of the French Revolution<br />

etc.) though the symbolic representation appears to<br />

grasp the essence of Paris. When dealing with different<br />

understandings of Paris we choose perspective.<br />

Initially, as we came to know of Paris some elements<br />

(variables) or contingencies seemed relevant to our<br />

particular idea of Paris, while others were concurrently<br />

discounted as irrelevant. For instance if interested<br />

in bicycling, watching the Tour de France<br />

Evolution and Cognition ❘ 172 ❘ 2003, Vol. 9, No. 2

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