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INVESTING TOWARDS UNIVERSAL COVERAGE AGAINST NTDS − CHAPTER 2<br />

37<br />

39 countries. Comparisons of domestic funding with domestic investment targets will help<br />

inform future WHO reports on progress made towards universal coverage against NTDs.<br />

2.6.3 The role of innovative fi nancing mechanisms in optimizing domestic<br />

investments<br />

The rebalancing of the financing mix towards less foreign aid and more domestic<br />

investment will take time, especially in low-income countries. But almost nowhere will<br />

financing universal coverage against NTDs be business-as-usual. Both foreign and domestic<br />

investors will need not only to invest more, but invest more wisely. Wiser investment,<br />

in turn, is not only about integrating NTD programmes to lower costs; it is also about<br />

strengthening programmes to deliver results. Increasingly, NTD investments are being<br />

made through innovative financing mechanisms, with the goal of overcoming some of the<br />

perceived problems with traditional mechanisms, which have focussed more on inputs and<br />

activities than on outputs and outcomes and may have underemphasized adaptation. This<br />

section considers the recent arrival of “development impact bonds” within the NTD space.<br />

Development impact bonds, or DIBs, are a form of “payment by results” (PbR) in which<br />

private investment is leveraged against commitments from governments and donors to<br />

pay for certain outcomes (60). DIBs bring these “outcome funders” together with private<br />

investors and their service providers or “delivery partners”. Private investors provide<br />

upfront funding to their delivery partners, who work towards measured outcomes. If results<br />

are delivered, the private investors are paid back by the outcome funders, with an agreed<br />

financial return. If interventions fail, private investors lose some or all of their investment.<br />

The outcome funders do not specify or fund inputs. They pay if, and only if, independently<br />

verified outcomes are achieved. At first, the most likely investors will be philanthropic<br />

foundations and the emerging class of impact investors that are motivated by social as well<br />

as financial returns. DIBs are not a replacement for public provision of public goods but<br />

one available model for engagement with the private sector in areas in which it may have a<br />

comparative advantage. Indeed, in the spirit of universal coverage against NTDs, the group<br />

of outcome funders should be led by the governments of endemic countries.<br />

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has recently announced<br />

support for DIBs (61). Importantly, the first DIB piloted by DFID will target control of<br />

rhodesiense human African trypanosomiasis with veterinary public-health interventions<br />

in Uganda. DFID will also support the development of other such partnerships by bringing<br />

together investors, governments and aid agencies to design new investments. Groups<br />

behind the initial development of the DIB for human African trypanosomiasis are looking<br />

at the feasibility of DIBs for dengue and rabies control. Initiatives such as these will help<br />

to identify the necessary conditions under which DIBs might be expected to improve the<br />

performance of health systems in controlling these and other NTDs. Further experience is

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