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Market Economics | Interest Rate Strategy - BNP PARIBAS ...

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The modest deviation of inflation currently relative to<br />

the ECB’s definition of price stability was a point<br />

emphasised in an interview with Governing Council<br />

member Orphanides on 14 January, the day after the<br />

‘hawkish’ press conference. He also hinted, as others<br />

have, that the market may have over-reacted to the<br />

comments in the press conference.<br />

…but there are risks<br />

There are three potential challenges to our view of no<br />

rate hike this year. First, that commodity prices<br />

remain higher for longer, outweighing the favourable<br />

base effects pushing down on headline inflation from<br />

the spring. If, as a result, inflation were to stay higher<br />

for longer, this would increase the risk of upward<br />

pressure on wages and inflation expectations. The<br />

‘emergency’ level of rates would be increasingly<br />

inappropriate in this context.<br />

In those circumstances, economic growth prospects<br />

would suffer. Commodity price rises would crimp real<br />

income growth for households and ECB rate hikes<br />

would hit confidence. This would probably limit how<br />

far the ECB tightening cycle would go.<br />

Box 2: Extracts from ECB Monthly Bulletin<br />

“Labour cost indicators for Q3 2010 continued to show<br />

subdued wage pressures. Preliminary information on<br />

negotiated wages for the first month of Q4 suggests that<br />

the pattern of moderate wage growth continued… in line<br />

with continuously weak labour market conditions.<br />

The annual rate of growth in euro area negotiated wages<br />

slowed to 1.4% in Q3 2010, a record low since the start<br />

of the series in 1991. Annual hourly labour cost growth in<br />

the euro area also slowed in Q3, to 0.8% from 1.6% in<br />

Q2. This too is the lowest growth rate observed since<br />

the start of this series in 2001.<br />

The annual growth rate of compensation per employee<br />

slowed to 1.5% in Q3 from 1.9% in Q2. This decline was,<br />

with a few exceptions, broad-based across countries.<br />

Sectoral developments show that the deceleration in the<br />

annual rate of change in the labour cost index in Q3<br />

2010 was broad-based across sectors.”<br />

Monthly Bulletin, January 2011<br />

Source: ECB<br />

Chart 4: Real Policy <strong>Rate</strong>s<br />

The second risk to our forecast of unchanged rates<br />

this year is that pay pressures emerge in the core<br />

countries of the eurozone, most likely in Germany,<br />

prompting an ECB response. A recurring theme of<br />

our analysis for some while now has been to expect<br />

a pick up in wage growth in Germany. This reflects<br />

the obvious factors including: the low unemployment<br />

rate; skill shortages in some fast-growing sectors;<br />

and looser policy than for German needs.<br />

3.5<br />

3.0<br />

2.5<br />

2.0<br />

1.5<br />

1.0<br />

0.5<br />

0.0<br />

-0.5<br />

Refi <strong>Rate</strong><br />

As conditions in peripheral countries will be radically<br />

different, assessing how the Governing Council will<br />

respond to ‘local’ pay pressures is difficult to judge. If<br />

it is a problem for Germany only, it may be difficult to<br />

secure a consensus on the Governing Council in<br />

favour of hiking rates. But at the very least, we can<br />

expect the vocal hawks on the Governing Council to<br />

make a lot of noise about the upside risks to inflation<br />

and the need for a policy response.<br />

Normalisation mode<br />

An alternative scenario of earlier rate increases than<br />

we currently expect is via the ‘normalisation’ route. In<br />

short, the rationale would be that the level of policy<br />

rates has been set at an emergency level but the<br />

emergency is over – for the eurozone as a whole if<br />

not for specific member states. In this context, there<br />

is a case for taking rates higher whether secondround<br />

effects start to appear or not.<br />

The level of policy rates in real terms is unusually low<br />

(Chart 4). Measured on the basis of the headline<br />

inflation rate or inflation expectations, real short-term<br />

rates are well below zero. Measured on the basis of<br />

-1.0<br />

-1.5<br />

Relative to HICP (% y/y)<br />

EONIA<br />

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

7<br />

6<br />

5<br />

4<br />

3<br />

2<br />

1<br />

0<br />

-1<br />

-2<br />

-3<br />

-4<br />

-5<br />

-6<br />

Chart 5: Nominal Growth & Policy<br />

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Real GDP (% y/y) + HICP (% y/y)<br />

ECB Refi <strong>Rate</strong> (%)<br />

<strong>BNP</strong>P Forecast<br />

core HICP inflation, real policy rates are negative still<br />

but less dramatically so.<br />

Ken Wattret 20 January 2011<br />

<strong>Market</strong> Mover<br />

20<br />

www.Global<strong>Market</strong>s.bnpparibas.com

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