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Interim Report - TEEB

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legal rights over the lands on which they live and work. This<br />

may become an incentive to “mine” these lands rather than<br />

to manage them sustainably.<br />

Policy failures arise due to incentives encouraging harmful<br />

action. Tax incentives and subsidies can lead to the market<br />

working for the destruction of natural capital, even where<br />

natural assets offer a sustainable flow of services to the<br />

economy and to society. Environmentally harmful subsidies<br />

(EHS, see Chapter 4 on subsidies) discriminate against<br />

sound environmental practices while encouraging other, less<br />

desirable activities. Fisheries are an example of this (see Box<br />

3.2). Such subsidies are often economically inefficient,<br />

prompting growing calls for reform.<br />

Policy failures also arise when the system of incentives fails<br />

to reward those who work to improve the environment, or<br />

fails to penalize those who damage it. Many agricultural<br />

practices can support high-value biodiversity. But without<br />

appropriate recognition, for example through payments<br />

for environmental services (PES), some good practices<br />

risk disappearing.<br />

There are often no mechanisms for winning compensation<br />

from those who damage the environment for those who<br />

have lost as a result. Upstream mining activities do not<br />

generally pay those downstream for the fish they can no<br />

longer eat, or for health impacts. While such failures are still<br />

the norm, there is a shift in some countries. Costa Rica is<br />

the poster child for PES (see Chapter 4, Box 4.3), although<br />

the approach is widely used in developed countries as well<br />

in the form of agri-environment subsidies. Overall, benefit<br />

sharing is becoming a more acceptable concept, and<br />

liability and compensation payments are sometimes offered<br />

at levels that begin to act as real incentives. We elaborate<br />

on these aspects in the following chapter.<br />

Lastly, due to population pressures, poverty and weak<br />

enforcement of protection, development policies sometimes<br />

indirectly result in natural ecosystems being<br />

converted into agricultural or urban landscapes in situations<br />

where, for social and environmental reasons, these are not<br />

the optimal choices. This is an example of policy failure<br />

driven by institutional failure and information failure. Formal<br />

and informal networks and rules are needed to support<br />

responses to policies which effectively manage ecosystem<br />

services. The costs of such institutional frameworks can<br />

be called policy costs and we return to this topic later in<br />

the chapter.<br />

But before we discuss and analyse benefits and costs, we<br />

would like to recognize three important issues – risks,<br />

uncertainty, and the principle of equity – which must be<br />

addressed. Not only do they influence analysis, evaluation<br />

and the design of solutions for the various failures we have<br />

outlined above, but because they are in essence deep<br />

ethical issues, they translate into underlying assumptions<br />

for our analytical framework. We show that selecting an<br />

appropriate discount rate, a vital component of any costbenefit<br />

analysis, is the outcome of implicit or explicit ethical<br />

choices.<br />

ECONOMICS, ETHICS AND EQUITY<br />

“Economics is mere weaponry;<br />

its targets are ethical choices.”<br />

Sanjeev Sanyal, Director, GAISP<br />

Economics has developed techniques to deal with risks,<br />

uncertainty and questions of equity. Discounting is a key<br />

tool in many conventional economic analyses because it<br />

helps to assess the value of cash flows resulting from<br />

decisions taken now. Conventional economic approaches<br />

can also be important in valuating biodiversity, but they<br />

cannot necessarily be applied routinely because of the<br />

potentially extreme consequences of biodiversity decisions.<br />

We outline below the complexities of applying economics<br />

in a field such as biodiversity.<br />

Box 3.2: The effect of subsidies on fisheries<br />

Subsidies are considered to be one of the most<br />

significant drivers of overfishing and thus indirect<br />

drivers of degradation and depletion in marine<br />

biodiversity.<br />

• Subsidies fund fisheries expansion. Globally,<br />

the provision of subsidies to the fisheries<br />

industry has been estimated at up to US$ 20-50<br />

billion annually, the latter roughly equivalent to<br />

the landed value of the catch.<br />

• Over half the subsidies in the North Atlantic have<br />

negative effects through fleet development. This<br />

includes decommissioning subsidies, which<br />

have been shown usually to have the effect of<br />

modernizing fleets, thereby bringing about an<br />

increase in their catching powers.<br />

• While fishing vessel populations stabilized in the<br />

late 1990s, cheap fuel subsidies keep fleets<br />

operating even when fish are scarce.<br />

• The Common Fisheries Policy of the European<br />

Community, for example, allows for vessels to<br />

be decommissioned to reduce effort in some<br />

countries while simultaneously subsidizing<br />

others to increase their fishing capacity.<br />

Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005a: Chapter 18<br />

28 The economics of ecosystems and biodiversity

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