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On the Design of Flight-Deck Procedures - Intelligent Systems ...

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6. ISSUES IN PROCEDURE DESIGN6.1 COMPATIBILITY OF PROCEDURESPhilosophies, policies, and procedures must not be developed and designed without consideration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>operational environment in which <strong>the</strong>y will be used. Commercial aviation procedures, in this regard, arecomplex because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ever-changing environment (wea<strong>the</strong>r, o<strong>the</strong>r traffic in vicinity, airport limitations,etc.). In addition, <strong>the</strong> necessity to coordinate so many different agents and entities, which are allinvolved in dispatching and maintaining control over <strong>the</strong> aircraft during flight, requires compatibility with<strong>the</strong> operational environment. When elements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> system, in this case <strong>the</strong> procedures, tasks, devices,equipment, are compatible, <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> conducting <strong>the</strong> task is more efficient -- <strong>the</strong> pilots have to exertless mental and physical effort. We define compatibility here as <strong>the</strong> orderly and efficient integration witho<strong>the</strong>r elements in <strong>the</strong> system. We will now attempt to describe <strong>the</strong> basic structure <strong>of</strong> airline operationsthat may cause an incompatibility <strong>of</strong> procedures.6.1.1 Environment and <strong>Procedures</strong>Many cockpit procedures are dependent on <strong>the</strong> activities <strong>of</strong> external agents such as flight attendants, gateagents, fuelers, and o<strong>the</strong>rs. When designing a procedure, <strong>the</strong> influence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se entities on proceduredesign, implementation, and task completion must be considered (Degani and Wiener, 1990).For example, one company's SOP requires a check <strong>of</strong> log books for open maintenance items prior toactivating any controls or switches in <strong>the</strong> aircraft. The logic is that this check will prevent a flight crewmember from activating a system that may be inoperative, <strong>the</strong>reby causing more damage (e.g.,attempting to start an inoperative APU). At most stations, <strong>the</strong> aircraft log books are in <strong>the</strong> cockpit when<strong>the</strong> flight crews come on board. However, at some remote stations, due to maintenance procedures <strong>the</strong>log book is brought to <strong>the</strong> aircraft five minutes before push-back. Therefore <strong>the</strong> procedure cannot beaccomplished in those remote stations. A change in <strong>the</strong> procedure, so that this information can beobtained from ano<strong>the</strong>r source, or a change in maintenance procedure is required to defeat thisincompatibility.Let us examine ano<strong>the</strong>r example. <strong>On</strong>e company was considering a change in <strong>the</strong>ir SOP so that flapsextension would be performed as soon as <strong>the</strong> aircraft leaves <strong>the</strong> gate. Pilots raised <strong>the</strong> concern <strong>of</strong> hittinga truck or o<strong>the</strong>r obstacles under <strong>the</strong> wing (as <strong>the</strong> crew cannot see <strong>the</strong> wing from <strong>the</strong> cockpit). Although<strong>the</strong> ground crew's salute is an indication that all is clear, <strong>the</strong>re was still a concern that this gesture is notdependable. The argument was made that when a widebody leaves <strong>the</strong> gate, <strong>the</strong>re are many groundpersonnel around <strong>the</strong> aircraft. When a salute is given, <strong>the</strong> flight crew is assured that <strong>the</strong> area below <strong>the</strong>wing is clean. In contrast, when a medium size twin-jet is departing from a remote station, where <strong>the</strong>company has only a part-time ground crew who may be less experienced, flight crews are less certainthat a salute is truly an indication that all is clear. In one incident, a cargo cart reached <strong>the</strong> aircraft after<strong>the</strong> salute, and <strong>the</strong> ground crew opened a cargo door. The only way <strong>the</strong> cockpit was aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>intrusion was that <strong>the</strong> cargo bay light illuminated on <strong>the</strong> panel.These are two examples <strong>of</strong> what we call “system procedures.” The system in <strong>the</strong>se cases involves notonly <strong>the</strong> cockpit crew and <strong>the</strong> aircraft, but also ground crew, <strong>the</strong>ir management, and ATC (handling rampcongestion and taxi clearances). Such system procedures must be developed using a systems approach-- developing a common definition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> task and involving all <strong>the</strong> components <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> system in <strong>the</strong>design <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> procedures and policies. If system procedures are designed piecemeal, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> productmay be an inefficient procedure, unbalanced set <strong>of</strong> responsibilities, and complicated dependencies -- allare <strong>the</strong> foundations <strong>of</strong> a potential system breakdown.Compatibility between components in <strong>the</strong> system is not restricted to matching cockpit procedures to <strong>the</strong>operating environment; it can also be <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r way around. For example, we once observed a flight inwhich <strong>the</strong> ground controller cleared <strong>the</strong> aircraft (a narrow body twin-jet) toward a runway intersection.The controller tried to schedule <strong>the</strong> taxi clearances so that <strong>the</strong> approach-end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> runway would beutilized by heavy jets, with smaller jets making intersection take<strong>of</strong>fs. After <strong>the</strong> aircraft taxied to <strong>the</strong>intersection, <strong>the</strong> controller communicated to <strong>the</strong> flight to expect an intersection take<strong>of</strong>f. The crew,however, insisted that <strong>the</strong>y use full runway. The reason: <strong>the</strong> company's policy prohibited <strong>the</strong> flight30

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