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On the Design of Flight-Deck Procedures - Intelligent Systems ...

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coordination <strong>of</strong> tasks between agents. If <strong>the</strong> same SOP, used in different situations, yields asignificantly different outcome, <strong>the</strong>n this should raise a warning flag to <strong>the</strong> procedure designer. Thefollowing example illustrates such ambiguity.The SOP for starting engines <strong>of</strong> a twin-jet for one U.S. carrier is for <strong>the</strong> ground-crewmember to call <strong>the</strong> cockpitand say, “Cleared to start engines.” During line operations, however, most experienced ground-crewmemberswill give this clearance per a specific engine, i.e., “cleared to start No. 1,” or “cleared to start No. 2.” It ispreferred to start <strong>the</strong> No.1 (left engine) first, because <strong>the</strong> bags/cargo are loaded from <strong>the</strong> right side <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> aircraft.Ano<strong>the</strong>r reason for this sequence is that <strong>the</strong> tow-bar pin is extracted from <strong>the</strong> right side. Therefore, it isrecommended not to have <strong>the</strong> right engine operating while <strong>the</strong> ground crew is disconnecting <strong>the</strong> tow bar.In one reported incident a ground-crew trainee called <strong>the</strong> cockpit and told <strong>the</strong> captain “cleared to startengines” (exactly as SOP dictates). What he should have said was “cleared to start No. 1,” as o<strong>the</strong>rground crews were loading bags on <strong>the</strong> right side <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> aircraft. The captain later stated that <strong>the</strong> callout“just did not sound right.” He did not start <strong>the</strong> engine and called <strong>the</strong> ground crewmen to verify if he wascleared to start any engine, or just one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m.The procedure, apparently, led to an ambiguous situation. As our definition <strong>of</strong> procedure in Section2.1.1 stated, <strong>the</strong> outcome <strong>of</strong> a procedure must be a product which is unambiguous to all agents involved.If <strong>the</strong> same procedure can yield significantly different outcomes, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> procedure must be modified orchanged (e.g., “Cleared to start engine number [one, or two]”).Likewise, in spite <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> best efforts <strong>of</strong> standardization departments, flight crews can also make aprocedure or callout ambiguous by taking shortcuts. We observed a captain who, upon being given aheading, altitude, and airspeed to make good while descending for a landing at San Diego, replied toATC, “We'll do it all.” Note that by not repeating <strong>the</strong> information, he short-circuited <strong>the</strong> checkingprocess, denying both ATC and his fellow crew persons <strong>the</strong> opportunity to be sure that he operating oncorrect information.Guideline #15: If <strong>the</strong> same procedure can yield significantly different outcomes, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>procedure must be modified in order to eliminate its embedded ambiguity. In brief, aprocedure should lead to a totally predictable outcome.6.2.4 Resources and DemandsIf <strong>the</strong> procedure places an unrealistic demand on <strong>the</strong> crew, <strong>the</strong>n some pilots will very quickly developcreative “tricks” to bypass <strong>the</strong>se procedural restrictions. These creative “tricks” may be even moredangerous than <strong>the</strong> situation which <strong>the</strong> procedure attempted to regulate. For example, ACARS pushback time is sensed automatically when <strong>the</strong> captain releases <strong>the</strong> brakes. This information is <strong>the</strong>n used todetermine on-time performance. To bypass this, some crews have developed a technique in which <strong>the</strong>yrelease <strong>the</strong> brakes and <strong>the</strong>n set <strong>the</strong>m again before <strong>the</strong>y are ready to go, so that <strong>the</strong> push back signal willenter into <strong>the</strong> ACARS. Besides <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> crew is deliberately falsifying data, if this practice is notwell coordinated with <strong>the</strong> ground crew, it can result in an injury.In summary, all <strong>the</strong> above design issues cannot be extracted from <strong>the</strong> system by management only. Theawareness and cooperation <strong>of</strong> flight crews is required in order to point to an existing problem. A formalfeedback loop, such as previously advocated in Section 3.2.4, should be in place to obtain, collect,analyze, and rectify problems encountered on <strong>the</strong> line.6.3 CALLOUTSCallouts are aids in maintaining awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> crew as to <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> given tasks. They areextremely important in aiding situational awareness <strong>of</strong> a dynamic task, such as flight-path changes,engine starts, etc. There are several advantages and disadvantages to this form <strong>of</strong> status reporting. Itallows <strong>the</strong> controlling entity to have full information on <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> each system component. Likewise,each component in <strong>the</strong> system also knows <strong>the</strong> state <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r components. This, however, is purchased ata price -- constant chatter. But even repetitious chatter is not always a disadvantage, as <strong>the</strong> experiencedhuman operator may detect departure from <strong>the</strong> monotonous sing-song as an indication <strong>of</strong> a problemstarting to develop (Rochlin, La Porte, and Roberts. 1987).38

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