On the Design of Flight-Deck Procedures - Intelligent Systems ...

The levels in the Three-P framework are not rigid. For some aspects of flight operations there may beseveral policies, for others there may be only a philosophy. For example, checklist SOP is a matureaspect of flight operation: there can be an overall checklist philosophy, checklist policies for normal,abnormal, and emergency situations. Flight-deck automation is still in an immature stage ofdevelopment. As the operation matures, policies will be defined and added, and philosophies maychange 2 .To illustrate the Three P's, let us assume that the task at hand is the configuration of an advancedtechnology aircraft for a Category-I ILS approach:1. Philosophy: Automation is just another tool to help the pilot.2. Policy: Use or non-use of automatic features (within reason) is at the discretion of the crew.3. Procedure: On a Category-I approach, the flight crew will first decide what level of automationto use (hand-fly with flight director; autopilot and mode control panel; coupled; etc.), whichdetermines what must be done to configure the cockpit.4. Sub-tasks (or actions): Follow from procedures (e.g., tune and identify localizer and compasslocator, set decision height, select autopilot mode, etc.)In some cases, policies that are actually remote from flight operations can affect procedures. Onecarrier's new public relations policy called for more interaction between the cockpit crew and thepassengers. It was recommended that at each destination the captain stand at the cockpit door and makefarewells to the passengers as they departed the cabin. In particular, the marketing department wantedthe pilot to be in place at the cockpit door in time to greet the disembarking first-class passengers. Thisdictated a procedural change in that most of the SECURE-AIRCRAFTchecklist had to be done alone by thefirst officer. Thus checklist procedures which would normally be run by both pilots, probably as achallenge-and-response, were performed by a single pilot in deference to public relations imperatives.To conclude, it is our position that procedures should be based on the operational concepts of theorganization. We hypothesize that if these operational concepts are specified (in writing) as a philosophyand a set of policies, then (1) a logical and consistent set of cockpit procedures that are in accord with thepolicies and philosophy can be generated, (2) discrepancies and conflicting procedures will be easilydetected, and (3) flight crews will be aware of the logic behind every SOP 3 . We also hypothesize that allof the above will lead to a higher degree of conformity to procedures during line operations. In addition,flight training, transition training, and line and FAA checking will be made easier, and the general qualityof flight operations will be enhanced.To design procedures, even in the manner that we have recommended, does not ensure perfectconformity by line crews. In the next chapter we will explore the actual practices as conducted on theline, and the reasons for non-conformity to standard operating procedures. This discussion extends thedevelopment of the model to the fourth "P" - practices. An all- inclusive model, linking the four P's toline operations will be developed, and the role of feedback from line to management will be discussed.2 Rosenbrock (1990), makes a somewhat similar distinction between purpose, policy, and schedule, from a view point ofa control theorist.3 For a practical example detailing the benefits of specifying policies prior to making technical decisions, see Hammondand Adelman (1976).7