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On the Design of Flight-Deck Procedures - Intelligent Systems ...

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solution involves “anchoring” a “man-made” waypoint at an arbitrary distance (100 miles typically) on abearing <strong>of</strong> 347 degrees from FL 11 . 12Guideline #8: The procedures designer must be mindful <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> limitations and capabilities <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> device he or she is designing a procedure for. Devices that are well designed for <strong>the</strong> humanuser require minimal procedurization. Less robust devices will require more thought on <strong>the</strong>part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> designer, and will probably require more complex and lengthy procedures.Electronic checklist displays are highly demanding <strong>of</strong> compatibility between <strong>the</strong> procedure and display.The first generation <strong>of</strong> electronic checklists is currently installed in three air transport aircraft (A-310, A-320, and MD-11). With respect to procedural modifications, <strong>the</strong>se systems are inflexible because <strong>the</strong>customer cannot easily modify <strong>the</strong> items which will appear on <strong>the</strong> electronic checklist display, or even<strong>the</strong>ir order <strong>of</strong> appearance. For example, one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> procedures in <strong>the</strong> electrical checklist system is quitecumbersome when performed at a low altitude. To combat this, one airline devised a procedure called<strong>the</strong> “mini checklist.”If engine failure occurs at low altitude and landing is imminent, <strong>the</strong> ECAM procedure, if sequentially followed,results in turning <strong>of</strong>f various equipment, reactivating <strong>the</strong> hydraulic system, and <strong>the</strong>n turning ON much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>same equipment that was just turned OFF. To preclude this, and streamline <strong>the</strong> procedure, a good technique isto turn ON <strong>the</strong> green electronic pumps and <strong>the</strong> appropriate PTU shortly after engine failure in order to reactivate<strong>the</strong> affected hydraulic system and eliminate much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ECAM procedure. It is also a good technique to start<strong>the</strong> APU to provide electrical backup. Commonly used terminology is to call for <strong>the</strong> “mini-checklist” whichconsists only <strong>of</strong> restoring <strong>the</strong> hydraulic system and starting <strong>the</strong> APU as noted above. (If an engine fails duringtake<strong>of</strong>f, do not call for <strong>the</strong> “mini-checklist” until after calling for flaps up).The mini-checklist is a paper checklist which is kept in <strong>the</strong> cockpit. It lists several items for restoring <strong>the</strong>hydraulic system and starting <strong>the</strong> APU. The “mini-checklist,” <strong>the</strong>refore, is a form <strong>of</strong> adaptation inhuman-machine systems. A task is “tailored,” or modified, by <strong>the</strong> human operator to accommodate aconstraints imposed by inflexible devices (Woods and Cook, 1991). This adaptation is required because<strong>the</strong> modified procedure cannot be supported by <strong>the</strong> existing electronic checklist. The consequences <strong>of</strong>such inflexibility are that <strong>the</strong> pilot is required to conduct a procedure (mini checklist) on top <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>rprocedure (ECAM), in order to execute <strong>the</strong> task. Note that both procedures discussed are performed in ahighly critical and workload-intensive situation -- restoring an essential system after an engine failure atlow altitude.6.1.4 Aircraft <strong>Systems</strong> and <strong>Procedures</strong>A procedure that details how to operate a particular sub-system must be compatible (or correct) in terms<strong>of</strong> its procedural steps, actions, and flow. The following examples will show how much <strong>the</strong> proceduraldesigner must be attuned to <strong>the</strong> engineering aspect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> device (or sub-system). <strong>On</strong>e company’s splitflapprocedure had to be re-written when it was found to be wrong. The problem was traced to <strong>the</strong> factthat system components that were powered by <strong>the</strong> standby power unit were different from <strong>the</strong> standardconfiguration for this model aircraft. The airline apparently did not keep a good record <strong>of</strong> its ownelectrical system specifications. Such problems, however, are not unique only to airlines. During SpaceShuttle Mission 49, <strong>the</strong> crew <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orbiter Endeavor tried to deploy a rescued satellite (Intelsat). Theprimary and backup deployment circuits would not send power to <strong>the</strong> cradle holding <strong>the</strong> satellite.“Investigation showed that <strong>the</strong> checklists used in Mission Control and on Endeavor were identical tothose on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r three NASA orbiters. But <strong>the</strong> problem occurred when circuitry for Endeavor's wiringwas engineered differently and <strong>the</strong> checklists were not changed to conform with <strong>the</strong> new orbiter'sdesign.” The problem was finally overcome with <strong>the</strong> help <strong>of</strong> engineers in Ground Control (AviationWeek and Space Technology , 1992a, p.79).Likewise, <strong>the</strong>re may be wide differences in aircraft configurations within a given fleet. This sets <strong>the</strong>stage for <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> using an inappropriate procedure in some models. This is particularly true if11 <strong>On</strong>e captain that we interviewed remarked that <strong>the</strong> 757 (and o<strong>the</strong>r glass aircraft equally so) is “a good 'to' airplane, but apoor 'from' airplane.”12 A similar incompatibility that requires a cumbersome procedure is <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> intercepting a jet airway in a 757/767FMS. The procedure requires some 6 steps and two mode changes.32

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