On the Design of Flight-Deck Procedures - Intelligent Systems ...

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esponse. The PF, therefore, can concentrate on the climb-out and not be bothered with theAFTER TAKEOFF checklist.4. Eliminating secondary tasks. There are two methods to achieve this. One is by “assigning”the task to a machine. For example, in an earlier Section (6.3) we discussed one company’sconcern about PNF being occupied by making radio altimeter callouts and not monitoring thelanding. The solution, currently under implementation, is to use a feature of the GPWS that willsound these calls automatically.Another method is to eliminate the task completely. For example, some airlines have a sterile-cockpit lightswitch to indicate this state to the cabin crew members. Pilots would switch it “on” or “off” crossing10,000 feet. Other carriers do not have such a light, thereby eliminating this task and the associatedprocedures.7.4 IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURESOne should not assume that management's duties are over once a procedure is designed and implemented.The practices of the users and the outcome of the procedure are also within the responsibility ofmanagement.A common complaint of many flight crews is that procedures are being changed in a rate far greater thanwould seem required by such external factors such as new FAR or ATC procedures, new equipment, etc.Many believe that flight managers sometimes change procedures for the sake of making a politicalstatement or to justify a project that they are responsible for. The situation can be alleviated bymanagement seeking to minimize non-essential procedure and checklist changes, and by, whereverpossible, explaining the reasons for the changes. Some of the counter-measures that management can takein attempting to avoid minimize non-essential procedural changes are listed below.Guideline #19: Frequent procedure and checklist changes lead flight crews to conclude that thesystem is unstable. This may diminish the importance they attribute to new and modifiedprocedure. Therefore, management should minimize frequent procedures or checklist changes. Itis probably better to bunch them together and make larger, less frequent “bundles” of changes ifthe items are not time-critical.7.4.1 ExperimentationWe recommend that important flight-deck procedures should be validated experimentally by testing themagainst the behavior of line pilots, and not the judgment of others. The experimentation should take placein the appropriate flight simulator using a true sample of the target population, i.e., line pilots, as opposedto management pilots. The dependent variables such as flow, time, correctness, subjective ratings,workload ratings, etc., should be analyzed to determine the optimum results. Evaluation in a full missionsimulation environment, although expensive and time-consuming, can go a long way towarddemonstrating potential “pitfalls” of procedures under evaluation (Mosier, Palmer, and Degani, 1992). Asimulator test will uncover possible problems that would not be apparent to persons writing proceduresand checklists “around the table.”As stated in Section 6.2.3, the outcome of a procedure should always be the same, i.e., independent of theconstraints in the operational environment. To achieve this, procedures must be tested throughout thepossible constraints, or scenarios, prior to implementation. This will reduce the likelihood ofmodifications to the procedure down the road. A proper procedure must work well in any ATCenvironment, under any reasonable workload level, weather, terrain, or geographical location. Particularscrutiny should be applied to trans-oceanic operating procedures, due to their special sensitivity to error.7.4.2 Documenting ProceduresIt is extremely important that the operational logic that leads to the construct of a procedure be documentedand maintained. Documentation is essential in order to provide for the efficient and cost effective48
development, modifications, and maintenance, as well as for understanding the concepts behind acomplicated set of procedures (Sheppard, 1987).While observing several procedure-design sessions, we noted that flight management personnel who wereresponsible for designing procedure could not recall the operational logic and the constraints that promptedan existing procedural sequence. This is understandable, specially in light of constant change in personalin flight management departments. However, the result is inefficiency -- much time is spent in trying torecall or understand the logic and constraints that led to the construct of the procedure. Critical constraintsmay be forgotten, and what is even worse, constraints that may no longer exist, are being “carried along.”Such documentation can be tied into the “Four-P” model, showing the logical links between theprocedures, policies, and philosophies. They can be also extremely helpful when questions arise whileflight crews learn new procedures during transition training.Guideline #20: The SOP documentation should not only explain the mechanics of theprocedure, but also state the logic behind it. A detailed account of the operational logic, systemconstraints, and the link to the “Four-P” model should be part of the documentation.7.4.3 “Selling” ProceduresOnce the decision to change a procedure is approved by flight management and the FAA’s principaloperations inspector, the change must be communicated to the line pilots. This may seem the most trivialpart of procedure modification -- but it is not. Pilots will usually, in some form or another, resistchanges in procedures, particularly the ones that may seem as “change for the sake of change.”Management must be able to persuade itself and the line pilots that the procedure change is trulynecessary and beneficial. Flight crews, therefore, have to know the why behind a procedure change andnot just what and how. The “Four-P” model could be used in this regard, as the logical progressionfrom philosophies, policies, to procedures can be shown.Flight management can be creative in making this “sell.” For example, one airline sent a video tape to allpilots in the fleet, explaining and presenting the new upcoming changes. If procedure changes are justsent out as a revision to the manual and not properly communicated, then the likelihood of properimplementation is low.7.5 IMPLEMENTING STANDARDIZATIONPerrow (1986) contrasts the complex human-machine systems of nuclear power plants with aircraftoperations: “In the aircraft and the ATC system, we let more of the operating environment in -- itcomplicates the situation” (p. 229). This factor, the complexity associated with the interaction with theever changing operational environment, is critical in any attempt at standardization. If one could bettercontrol the environment, then a greater level standardization could be achieved (Landau and Stout,1979). Unfortunately, that is almost impossible.When a company is relatively small, standardization is sometimes achieved by default 18 . Pilotstraditionally had a clear career path, i.e., they transition through the different seats in a consistentsequential manner. Nevertheless, in today’s mega-carriers, this clear career path does not exist becauseof the sheer size of the organization, the number of bases, and the variety of aircraft in a company's fleet.This is why standardization has become such an important issue. There are several components to theefficient standardization of procedures, which we shall now discuss.18 Note that we have used the term "standardization" in two ways in this report. In the sense of the present discussion, itrefers to commonalty of cockpit hardware and procedures within and across fleets. In previous discussions (see Section3.2.3), the term referred to management's function in quality control of pilot performance in adherence to procedures andregulations. In the first sense, it is hardware and supporting documentation and devices that are standardized, in the second itis the crew members' behavior.49
Page 2 and 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSSUMMARY ..........
Page 4 and 5: 1. INTRODUCTIONWhen we try to pick
Page 6 and 7: Hendrick (1987) states that human f
Page 8 and 9: influenced by the individual philos
Page 10 and 11: 3. THE FOURTH P: PRACTICES3.1. AN E
Page 12 and 13: To summarize, the ultimate factor t
Page 14 and 15: Humor. Humor is closely related to
Page 16 and 17: technical deficiencies, induce work
Page 18 and 19: operations and the philosophy of th
Page 20 and 21: 5.3 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONSMergers
Page 22 and 23: Figure 7. A Boeing B-757 checklist
Page 24 and 25: e made. Consider, also, the followi
Page 26 and 27: flight operations, the philosophy m
Page 28 and 29: 5.7.3 Technique and PoliciesAny giv
Page 30 and 31: For example, one company constantly
Page 32 and 33: 6. ISSUES IN PROCEDURE DESIGN6.1 CO
Page 34 and 35: solution involves “anchoring” a
Page 36 and 37: On August 19, 1980, a Saudi Arabian
Page 38 and 39: 3. The procedures allow the other a
Page 40 and 41: coordination of tasks between agent
Page 42 and 43: Similarly, it has been a common pra
Page 44 and 45: 7.1.3 Structure of ProceduresAs men
Page 46 and 47: mission simulation (see Wiener et a
Page 48 and 49: felt that this is an efficient tech
Page 52 and 53: 7.5.1 Cross-fleet StandardizationCr
Page 54 and 55: 1. Training department (for both pi
Page 56 and 57: REFERENCESAviation Week and Space T
Page 58 and 59: Perrow, C. (1986). Complex organiza
Page 60 and 61: APPENDICESAppendix 1 - Guidelines f
Page 62 and 63: 14. In managing automated cockpits,
Page 64 and 65: APPENDIX 3 - QUESTIONS ASKED OF FLI
Page 66 and 67: APPENDIX 5 - QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
Page 68 and 69: 8. Change in operational environmen

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