14. In managing automated cockpits, briefing becomes an critical crew coordination tool -- not so muchto reduce variance, but ra<strong>the</strong>r to reduce <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> ambiguity <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r agents (e.g., PNF or F/O) byincreasing expectations. The more one allows for technique, <strong>the</strong> more one has to stress briefing.(Section 6.2.2)15. If <strong>the</strong> same procedure can yield significantly different outcomes, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> procedure must bemodified in order to eliminate its embedded ambiguity. In brief, a procedure should lead to a totallypredictable outcome. (Section 6.2.3)16. Particular attention should be paid in order to safeguard information transfer during critical and highworkload phases <strong>of</strong> flight. Callouts should be economical, unambiguous, and should convey only<strong>the</strong> information needed by <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r crew member(s). They should not distract <strong>the</strong> crew memberfrom his primary task(s). Finally, we urge frequent review <strong>of</strong> callout procedures: as o<strong>the</strong>rprocedures change, callouts should be reexamined. (Section 6.3)17. Procedure designers should always bear in mind <strong>the</strong> contribution which any procedure makes to totalworkload <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> crew at any given time. They should be especially sensitive to procedures that mayrequire crew attention in times <strong>of</strong> high workload, and should strive to “manage” workload by movingtasks that are not time-critical to periods <strong>of</strong> low workload. (Section 7.2.3)18. The designer <strong>of</strong> flight-deck documentation should search for situations where procedures are tightlycoupled, and exploit <strong>the</strong> opportunity to decouple <strong>the</strong>m. (Section 7.3)19. Frequent procedure and checklist changes lead flight crews to conclude that <strong>the</strong> system is unstable.This may diminish <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>the</strong>y attribute to new and modified procedure. Therefore,management should minimize frequent procedures or checklist changes. It is probably better tobunch <strong>the</strong>m toge<strong>the</strong>r and make larger, less frequent “bundles” <strong>of</strong> changes if <strong>the</strong> items are not timecritical.(Section 7.4)20. The SOP documentation should not only explain <strong>the</strong> mechanics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> procedure, but also state <strong>the</strong>logic behind it. A detailed account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> operational logic, system constraints, and <strong>the</strong> link to <strong>the</strong>“Four-P” model should be part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> documentation. (Section 7.4.2)21. While benefits <strong>of</strong> cross fleet standardization are quite obvious, <strong>the</strong>re are certain situations where thistype <strong>of</strong> standardization is just inappropriate. It may lead to sub-optimal procedures bysuperimposing procedures that are suitable for one type <strong>of</strong> cockpit operation on ano<strong>the</strong>r. (Section7.5.1)22. We recommend a three-way approach for a cross-fleet standardization. (1) Development <strong>of</strong> a crossfleetphilosophy, (2) creating a cross-fleet standardization forum, and (3) obtaining input forprocedural design from personnel that design, certify, teach, use, and check procedures. (Section7.5.1)23. The flow <strong>of</strong> any procedure through design, training, checking, implementation, and finally feedback,must be supported by <strong>the</strong> organizational structure. When a new procedure, or a modified procedureis established, it should be closely monitored (by standardization and check airmen, and LOFTinstructors) for compliance. (Section 7.5.4)60
APPENDIX 2 - DELTA AIR LINES AUTOMATION PHILOSOPHYThe word “Automation,” where it appears in this statement, shall mean <strong>the</strong> replacement <strong>of</strong> humanfunction, ei<strong>the</strong>r manual or cognitive, with a machine function. This definition applies to all levels <strong>of</strong>automation in all airplanes flown by this airline. The purpose <strong>of</strong> automation is to aid <strong>the</strong> pilot is doinghis or her job.The pilot is <strong>the</strong> most complex, capable and flexible component <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> air transport system, and as such isbest suited to determine <strong>the</strong> optimal use <strong>of</strong> resources in any given situation.Pilots must be pr<strong>of</strong>icient in operating <strong>the</strong>ir airplanes in all levels <strong>of</strong> automation. They must beknowledgeable in <strong>the</strong> selection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> appropriate degree <strong>of</strong> automation, and must have <strong>the</strong> skills neededto move from one level <strong>of</strong> automation to ano<strong>the</strong>r.Automation should be used at <strong>the</strong> level most appropriate to enhance <strong>the</strong> priorities <strong>of</strong> Safety, PassengerComfort, Public Relations, Schedule, and Economy, as stated in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Flight</strong> Operations Policy Manual.In order to achieve <strong>the</strong> above priorities, all Delta Air Lines training programs, training devices,procedures, checklists, aircraft and equipment acquisitions, manuals, quality control programs,standardization, supporting documents, and <strong>the</strong> day-to-day operations <strong>of</strong> Delta aircraft shall be inaccordance with this statement <strong>of</strong> philosophy.(Reprinted from Wiener, Chidester, Kanki, Palmer, Curry, and Gregorich, 1991)61
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TABLE OF CONTENTSSUMMARY ..........
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1. INTRODUCTIONWhen we try to pick
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Hendrick (1987) states that human f
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influenced by the individual philos
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3. THE FOURTH P: PRACTICES3.1. AN E
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- Page 22 and 23: Figure 7. A Boeing B-757 checklist
- Page 24 and 25: e made. Consider, also, the followi
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- Page 30 and 31: For example, one company constantly
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- Page 46 and 47: mission simulation (see Wiener et a
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- Page 54 and 55: 1. Training department (for both pi
- Page 56 and 57: REFERENCESAviation Week and Space T
- Page 58 and 59: Perrow, C. (1986). Complex organiza
- Page 60 and 61: APPENDICESAppendix 1 - Guidelines f
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