International Energy Outlook 2011 - EIA

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U.S. Energy Information Administration | International Energy Outlook 2011 Liquid fuels In contrast, the Low Oil Price and High Oil Price cases in IEO2011 assume that changes in demand growth, resulting in different levels of demand, also affect prices. Thus, the Low Oil Price and High Oil Price cases incorporate alternative assumptions about economic growth and other structural factors in non-OECD countries that shift the “demand schedule” for liquids fuels while also continuing to maintain a portion of the change in “supply schedules” that drive the Traditional High Oil Price and Traditional Low Oil Price cases. The IEO2011 Low Oil Price case assumes that liquids demand in the non-OECD countries (where most of the world’s demand uncertainty lies) at any given price level is lower than in the Reference case, and that total liquids supply available at any price point is higher than in the Reference case. It also assumes that the shifts in demand and supply schedules lead to changes in the liquids quantities, resulting in price levels that are the same as those in the Traditional Low Oil Price case. That is, the only change is in the amount of oil consumed in the world market. Similarly, the IEO2011 High Oil Price case assumes that liquids demand in the non-OECD countries at any given price level is higher than in the Reference case, and that the total liquids supply available at any price point is lower than in the Reference case, with the shifts in demand and supply schedules leading to changes in the quantities of liquids available, so that price levels that are the same as those in the Traditional High Oil Price case. Again, the only change is in the amount of oil consumed in the market. In the Reference case, world oil prices are $95 per barrel in 2015 (real 2009 dollars), increasing slowly to $125 per barrel in 2035 ($200 per day in nominal terms). The Reference case represents EIA’s current best judgment regarding exploration and development costs and accessibility of oil resources outside the United States. It also assumes that OPEC producers will choose to maintain their share of the market and will schedule investments in incremental production capacity so that OPEC’s conventional oil production represents about 42 percent of the world’s total liquids production. To retain that share, OPEC would have to increase production by 11.3 million barrels per day from 2008 to 2035, or 43 percent of the projected total increase in world liquids supply (Figure 32). Non-OPEC conventional supplies—including production from high-cost projects and from countries with unattractive Figure 29. Non-OPEC liquids production by region, 2008 and 2035 (million barrels per day) 200 150 100 50 United States Brazil Russia Canada Other non-OPEC Asia Mexico OECD Europe 0 5 10 15 Figure 31. World oil prices in three cases, 1990-2035 (2009 dollars per barrel) History 2009 Projections High Oil Price Reference 2008 2035 Low Oil Price 0 1990 2000 2009 2015 2025 2035 Figure 30. Unconventional liquids production by fuel type, 2008 and 2035 (million barrels per day) Oil sands/bitumen Biofuels Coal-to-liquids Extra-heavy oil Gas-to-liquids Shale oil 2008 Reference Traditional High Oil Price Low Oil Price High Oil Price Traditional Low Oil Price 2008 2035 0 1 2 3 4 5 Figure 32. World liquid fuels production in five cases, 2008 and 2035 (million barrels per day) Unconventional Non-OPEC conventional OPEC conventional 86 112 107 113 122 131 0 50 100 150 27
Liquid fuels fiscal or political regimes—account for an increase of 7.1 million barrels per day over the projection, and non-OPEC production of unconventional liquid fuels provides the remaining 8.2 million barrels per day of the increase. In the High Oil Price case, world oil prices are about $200 per barrel in 2035 ($320 per barrel in nominal terms), with the higher prices resulting from the combination of an outward shift (greater demand at every price level) in the “demand schedule” for liquid fuels in the non-OECD nations and a downward shift (reduced supply at every price level) in the “supply schedule.” The shift in the demand schedule is driven by higher economic growth relative to the Reference case in the non-OECD region, with non-OECD growth rates raised by 1.0 percentage point relative to the Reference case in each projection year starting with 2015. The downward shift in the supply schedule is a result of the assumption that several non-OPEC producers further restrict access to, or increase taxes on, production from prospective areas, and that the OPEC member countries reduce their production substantially below current levels. High oil prices encourage the expansion of unconventional production relative to the Reference case. In the Traditional High Oil Price case, OPEC countries are assumed to reduce their production from the current rate, sacrificing market share, and oil resources outside the United States are assumed to be less accessible and/or more costly to produce than in the Reference case. As in the High Oil Price case, higher oil prices allow unconventional resources to become more economically attractive, and their production increases above the levels in the Reference case. Oil consumption is lower solely due to the higher prices (which are the same as in the High Oil Price case), reflecting a movement upward and to the left along the demand curve. In the Low Oil Price case, world crude prices are $50 per barrel in 2035 ($82 per barrel in nominal terms), compared with $125 per barrel in the Reference case. The low prices result from the combination of a shift to lower demand at every price level in the demand schedule and a shift to increased supply at every price level in the supply schedule. The shift in demand is driven by lower economic growth in the non-OECD region relative to the Reference case, with non-OECD growth rates lowered by 1.5 percentage points relative to the Reference case in each projection year starting with 2015. The upward shift in the supply schedule in this case results from greater access and more attractive fiscal regimes in prospective non-OECD areas, as well as higher levels of production from OPEC members. However, the lower prices make it uneconomical to expand production of unconventional resources. In the Traditional Low Oil Price case, the OPEC countries increase their conventional oil production to obtain a 52-percent share of total world liquids production, and oil resources are more accessible and/or less costly to produce (as a result of technology advances, more attractive fiscal regimes, or both) than in the Reference case. With these assumptions, conventional oil production is higher in the Traditional Low Oil Price case than in the Reference case, but low prices constraint the expansion of unconventional resources. Oil consumption is higher solely as a result of the lower prices (which are the same as in the Low Oil Price case), reflecting a movement downward and to the right along the demand curve. World liquids consumption World liquids consumption in the IEO2011 Reference case increases from 85.7 million barrels per day in 2008 to 97.6 million barrels per day in 2020 and 112.2 million barrels per day (225 quadrillion Btu) in 2035. World GDP is a key driver of demand, growing by an average 3.6 percent per year from 2008 to 2020 and 3.2 percent per year from 2020 to 2035. Developing non-OECD nations, particularly in Asia and the Middle East, experience strong economic growth in the Reference case, which is accompanied by increasing demand for liquids in the transportation and industrial sectors. Rising prices for liquids increase the cost-competitiveness of other fuels, leading many users of liquids outside the transportation sector to switch to substitute sources of energy when possible. As a result, the transportation share of total liquid fuels consumption increases, accounting for about 80 percent of the overall increase in liquids consumption in all sectors over the projection period (Figure 33). In 2035, the transportation sector consumes 60 percent of total liquids supplied, as compared with 54 percent in 2008. Strong expansion of liquids use is projected for non-OECD countries, fueled by a return to robust economic growth, burgeoning industrial activity, and rapidly expanding transportation use. The largest increase in regional non-OECD consumption from 2008 to 2035 is projected for non-OECD Asia, at 17.3 million barrels per day. Within non-OECD Asia, the largest increases in demand Table 4. World oil prices in four cases, 2009-2035 (2009 dollars per barrel) 28 Year Reference IEO2011 Low Oil Price High Oil Price IEO2010 Reference case 2009 62 62 62 100 2015 95 55 146 95 2020 108 53 169 109 2025 118 51 186 116 2030 123 50 196 125 2035 125 50 200 134 come from China (9.1 million barrels per day) and India (4.6 million barrels per day), with the increase from China being the largest for any single country worldwide. Large consumption increases are also expected in the Middle East (2.9 million barrels per day), followed by Central and South America (2.5 million barrels per day) (Figure 34). Liquids consumption in OECD regions generally grows more slowly over the next 25 years, reflecting slowly growing or declining populations and relatively low economic growth as compared with non-OECD nations. In addition, growth in demand for liquids in many OECD countries is slowed by government policies and legislation aimed at improving the efficiency of personal motor vehicles. This includes increased U.S. Energy Information Administration | International Energy Outlook 2011
Page 2 and 3: Contacts The International Energy O
Page 4 and 5: U.S. Energy Information Administrat
Page 6 and 7: Contents Highlights ...............
Page 8 and 9: Figures (continued) U.S. Energy Inf
Page 10 and 11: Highlights In the IEO2011 Reference
Page 16 and 17: levels of income and fossil fuel us
Page 18 and 19: Chapter 1 World energy demand and e
Page 34 and 35: Chapter 2 Liquid fuels Overview Con
Page 52 and 53: Chapter 3 Natural gas Overview In t
Page 74 and 75: References for natural gas Links cu
Page 78 and 79: Chapter 4 Coal Overview In the IEO2
Page 80 and 81: decline substantially over the proj
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Europe, Middle East, and Africa In
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process could impede or delay those
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References for coal Links current a
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Mechel OAO Commences Construction o
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Chapter 5 Electricity Overview In t
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Chapter 6 Industrial sector energy
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References for industrial sector en
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Chapter 7 Transportation sector ene
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Chapter 8 Energy-related carbon dio
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Table 18. Average annual changes in
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Data Sources Links current as of Ju
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Appendix A Reference case projectio
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Table A1. World total primary energ
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Table A2. World total energy consum
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Table A4. World gross domestic prod
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Table A6. World natural gas consump
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Table A8. World nuclear energy cons
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Table A10. World carbon dioxide emi
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Table A12. World carbon dioxide emi
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Table A14. World population by regi
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Appendix B High Oil Price case proj
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Table B1. World total primary energ
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Table B4. World liquids consumption
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Table B6. World coal consumption by
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Table B8. World consumption of hydr
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Table B12. World carbon dioxide emi
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Appendix C Low Oil Price case proje
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Table C1. World total primary energ
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Table C4. World liquids consumption
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Table C6. World coal consumption by
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Table C8. World consumption of hydr
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Table C12. World carbon dioxide emi
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Appendix D Reference case projectio
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Reference case projections by end-u
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Appendix E Projections of liquid fu
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Projections of liquid fuels and oth
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Table E11. World conventional liqui
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Table E14. World conventional liqui
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Appendix F Reference case projectio
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Reference case projections for elec
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Appendix G Reference case projectio
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Table G1. World total natural gas p
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Table G3. World other natural gas p
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Appendix H Kaya Identity factor pro
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Table H1. World population by regio
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Table H3. World energy intensity by
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Appendix I Comparisons with Interna
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Comparisons with International Ener
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Appendix J Models used to generate
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Appendix K Regional definitions The
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International Energy Outlook 2011 - EIA

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