International Energy Outlook 2011 - EIA

More documents

Recommendations

Info

U.S. Energy Information Administration | International Energy Outlook 2011 Liquid fuels Although some projects are publicized more than 7 to 10 years before their first production, others can come on line within 3 years. For that reason, project-by-project analyses are unlikely to provide a complete representation of company or country production plans and achievable production volumes beyond 3 years into the future. Instead, production decisions made after the mid-term, or 2015, are assumed to be based predominantly on resource availability and the resulting economic viability of production. In view of the residual effects of previous government policies and the unavoidable lag time between changes in policy and any potential production changes, however, most country-level changes in production trends are noticeable only in 2020 and beyond. Geopolitical and other above-ground constraints are not assumed to disappear entirely after 2015, however. Longstanding above-ground factors for which there are no indications of significant future changes—for instance, the government-imposed investment conditions currently in place in Iran, or OPEC adherence to production quotas—are expected to continue affecting world supplies long after 2015. Even if above-ground constraints were relaxed, the expansion of production capacity could be delayed, depending on the technical difficulty and typical development schedules of the projects likely to be developed in a particular country. For some resource-rich countries it is assumed that current political barriers to production increases will not continue after 2015. For instance, both Mexico and Venezuela currently have laws that restrict foreign ownership of hydrocarbon resources. Their resource policies have discouraged investment—both foreign and domestic—and hindered their ability to increase or even maintain historical production levels. In the Reference case, both Mexico and Venezuela ease restrictions at some point after 2015, allowing some additional foreign involvement in their oil sectors that facilitates increases in liquids production, including from deepwater prospects in Mexico and extra-heavy oils in Venezuela’s Orinoco belt. Iraq is another resource-rich country where currently there are significant impediments to investment in the upstream hydrocarbon sector. Liquids production in Iraq dropped substantially after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. From 2002 to 2003 production declined from 2.0 million barrels per day to 1.3 million barrels per day, and since then it has achieved only inconsistent and slow growth. Although Iraq’s production levels are not expected to increase substantially in the near term, it is assumed that political and legal uncertainty eventually will subside, and that renewed investment and development activity will ensue, resulting in significant growth in production from 2015 to 2035. Non-OPEC production The return to sustained high oil prices projected in the IEO2011 Reference case encourages producers in non-OPEC nations to continue investment in conventional liquids production capacity and increase investment in EOR projects and unconventional liquids production. Non-OPEC production increases steadily in the projection, from 50.0 million barrels per day in 2008 to 65.3 million barrels per day in 2035, as high prices attract investment in areas previously considered uneconomical, and fears of supply restrictions encourage some net consuming nations to expand unconventional liquids production from domestic resources, such as coal and crops. Despite the maturity of most non-OPEC producing basins, conventional liquids production in the Reference case increases from 46.8 million barrels per day in 2008 to 53.9 million barrels per day in 2035. The overall increase results primarily from production increases in four countries: Brazil, Russia, Kazakhstan, and the United States (Figure 36). Among non-OPEC producers, the near absence of prospects for new, large conventional petroleum liquids projects, along with declines in production from existing conventional fields, results in heavy investment in the development of smaller fields. Producers are expected to concentrate their efforts on more efficient exploitation of fields already in production, either through the use of more advanced technology Figure 36. Non-OPEC conventional liquids production by region, 2008 and 2035 (million barrels per day) Russia Brazil United States Caspian Region Africa Other Canada Asia Mexico OECD Europe 2008 2035 0 5 10 15 for primary recovery efforts or through EOR. Those efforts are expected to allow most established non-OPEC producers to maintain or slow production declines but not to raise production volumes. In the Reference case, unconventional liquids production from non-OPEC suppliers rises to 6.5 million barrels per day in 2020 and 11.4 million barrels per day in 2035. In both the High Oil Price and Traditional High Oil Price cases, non- OPEC unconventional liquids production rises to about 17.4 million barrels per day in 2035, as significantly higher prices encourage the development of alternative fuel sources to the limits imposed by expected environmental protection measures and industry expansion in general. In contrast, in the Low Oil Price and Traditional Low Oil Price cases, fewer unconventional resources become economically competitive, and non-OPEC production of unconventional liquids rises to only about 7.0 million barrels per day in 2035 in each low price case. 31
Liquid fuels Major areas of decline in non-OPEC liquids production In the IEO2011 Reference case, Mexico and the North Sea are the only non-OPEC production areas that lose more than 1 million barrels of liquids production per day from 2008 to 2035. The most significant decline in non-OPEC liquids production is projected for OECD Europe, with a decrease from 5.1 million barrels per day in 2008 to 3.0 million barrels per day in 2035. Most of the decline is in North Sea production, which includes offshore operations by Norway, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany. Over time, fewer and fewer prospects capable of compensating for declines in existing fields have been discovered. The drop in North Sea liquids production does not vary significantly among the four price cases, both because the projected production is based on depletion of resources and because all the countries currently producing liquids from North Sea operations are expected to continue encouraging investment and providing open access to development. In Mexico, liquids production sinks to approximately 1.4 million barrels per day in 2025 before rebounding slowly to 1.7 million barrels per day in 2035, still 1.5 million barrels per day below the 2008 production volume of 3.2 million barrels per day. The rebound after 2025 depends entirely on the development of potential resources in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico, which must begin some years in advance of any increase in production levels. The outlook for Mexico’s liquids production is markedly different from the IEO projection just 5 years ago, in which production did not fall below 2.9 million barrels per day, and a long-term recovery began in 2013. The difference between the projections is the result of production declines at Cantarell, which have been more severe than expected, as well as diminished expectations for Chicontepec production and more pessimistic assumptions about the level of future investment, both foreign and domestic, in Mexico’s deepwater production. Although the shortage of investment in Mexico is expected to lead to a mid-term decline, Mexico has potential resources to support a long-term recovery in total production, primarily in the Gulf of Mexico. The extent and timing of a recovery will depend in part on the level of economic access granted to foreign investors and operators. Mexico’s national oil company, Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), currently does not have the technical capability or financial means to develop potential deepwater projects in the Gulf of Mexico. Major areas of growth in non-OPEC liquids production The largest increase in non-OPEC total liquids production is expected for Brazil, where total production in 2035 is 4.1 million barrels per day above the 2008 level of 2.4 million barrels per day. Of that increase, 2.9 million barrels per day is attributed to conventional liquids production. The strong growth in Brazil’s conventional production results in part from short- and mid-term increases at producing fields for which expansions currently are either planned or in progress. In addition, recent and expected discoveries in the Campos and Santos basins, including the massive Tupi and related Guara and Iara discoveries, both add to production in the mid- and long term and suggest the presence of other large fields in the same formation [47]. The vast size of the sub-salt potential in Brazil, as well as national economic strategy and industrialization goals, has led Brazil to pursue new petroleum legislation [48]. The legislative change most pertinent to production potential is the requirement that the state oil company, Petrobras, be the sole operator and a minimum 30-percent equity holder for all sub-salt fields. Although Petrobras has repeatedly proven itself a leader in deepwater development and is known to have the technical capabilities to develop sub-salt prospects, it is not expected to have the resources (financial, labor, etc.) to develop its domestic plays completely on its own. The different IEO2011 price cases assume different investment terms offered by Brazil to foreign investors and hence different rates of sub-salt development. Although both the High Oil Price case and the Traditional High Oil Price case assume more restrictive terms of access to Brazil’s conventional resources, the increase in world liquids demand in the High Oil Price cases supports a production level of 5.3 million barrels per day in 2035, compared with 5.0 million barrels per day in the Traditional High Oil Price case. In contrast, both the Low Oil Price and Traditional Low Oil Price cases assume open terms of access to Brazil’s conventional resources, resulting in production increases averaging 3.4 percent per year and conventional production of 5.1 million barrels per day in 2035 in the Low Oil Price case (as a result of lower world liquids demand) and 5.6 million barrels per day in 2035 in the Traditional Low Oil Price case. In addition to the growth in conventional liquids production, Brazil’s biofuel production also increases, from 0.5 million barrels per day in 2008 to 1.7 million barrels per day in 2035 in the Reference case. The growth is a result of steadily increasing yields and expansion of crop production, with most of the increase consisting of ethanol. Brazil’s major ethanol production is derived from sugar cane, currently the highest yielding and least expensive feedstock for ethanol. Brazil also has a large amount of land available for sugar cane production, in the form of previously cleared and currently underutilized pasture land. The country’s domestic consumption is not expected to rise as fast as its expansion of ethanol production, making Brazil a net ethanol exporter over the course of the projection. Thus, its production depends largely on other countries’ policies and demand for ethanol. In the High Oil Price case, Brazil’s ethanol production totals 1.9 million barrels per day in 2035, reflecting higher demand for ethanol both at home and abroad. In the Low Oil Price case, which assumes reduced domestic and international demand for ethanol, Brazil’s ethanol production totals 1.1 million barrels per day in 2035. Even in the Low Oil Price case, however, there is only a small drop in Brazil’s domestic ethanol consumption, because of the country’s mandatory minimum E25 blend and the fact that ethanol makes up nearly 50 percent of the country’s domestic gasoline market [49]. 32 U.S. Energy Information Administration | International Energy Outlook 2011
Page 2 and 3: Contacts The International Energy O
Page 4 and 5: U.S. Energy Information Administrat
Page 6 and 7: Contents Highlights ...............
Page 8 and 9: Figures (continued) U.S. Energy Inf
Page 10 and 11: Highlights In the IEO2011 Reference
Page 16 and 17: levels of income and fossil fuel us
Page 18 and 19: Chapter 1 World energy demand and e
Page 34 and 35: Chapter 2 Liquid fuels Overview Con
Page 52 and 53: Chapter 3 Natural gas Overview In t
Page 74 and 75: References for natural gas Links cu
Page 78 and 79: Chapter 4 Coal Overview In the IEO2
Page 80 and 81: decline substantially over the proj
Page 82 and 83: demand for steel in both domestic a
Page 84 and 85: Table 9. World coal flows by import
Page 86 and 87: Europe, Middle East, and Africa In
Page 88 and 89: process could impede or delay those
Page 90 and 91:
References for coal Links current a
Page 92 and 93:
Mechel OAO Commences Construction o
Page 94 and 95:
Chapter 5 Electricity Overview In t
Page 96 and 97:
U.S. Energy Information Administrat
Page 98 and 99:
Page 100 and 101:
Page 102 and 103:
Page 104 and 105:
Page 106 and 107:
Page 108 and 109:
Page 110 and 111:
Page 112 and 113:
Page 114 and 115:
Page 116 and 117:
Chapter 6 Industrial sector energy
Page 118 and 119:
Page 120 and 121:
Page 122 and 123:
Page 124 and 125:
Page 126 and 127:
References for industrial sector en
Page 128 and 129:
Chapter 7 Transportation sector ene
Page 130 and 131:
Page 132 and 133:
Page 134 and 135:
Page 136 and 137:
Page 138 and 139:
Page 140 and 141:
Page 142 and 143:
Page 144 and 145:
Page 146 and 147:
Page 148 and 149:
Chapter 8 Energy-related carbon dio
Page 150 and 151:
Page 152 and 153:
Page 154 and 155:
Table 18. Average annual changes in
Page 156 and 157:
Data Sources Links current as of Ju
Page 158 and 159:
Page 160 and 161:
Page 162 and 163:
Page 164 and 165:
Appendix A Reference case projectio
Page 166 and 167:
Table A1. World total primary energ
Page 168 and 169:
Table A2. World total energy consum
Page 170 and 171:
Table A4. World gross domestic prod
Page 172 and 173:
Table A6. World natural gas consump
Page 174 and 175:
Table A8. World nuclear energy cons
Page 176 and 177:
Table A10. World carbon dioxide emi
Page 178 and 179:
Table A12. World carbon dioxide emi
Page 180 and 181:
Table A14. World population by regi
Page 182 and 183:
Appendix B High Oil Price case proj
Page 184 and 185:
Table B1. World total primary energ
Page 186 and 187:
Page 188 and 189:
Table B4. World liquids consumption
Page 190 and 191:
Table B6. World coal consumption by
Page 192 and 193:
Table B8. World consumption of hydr
Page 194 and 195:
Page 196 and 197:
Table B12. World carbon dioxide emi
Page 198 and 199:
Appendix C Low Oil Price case proje
Page 200 and 201:
Table C1. World total primary energ
Page 202 and 203:
Page 204 and 205:
Table C4. World liquids consumption
Page 206 and 207:
Table C6. World coal consumption by
Page 208 and 209:
Table C8. World consumption of hydr
Page 210 and 211:
Page 212 and 213:
Table C12. World carbon dioxide emi
Page 214 and 215:
Appendix D Reference case projectio
Page 216 and 217:
Reference case projections by end-u
Page 218 and 219:
Page 220 and 221:
Page 222 and 223:
Page 224 and 225:
Page 226 and 227:
Page 228 and 229:
Page 230 and 231:
Page 232 and 233:
Page 234 and 235:
Page 236 and 237:
Appendix E Projections of liquid fu
Page 238 and 239:
Projections of liquid fuels and oth
Page 240 and 241:
Page 242 and 243:
Page 244 and 245:
Page 246 and 247:
Page 248 and 249:
Page 250 and 251:
Page 252 and 253:
Table E11. World conventional liqui
Page 254 and 255:
Page 256 and 257:
Table E14. World conventional liqui
Page 258 and 259:
Appendix F Reference case projectio
Page 260 and 261:
Reference case projections for elec
Page 262 and 263:
Page 264 and 265:
Page 266 and 267:
Page 268 and 269:
Page 270 and 271:
Page 272 and 273:
Page 274 and 275:
Page 276 and 277:
Page 278 and 279:
Page 280 and 281:
Page 282 and 283:
Appendix G Reference case projectio
Page 284 and 285:
Table G1. World total natural gas p
Page 286 and 287:
Table G3. World other natural gas p
Page 288 and 289:
Appendix H Kaya Identity factor pro
Page 290 and 291:
Table H1. World population by regio
Page 292 and 293:
Table H3. World energy intensity by
Page 294 and 295:
Appendix I Comparisons with Interna
Page 296 and 297:
Comparisons with International Ener
Page 298 and 299:
Appendix J Models used to generate
Page 300 and 301:
Appendix K Regional definitions The
show all

International Energy Outlook 2011 - EIA

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?