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184 The LSE Identity Project <strong>Report</strong>: June 2005disabled participant group also indicated more concern prior to the trial, in particular ofthe iris biometric. 458 Though the concern fell after the enrolment, these same groupscontinued to show the greatest levels of concern.The polling on the results also showed dramatic differences in opinion between groups.When asked whether biometrics are an infringement of civil liberties, 55% within theBME subgroup tended to agree or agreed strongly, as did 53% of those designated as‘other religion’, and 42% within the 18-34 subgroup.Concluding Remarks on the TrialIn summary, this trial was a wasted opportunity to perform what the NPL reports hadcalled for: a wide-scale trial of the technology. The performance of biometrics from thistrial, however, was very disappointing. This reduces the likelihood for the potentialmass deployment of biometrics for a national identity scheme. Any scheme deployed ona large scale would have to have very small error rate. This is what the Home AffairsCommittee was told by numerous vendors and specialists.The results from this trial show that the enrolment of the biometrics was non-trivial.After a number of attempts, though, only 862,000 individuals would be likely to beexcluded entirely from the systems. That is, 862,000 disabled citizens would not be ableto participate in the scheme. The results on verification show that the average citizen islikely to encounter a number of rejections while using the system. Even for supposedlyperfect technologies such as iris scans, the failure to verify was still very high.Yet the Government has already hailed the results of this trial as evidence that thetechnology is fine. Home Office Minister Tony McNulty announced that, based on theUKPS trial:He continued,“Once we get onto the procurement process and delivery neither thegovernment nor the IT sector will be found wanting.” 459“I’m confident of the robustness of the technology within the timescales we are talking about. We are not starting from a zeroknowledge base. (…) The UKPS trial did teach us things that will befiltered into the process. I would be confident that the technology is inplace as and when we need it.” 460The UKPS trial report claims that the use of multiple biometrics would be ideal becauseof the problems with each specific biometric. But the NPL/BTexact study had alreadyshown that such a scheme would be overly complex and costly, unlikely to be worth theeffort and resources required. Implementing such a system involving these biometricslike this across the United Kingdom for use by 50 million individuals could bring thecountry to a stand-still. At best, it will be a tremendous waste of resources.458 Ibid., p.119459 ‘ID Cards on Trial: Minister defends "robust" biometrics’, Andy McCue, Silicon.com, June 7, 2005.460 ‘Minister says ID technology is robust’, Kable’s Government Computing, June 6, 2005, available athttp://www.kablenet.com/kd.nsf/Frontpage/9D2499D2C05F6E2A80257018004BBEF8?OpenDocument.
The LSE Identity Project <strong>Report</strong>: June 2005 185Conclusions: Remarks on the Perfectibility of TechnologyIt is important not to perceive technology as a panacea for social troubles. It is alsoimportant to understand that there is no perfectibility of technology: technology can beimproved, but the notion of achieving perfection is at best misguided, at worstdangerous. Technology may be scientific, but once outside of the laboratory, it involvesengineering. A great deal of engineering is about making the best decisions with theavailable limitations. It is thus important to remember that we are still able to, and must,make decisions about what are the appropriate technologies to implement.We conclude this section with a statement from one of the world’s leading experts ontechnology and privacy, the Italian Privacy Commissioner, Stefano Rodota. In a speechin which he warns against ‘technological anasthesia’, he argues that:“The public is overrating biometrics by thinking that technologicaldevelopment will go hand in hand with hi-tech protection againstterrorism. [He concedes that a rejection of biometrics] “would beunthinkable, as in many cases it can help to make people’s liveseasier. What should be avoided is encouraging unjustified use of thiskind of technology, which should only be used when a person needs tobe identified at all cost. Furthermore, we need to ensure that allpersonal data be dealt with accurately and not made public. We alsoneed to enforce all rules aiming at safeguarding personal privacy.Research has proven that the advantage of having centralizeddatabases is questionable, as these are difficult to manage. And if acriminal organization manages to access them, they turn from safetytools into potentially criminal tools. Therefore evaluations must bemade on the basis of each single case. The value of democracy mustbe a priority. We cannot afford to resort to controlling citizens astotalitarian regimes did. In the end, they lost their battle againstdemocracy.” 461Technology can not be perfected so expectations must be kept in check. Theseexpectations should then inform future decisions. Nothing about technology isinevitable, and this is a fact that merely empowers us to make decisions.It is not just so simple as to say that the technology will one day improve. The factorsthat go into this consideration are numerous and complex. The balancing act regardingsuch technology involves hundreds of factors including user perceptions, lighting,facilities-spacing, training of staff, age of devices, age of users, race, abilities to enrolcompared to abilities to verify, the acceptable rate of error in contrast to the acceptablerigour. We must consider all of these factors as we decide what kind of infrastructurewe would like to build, and what kind of society we are constructing.461 ‘Privacy watchdog warns against ‘technological anesthesia’’, AGI, April 28, 2005.
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