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272 The LSE Identity Project <strong>Report</strong>: June 2005deny access to him if he is late in paying his subscription fees at the local library. Inspecial cases, however, conceivably there may be a lawful requirement that access canbe denied at a group of service providers (but not outside of this designated group) tousers who abuse their access rights at any one of them. For these particular services,Bob’s card could agree to enable revocable unidirectional identifiers. The importantpoint to note is that the choice is up to Bob, who may refuse to hook up a revocableidentifier if he deems the request to be unlawful or unreasonable.Secondly, in order for Service B in the above figure to be able to deny access to Bob incase Bob has abused his access rights at Service A, Service B must ask each user whowants to gain access to its service to submit a cryptographic proof that the invisiblyembedded number in their local identifier with Service B is different from the revokednumber that Service A has passed on to Service B. If the embedded number of an accessrequestor is equal to the blacklisted number, no valid cryptographic proof can becreated. The important points to note are: (a) entries on the revocation list aremeaningless random numbers to everyone, (b) the list of revoked numbers must be sentto each user who is requesting access, so each user sees that they are asked to prove theyare not on the list, and (c) proving that one is not on the revocation list does not invadeone’s privacy.ConclusionIt is inappropriate for government to model the design of a national ID cardinfrastructure for citizens after architectures for enterprise identity management thatcentrally house the capability to electronically trace and profile all participants. In thecontext of a national ID card infrastructure, the privacy implications for citizens of suchpanoptical identity architectures would be unprecedented. Panoptical identitymanagement architectures would also eliminate the ability of government and privatesector service providers to function autonomously, requiring a transformation of theirown systems for integration purposes. It would introduce enormous security risks tocitizens, companies and government alike, as fraudulent insiders and successful hackerswould have the ability to electronically impersonate citizens across organisations, tocause false denial-of-access to citizens on a fine-grained per-transaction basis, and tocause massive identity theft damage.Using modern authentication technologies that have been designed to preserve privacy,it is entirely feasible to build a national ID card infrastructure that simultaneouslyaddresses the legitimate security and data sharing needs of government and thelegitimate privacy needs and identity theft concerns of citizens. This approach is notonly much better for the citizen, but also for government itself.In the context of a national ID card infrastructure, security and privacy are not oppositesbut mutually reinforcing, assuming proper privacy-preserving technologies aredeployed. In this context, privacy is essentially the same as security against insiders. Inorder to move forward constructively with a national ID card, it is important forgovernment to adopt technologies that provide multi-party security while preservingprivacy.
The LSE Identity Project <strong>Report</strong>: June 2005 273Note 1: Microsoft’s take on digital identityPrivacy and security experts are not alone in critiquing the use of enterprise identitymanagement architectures outside of enterprise-to-employee contexts. Big companiesare increasingly finding it problematic.One prominent example of this is Microsoft. Mid 2004, Microsoft publiclyacknowledged that its original Passport strategy for distributed digital identity forindividuals online has been a complete failure outside of the narrow context of access tospecific Microsoft services. Other service providers did not appreciate the loss of theirautonomy, and individuals were highly concerned about the privacy and identity theftrisks of Passport.Following this debacle, Microsoft completely revised its strategy for distributed identitymanagement, taking instead a user-centric approach. In a recent white paper, Microsoftdiscusses what it believes are fundamental requirements that must be met by anydistributed identity management infrastructure that involves individuals. Specifically,the white paper discusses seven “laws of identity” that “explain the successes andfailures of digital identity systems.” It states that:“… The system must be designed to put the user in control—of whatdigital identities are used, and what information is released. … Law ofMinimal Disclosure: The solution that discloses the least amount ofidentifying information and best limits its use is the most stable longtermsolution. … The concept of "least identifying information"should be taken as meaning not only the fewest number of claims, butthe information least likely to identify a given individual acrossmultiple contexts. … Law of Directed Identity: A universal identitysystem must support both "omni-directional" identifiers for use bypublic entities and "unidirectional" identifiers for use by privateentities, thus facilitating discovery while preventing unnecessaryrelease of correlation handles. … A unidirectional identity relationwith a different site would involve fabricating a completely unrelatedidentifier. Because of this, there is no correlation handle emitted thatcan be shared between sites to assemble profile activities andpreferences into super-dossiers. … Public key certificates have thesame problem when used to identify individuals in contexts whereprivacy is an issue. It may be more than coincidental that certificateshave so far been widely used when in conformance with this law (i.e.,in identifying public Web sites) and generally ignored when it comesto identifying private individuals. …” 681Note 2: A look at the French e-government initiativeIn 2003, the ministry in charge of e-government in France published a four-yearstrategic plan 682 (PSAE) for 2004-2007 for e-government services to citizens, the681 Available athttp://msdn.microsoft.com/webservices/understanding/advancedwebservices/default.aspx?pull=/library/enus/dnwebsrv/html/lawsofidentity.asp682 Available at http://www.adae.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Le_plan_strategique-GB.pdf.
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