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Report - Guardian

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214 The LSE Identity Project <strong>Report</strong>: June 2005Fifteen days later the Home Office “concluded that the balance is in favour of nondisclosure”.506 The Home Office did release some “background information containedwithin the two Gateway 0 Reviews”. The background documentation on the GatewayZero review from 2003 merely repeated Home Office policy on the need for an identitycard. The background documentation for the Gateway Zero review of 2004 heldadditional information that eventually became part of the draft Bill of April 2004,merely updating the Home Office existing public policy statements.While appeals were being filed with the OGC for an internal review, a furtherparliamentary question was posed.“Mark Oaten (Winchester, LDem): To ask the Chancellor of theExchequer what traffic light status was awarded to the identity cardsscheme by the Office of Government Commerce at the GatewayReview 1 stage.”“Paul Boateng (Brent South, Lab): The ID Cards programme has notyet undergone a Gate 1 Review. It has, however, undergone two OGCGate 0 Reviews, in June 2003 and January 2004 respectively. Thetraffic light status awarded by these reviews is exempt from disclosureunder the Freedom of Information Act 2000 as disclosure would belikely to prejudice both the ability of OGC to examine theeffectiveness, efficiency and economy with which other GovernmentDepartments exercise their functions and also the formulation anddevelopment of Government policy. I believe the public interest indisclosure of such information is outweighed by the public interest innon-disclosure.” 507The Home Office did not respond to a request for Internal Review. As a result, to thisdate we are unable to ascertain the details of the Gateway reviews, and weconsequentially cannot fully ascertain the levels of knowledge, appreciation, andconcern within the Home Office regarding the risks and costs involved in taking theIdentity Cards programme forward.The purpose of this section was to review the reasons for past failures in government ITprojects. These failures have led to serious problems with sometimes dangerousrepercussions. A system on the scale of the Identity Cards programme will have similarproblems and repercussions, particularly because of the architecture selected by theHome Office. Some innovations have been introduced into the Government ITprocurement process, but because the Home Office is unwilling to disclose either itsprocess of consultation with industry organisations or the details of the risk managementprocess under the OGC, we are unable to ascertain whether these innovations were ofany benefit to the Identity Cards Programme.This leads us to conclude that there is a risk the Government is not adequatelyprotecting this project from the fate that lay in store for its other large and complex506 Response to Freedom of Information request, From the Information Policy Team of the Home Office, February22, 2005.507 House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for March 16, 2005.

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