Report - Guardian

288 The LSE Identity Project Report: June 200513. It is also clear that the integrity of the UKsystem will be dependent on the integrity of thepassport, asylum and visa regimes in other EUcountries. In our visit to Germany we were told of apilot scheme involving biometrics to preventfraudulent asylum and visa applications. TheMinister of State has set out the UK's involvementin similar schemes. As part of the development ofthe identity card scheme, the Government shouldreport regularly to Parliament on progress beingmade across the EU to tackle any weaknesses inother EU countries, and, in particular, thosecountries currently judged to be the least secure.(Paragraph 83)14. We conclude that identity cards, by reducingthe "pull factor" from work, and public services,could make a contribution to preventing illegalimmigration, but only if the scheme is properlyenforced and complemented by action on access topublic services. (Paragraph 84)Organised crime and terrorism15. We understand that the contribution to fightingterrorism would be the ability to disrupt the use ofmultiple identity, identity fraud and relatedactivities like money-laundering, and illegalmigration by terrorists and their networks. While, ofcourse, not all terrorists make use of activities basedon false identities, and some will have legitimatenational or international identity documents, webelieve that effective action on identity would be areal and important contribution to restricting theease with which terrorists can operate. (Paragraph94)16. We note, however, the real benefits of anidentity card in fighting serious crime and terrorismare only likely to be achieved with a compulsoryscheme covering all citizens and residents. It willalso be dependent on the effective use of the schemeto check identities, an issue we discuss in the nextsections. (Paragraph 95)Identity fraud17. We believe there is a danger that in many dayto-daysituations the presentation alone of anidentity card will be assumed to prove the identityof the holder without the card itself or thebiometrics being checked, thus making possessionof a stolen or forged identity card an easier way tocarry out identity fraud than is currently the case.The availability of readers of cards and biometrics,including to the private sector, is therefore a crucialfactor. (Paragraph 99)18. We think it would be likely that identity cardswould help combat identity fraud, but only as partof a wider package of measures. The Governmentshould be clearer both about how and when itexpects the card and biometrics to be checked andabout what levels of security are appropriate indifferent circumstances. (Paragraph 100)Entitlement to public servicesSupported by research.Conditionally supported. A comprehensive riskassessment is required.Not supported by research. This reasoningappears to have little foundation in evidence.Research should be undertaken before reachingconclusions on these questions.Not supported by research. This conclusion is,again, assumed without much factual basis. Moredetailed research is required.Conditionally supported. The outcome woulddepend largely on the extent of biometricspoofing techniques. The widespread availabilityof biometric readers in an environment ofwidespread spoofing would magnify the extent ofidentity theft.Conditionally supported. See 17 above.