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Report - Guardian

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236 The LSE Identity Project <strong>Report</strong>: June 2005operator would ask the card-holder for the requested information and then pass it backto the authentication service, who would confirm whether the answer was correct. Asthe full pin/phrase would not be exchanged, the call centre operator would not know thefull pass-phrase and this would not compromise security. 626 A similar semi-PIN wasoriginally envisioned for on-line transactions. 627However, use of a PIN would enable security breaches which the use of biometricinformation would prevent, either through an ‘online check’ or an ‘off-line check’. Offlinechecking would involve comparison of the card-holder’s characteristics comparedwith those stored on the card. This would mean investing in suitable scanners and cardreaders, and would therefore be suitable only for high value transactions where the cardholder was present, unless the card holder owned their own fingerprint or iris scanner. 628An on-line check would involve comparison of the card holder’s biometriccharacteristics against those held on the central register. This would require that therelevant organisation purchase a scanner, a card-reader and also on an on-lineconnection to the authentication service. 629 In the case of iris or fingerprint scanning,matches would be confirmed or disputed by a computer system based on statisticalprobability, but with respect to facial recognition, human judgement could suffice. Nobiometric system is foolproof and: “there is always a finite probability that the systemwill fail to identify a valid card-holder”’. 630 Use of a digital signature incorporated intothe card was briefly considered; however this would incur added costs due the need fora more sophisticated microchip. 631BiometricsThe Government originally established a four point-test to decide which biometricinformation to include in an identity card system: cost, feasibility, acceptance of thetechnology in principle, and acceptance of the technology in practice.The question of feasibility covers implementation difficulties for those living in sparselypopulated areas or who are housebound, and the fact that a: “nation-wide network ofdevices to record biometric information would have to be installed”. The considerationsfor acceptance of the technology in practice seem largely to rest on the level ofconvenience when individuals visit recording devices and that: “there might still be arisk of queuing at peak times such as on Saturday mornings”. 632 The Government alsorecognises that issues may arise for UK passport holders living abroad, and it would bedifficult for all the individuals concerned to visit a consulate in person for a biometriccheck. 633The Government decided in 2002 that the most promising types of biometricidentification for consideration in the entitlement card scheme are fingerprints, iris626 Consultation Document, Section 4, 2002, paragraph 77627 Consultation Document, Section 4, 2002, paragraph 78.628 Consultation Document, Section 4, 2002, paragraph 81.629 Consultation Document, Section 4, 2002, paragraph 82.630 Consultation Document, Section 4, 2002, paragraph 83.631 Consulation Document, section 4, 2002, paragraph 84.632 Consultation Document, Section 4, 2002, paragraph 40.633 Consultation Document, Section 4, 2002, paragraph 42.

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