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256 The LSE Identity Project <strong>Report</strong>: June 2005cryptographic techniques 677 to ensure that any loss of integrity would be instantlydetectable. Similarly, cryptography will be used to protect the communications datapath between a biometric reader and the database in an online checking scenario. Thecryptography and its implementation will have to be trusted for communication withand protection of a central biometric database. If one trusts the cryptography for online,why not for offline?Would online checking help against very sophisticated insider attacks involvingtampering with the database cryptography? The answer is no – these threats implycomplete compromise to the integrity of the system. Any putative additional securityvalue for online verification is illusory.Also, offline verification provides a far more resilient system overall. A single,centralised online authentication service carries an inherent risk of systemic loss ofservice. A system based on biometric readers that match against templates stored on thecard do not carry this additional and catastrophic risk of a single point of failure, andwould permit most transactions to continue.In summary a central biometric database system with online verification is much morecostly, much riskier in operation, and for example is extremely vulnerable to distributeddenial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on its authentication servers. Its sole advantage seemsto be the possibility of preventing individuals enrolling with multiple identities.The government has stated in support of the proposed scheme that one-third of terroristincidents involve multiple or false identities. But it would be logically fallacious to inferthat a system with unique non-duplicated identities could necessarily reduce theincidence of terrorism. Terrorists could continue to employ those modalities where theyhave operated under their real identities.Little benefit fraud involves false or multiple identities, ranging from 1% to 3%. Thevast majority involves misrepresentation of circumstances (undeclared income, housingbenefit ineligibility etc.). To bear down on benefit fraud, cross-departmental datamatchingcould be used to detect false statements of circumstances, and this would beeffective because inter-related claims must be connected through related identities.What has prevented this to date is a profusion of incompatible legacy systems that areunable to co-operate in data-matching cost effectively and reliably. Identification andidentity management systems are only a small part of solving this problem.More generally, the position in common law has traditionally been that use of an alias orpseudonym is lawful provided there is no fraudulent intent. Nevertheless, it isreasonable to ask if there is a risk that introducing an identity system in which multipleenrolment and a plurality of official identities was theoretically possible, could lead toan explosion in exploiting such a “loophole” for illegal purposes.However, such concerns can be obviated by adopting some simple principles ofcryptographic technical design, which are now being developed by IT vendors as677 Including, but not limited to, such as chained hash functions.
The LSE Identity Project <strong>Report</strong>: June 2005 257“Federated Identity” 678 systems, at least one of which has been endorsed by the Frenchgovernment 679 for precisely such purposes.Design Considerations and Legislative Implications of Central Database- In order to deal with the privacy and complexity issues arising from the centraldatabase model, biometric information should not be stored in the Register;- If there is an insistence upon the storing of biometrics on a central database, thenfor security purposes these may be recorded only if they employ privacyprotection mechanisms which prevent identification unless for purposes specificto the function of that database;- To ensure consistency, personal data can be redefined to include informationderived from the scheme which is reasonably likely to be identifiable by anycombination of parties;- It is technologically feasible that identity claims may be made by means ofcryptographic security tokens derived from the Registrable Facts, which containthe minimum personal data necessary to fulfil the intended purpose;- To ensure consistency across government departments, each public or privatesectorservice wishing to issue cryptographic security tokens derived frompersonal data in the scheme should provide a Privacy Impact Assessment to theIdentity Scheme Commissioner and Information Commissioner, demonstratinghow the design minimises infringement to privacy, in compliance with DPA1998 and the Human Rights Act, for certification by both Commissioners.Centralised Single Identity and British Social and EconomicpracticeWhen asked why they are in favour of ID cards, many respond that they already carryaround many forms of ID. There are two assumptions behind their responses:1. Individuals possess many forms of identification.2. An ID Card would reduce the number of cards an individual would need tocarry.There are indeed many ways for individuals to identify themselves to various public andprivate sector entities. The ID card as proposed by the Government could be used as aunique identifier with all of these entities. But the ID card will transform all of these.In particular, the Government’s proposed ID card is poorly designed for UK citizens’daily lives. The ID card can never replace all of these forms of identification.Currently, individuals can gain access to government and private-sector servicesthrough the disclosure of personal information and through presenting some form of IDor authentication when required. But generally this access takes place without the678 For more information see: Liberty Identity Web Services Framework (ID-WSF) Supports SAML Version 2.0,February 11, 2005, http://xml.coverpages.org/ni2005-02-11-b.html and Federation of Identities in a WebServices World, A joint whitepaper from IBM Corporation and Microsoft Corporation, http://www-128.ibm.com/developerworks/webservices/library/ws-fedworld/.679The French E-Government Strategic Plan (PSAE) 2004-2007, pp.15http://www.adae.gouv.fr/IMG/rtf/Le_plan_strategique-GB.rtf.
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