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264 The LSE Identity Project <strong>Report</strong>: June 2005Figure 1 - Modern Enterprise Identity ArchitecturesAbout Modern Enterprise Identity Architectures.The above figure illustrates how modern enterprise identity architectures function, suchas Liberty Alliance’s ID-FF. To gain access to a service, a user (e.g., a companyemployee) engages in the following steps.Step 1. The user logs in to a central server (“authority”), using a password or astronger form of authentication.Step 2. The user requests access to a service, such as a corporate resource.Step 3. The service electronically queries the central authority, asking it if it hasauthenticated the user. (This step may be accomplished by redirecting thetransfer through the user, but this does not change the privacy implications of thearchitecture.)Step 4. The authority verifies the user’s identity and whether or not that user hasjust been authenticated, and proceeds by informing the service provider of itsdecision. Note: Step 1 may take place at this point.While enterprise identity architectures such as the Liberty Alliance ID-FF architecturemay be adequate for the corporate management of the identities of employees andsuppliers who access their corporate resources, it would have highly problematicimplications if used for government-to-citizen identity management. The identityprovider and the service providers would have the power to electronically monitor allcitizens in real time across all government services, and its insiders (as well as hackersand viruses) would have the power to commit undetectable government-wide identitytheft with a single press of a central button.
The LSE Identity Project <strong>Report</strong>: June 2005 265Carving out independent “circles of trust” is not a solution to this problem either. Theonly way to break out of the individual circle-of trust “silos” that would result would beto merge them into a “super” circle by reconciling all user identifiers at the level of theidentity providers, which would only exacerbate the ID-FF privacy and securityproblems.More generally, panoptical identity architectures may be perfectly legitimate for acompany to deal with the access rights of its own employees, but they haveunacceptable privacy implications when adopted for government-to-citizen interactions.They would also eliminate the ability of government service providers to functionautonomously, and would introduce enormous security risks to citizens and governmentalike; fraudulent insiders and successful hackers would have the ability to electronicallyimpersonate citizens across government areas, to cause false denial-of-access to citizenson a fine-grained per-transaction basis, and to cause massive identity theft damage.How to design a privacy-preserving national ID cardOver the course of the past two decades, the cryptographic research community hasdeveloped an array of entirely practical privacy-preserving technologies that can readilybe used to design a national ID card that eliminates any unnecessary powers. Thesetechnologies can be used as building blocks to design a national ID card system thatwould simultaneously address the security needs of government and the legitimateprivacy and security needs of individuals and service providers. The resulting ID cardwould in fact be much more secure than the currently envisioned national ID card,because it would minimize the scope for identity theft and insider attacks.Individuals would be represented in their interactions with service providers by localelectronic identifiers that service providers would electronically link up to legacyidentity-related information (i.e., accounts) that they hold on individuals. These localelectronic identifiers within themselves are untraceable and unlinkable, and so any preexistingsegmentation of activity domains would be fully preserved.At the same time, certification authorities could securely embed into all of anindividual’s local identifiers a unique “master identifier.” (Different sets of the localidentifiers issued to an individual might have different master identifiers embeddedwithin them.) The embedded master identifiers would remain unconditionally hiddenwhen individuals authenticate themselves using their local electronic identifiers, buttheir hidden presence can be leveraged by service providers for cross-domain securityand data sharing purposes without causing privacy problems.For example, service providers can securely share identity assertions across unlinkableactivity domains, in a privacy-preserving manner and under the user’s control. Invisiblyembedded master identifiers of fraudulent users can be revoked in a manner that doesnot violate the privacy of individuals.Figures 2, 3, and 4 below explain the basic architecture, which ensures that citizensenjoy the convenience of single sign-on with government services while the governmentservices enjoy the benefits of secure authentication in their respective domains.
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