Report - Guardian

198 The LSE Identity Project Report: June 2005Data Integrity and Database PollutionEven small databases can quickly become outdated as the real world situations theyrecord change. It seems inevitable, for example, that the ‘place of residence’ data in theNational Identity Register for a significant proportion of National Identity Registerrecords will become outdated quite quickly, since it will be seen as a tedious andintrusive requirement to report such changes, especially for those such as students andyoung professionals who are highly mobile. It is not clear that a fine will be ameaningful deterrent if a significant proportion of the population ignores thisrequirement.Although addresses are an obvious example of data items that are subject to progressivepollution, other National Identity Register records, and even recorded biometrics, maysuffer from such problems.The progressive, slow degradation of the accuracy of data items in databases is a verycommon problem and one that often proves extremely difficult to control. It createsdifficulties in databases even when users and operators have strong interests inmaintaining good database integrity. In the case of the National Identity Register, theproblem could be much more serious since a proportion of those registered will beopposed to the Register’s existence and will see pollution of the National IdentityRegister as a benefit. In consequence, relying on subject change reports to ensure theintegrity of National Identity Register data is unrealistic.Database pollution is a serious problem because small amounts of data pollution canlead to a disproportionate drop in confidence in the integrity of the database as a whole,and thus undermine its effectiveness. Even in quite small databases, it is not uncommonto find that confidence in the accuracy of data items becomes so poor that the databasehas to be abandoned, and a new version built from scratch because this is a cheapersolution than an attempt to ‘clean’ the existing one.The scale of the pollution problem for the National Identity Register is hard to predict,but in such a huge database it is likely to be difficult and costly to control, especially if asignificant proportion of subjects actively work against the integrity objective. Thiscould result in significant operating costs because tracking down and correcting errorsin such a large database will be a very difficult task.ConclusionsSecurity analysis of the Identity Cards Bill and the National Identity Register showsthat:1. The scale and complexity of the National Identity Register make it infeasible tobuild a computer system that can provide the level of security assurancenecessary to protect the safety and privacy of those who are identified by itsrecords. An attempt to build such a system is likely to be extremely expensiveand at high risk of failure.2. There is no obligation on the Secretary of State to protect this data or to properlyauthenticate a person’s consent to accesses to data in their National IdentityRegister records.