Report - Guardian

192 The LSE Identity Project Report: June 2005Identity VerificationIf ID cards are to be more reliable than ‘photo ID’ cards, it is essential that theirbiometric features are widely used with frequent checks against the National IdentityRegister. Additionally, since the government proposes to hold identity-related data inthe National Identity Register, on-line identity checks will be essential in keycircumstances when access to this data is needed.This puts the National Identity Register at the heart of the system, which in turn makesthe security of National Identity Register data and control of access to it absolutelycritical for the safety and security of all who are identified in its records.Subject Consent for Access by Verifier to Data Held in theNational Identity RegisterIn recent months, Government Ministers, including the Prime Minister, have claimedthat data held in the National Identity Register will be safe and secure, and yet theIdentity Cards Bill contains no explicit security requirements that provide a basis forsuch assurances.Clauses 14(1)(a) and 14(1)(b) provide for verifier access with the consent of the subjectbut offer no indication of how this consent will be obtained nor how it will beauthenticated.Clauses 14(5) and 14(6) indicate that the Secretary of State may impose conditions onhow consent is given, but it contains no obligation to do this in a way that provides ahigh level of confidence that the identity of the person seeking access (or giving consentfor access by another party) matches the identity of the person whose National IdentityRegister record is being requested.It is particularly puzzling that the government should seek to introduce a supposedlyhigh-quality system for verifying people’s identity, and yet fail to invoke explicitly thismechanism for authenticating subject access and subject access consent.At very least, a new provision is needed to the effect that:The Secretary of State shall ensure that access under clauses 14(1)(a)and 14(1)(b) will only be granted if both the identity of the subject andtheir consent have been fully authenticated in a way that does not relyon a presumption that the subject trusts the person seeking to obtainsuch access.The Bill should also make it an explicit requirement that access to data held in anNational Identity Register record, other than the biometrics, is conditional onconfirmation that the biometrics of the person purporting to give consent match thebiometrics held in the National Identity Register record to which access is being sought.It would be hypocritical to advocate such services for use by others, yet fail to mandatetheir use in controlling access to the National Identity Register.