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292 The LSE Identity Project <strong>Report</strong>: June 2005Biometrics39. The security and reliability of biometrics are atthe heart of the Government's case for theirproposals. We note that no comparable system ofthis size has been introduced anywhere in the world.The system proposed would therefore be breakingnew ground. It is essential that, before the system isgiven final approval, there should be exhaustivetesting of the reliability and security of thebiometrics chosen, and that the results of those testsshould be made available to expert independentscrutiny, perhaps led by the Government's ChiefScientific Adviser. (Paragraph 175)Medical information40. We agree with the BMA: it would not be eitheruseful or appropriate to keep medical details on theRegister. But it would be sensible for the identitycard to be the mechanism that enables individuals toaccess their NHS records. (Paragraph 176)Supported by research.Conditionally supported. Risk assessmentrequired.The Citizen Information Project and other Government databases41. We doubt that the Citizen Information Project Not applicable to this study.will provide "a strong and trusted legal basis forholding personal contact information" if theinformation on it has to be confirmed by another,separate identity card Register. There is a very largedegree of overlap between the Citizen InformationProject and the National Identity Register. TheRegistrar General mentioned the options of"comprehensive legislation to oversee informationmatching which in itself was conducted byindividual agencies but which improves the qualityof individual registers without actually going to thenext step of creating a register" and of "commonstandards for register management in the Britishgovernment": each of these would be moreworthwhile than the Citizen Information Project asit is currently planned. (Paragraph 185)42. We are concerned by the proliferation of largescaledatabases and card systems, since we haveseen little to suggest that they are being approachedin a co-ordinated way. While we have not takendetailed evidence on current proposals, other thanthe Citizen Information Project, we have theimpression that each government department iscontinuing with its own project in the hope that it isnot going to be significantly affected by otherprojects. The format of registration on differentdatabases should be coherent and consistent.(Paragraph 186)43. We believe that the Government must tacklethis proliferation of databases, examining in eachcase whether the number, identifier or database isneeded, what its relationship is to other existing orplanned databases, how data will be shared orverified and other relevant issues. For this action tobe effective, it must be co-ordinated at the highestlevels of the Civil Service. (Paragraph 187)Conditionally supported. While this concept mayhave merit at a fiscal level, it also goes aconsiderable way to violating the principle ofFunctional Separation, which provides privacyprotections for individuals as well as creatingsafeguards to prevent full centralisation andcontrol of personal information.Conditionally supported. See 42 above.
The LSE Identity Project <strong>Report</strong>: June 2005 29344. We do not think that there should be a centraldatabase with all information available to theGovernment on it. But an identity card shouldenable access to all Government databases, so thatthere would be no need for more than onegovernment-issued card. (Paragraph 188)Registration and enrolment45. The integrity of the enrolment and registrationprocesses are central to both the smooth running ofthe system and to its security. Without data ofinvestigative or evidential quality, few of theobjectives of the scheme can be achieved. Issues theGovernment must consider include: the number ofmobile units to enrol the housebound, the elderlyand those in remote locations; how sensitive theequipment is to the environment; the training ofpersonnel; and the need to minimise opportunitiesfor corruption and fraud. More study of theseaspects is needed. (Paragraph 193)Cards46. The type of card to be used is a decision of thesame order of importance as the architecture of thedatabase, since it has consequences for issues suchas how the card will be used and the number ofreaders and the infrastructure needed, both of whichhave significant implications for costs. Somechoices, such as the nature of the chip, seem tofollow a decision to use the passport as an identitycard (and therefore follow ICAO) rather than anyindependent assessment of what would be mostappropriate for an identity card. We are concernedthat the Home Office appears to be taking these keydecisions without any external reference, technicalassessment or public debate. (Paragraph 197)47. The Government's figures on how much cardswould cost compare them to 10-year passports anddriving licences. The Government has not, however,confirmed explicitly how long the validity ofidentity cards would be. It must do so before theBill is published. (Paragraph 198)Readers and infrastructure48. We are deeply concerned that the Governmenthas published so little information about thenumber, type, distribution and cost of card readersand the infrastructure necessary to support this. Thisinformation is not only essential to proper costing ofthe scheme, but also to an assessment of howeffective the scheme will be. (Paragraph 201)Conditionally supported. See 42 above.Supported by research.Supported by research.Conditionally supported. Because of theinclusion of biometric data, the validity period ofthe cards may vary according to individualcircumstance.Supported by research.
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