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288 The LSE Identity Project <strong>Report</strong>: June 200513. It is also clear that the integrity of the UKsystem will be dependent on the integrity of thepassport, asylum and visa regimes in other EUcountries. In our visit to Germany we were told of apilot scheme involving biometrics to preventfraudulent asylum and visa applications. TheMinister of State has set out the UK's involvementin similar schemes. As part of the development ofthe identity card scheme, the Government shouldreport regularly to Parliament on progress beingmade across the EU to tackle any weaknesses inother EU countries, and, in particular, thosecountries currently judged to be the least secure.(Paragraph 83)14. We conclude that identity cards, by reducingthe "pull factor" from work, and public services,could make a contribution to preventing illegalimmigration, but only if the scheme is properlyenforced and complemented by action on access topublic services. (Paragraph 84)Organised crime and terrorism15. We understand that the contribution to fightingterrorism would be the ability to disrupt the use ofmultiple identity, identity fraud and relatedactivities like money-laundering, and illegalmigration by terrorists and their networks. While, ofcourse, not all terrorists make use of activities basedon false identities, and some will have legitimatenational or international identity documents, webelieve that effective action on identity would be areal and important contribution to restricting theease with which terrorists can operate. (Paragraph94)16. We note, however, the real benefits of anidentity card in fighting serious crime and terrorismare only likely to be achieved with a compulsoryscheme covering all citizens and residents. It willalso be dependent on the effective use of the schemeto check identities, an issue we discuss in the nextsections. (Paragraph 95)Identity fraud17. We believe there is a danger that in many dayto-daysituations the presentation alone of anidentity card will be assumed to prove the identityof the holder without the card itself or thebiometrics being checked, thus making possessionof a stolen or forged identity card an easier way tocarry out identity fraud than is currently the case.The availability of readers of cards and biometrics,including to the private sector, is therefore a crucialfactor. (Paragraph 99)18. We think it would be likely that identity cardswould help combat identity fraud, but only as partof a wider package of measures. The Governmentshould be clearer both about how and when itexpects the card and biometrics to be checked andabout what levels of security are appropriate indifferent circumstances. (Paragraph 100)Entitlement to public servicesSupported by research.Conditionally supported. A comprehensive riskassessment is required.Not supported by research. This reasoningappears to have little foundation in evidence.Research should be undertaken before reachingconclusions on these questions.Not supported by research. This conclusion is,again, assumed without much factual basis. Moredetailed research is required.Conditionally supported. The outcome woulddepend largely on the extent of biometricspoofing techniques. The widespread availabilityof biometric readers in an environment ofwidespread spoofing would magnify the extent ofidentity theft.Conditionally supported. See 17 above.
The LSE Identity Project <strong>Report</strong>: June 2005 28919. Identity cards would make it easier to establishentitlement to public services. However theGovernment should take action now to ensure thatmeasures to check identity are developed acrosspublic services prior to the introduction of the newcard. (Paragraph 107)20. The Government should also reviewentitlements to public services across the board withthe aim of rationalising and standardising them,since there does not appear to be a consistent set ofprinciples underlining access to governmentservices. (Paragraph 108)21. The existence within the United Kingdom of upto four different systems for checking entitlement topublic services will be a possible cause ofconfusion, particularly where cross-border servicesare provided. The UK Government should liaiseclosely with the devolved administrations on theseissues, both to avoid confusion and to learn from theexperiences of the devolved administrations' ownentitlement cards. (Paragraph 112)Easier access to public services22. The Government's current proposals wouldimprove access to public services to the extent towhich this depends on identification. It is importantto ensure that the convenience to the state of havinga comprehensive system of identifying individualsand accessing data about them is accompanied by anincrease in convenience to the individual. Thebenefit must not be entirely, or even predominantly,to the state. (Paragraph 118)23. The Government has not developed coherentproposals for using the identity card in other waysto improve access to a wider range of services andinformation or to promote greater coherence acrosspublic services. As a result, citizens are still likelyto be required to carry a wide range of cards anddocuments to use many local and national, publicand private services. We believe that this is a missedopportunity. (Paragraph 119)Key issues24. We note that at the moment there is very littleclarity about the level and nature of checks that willbe required and carried out, even though this isfundamental to the whole scheme. We recommendthat the Government should provide estimates of theproportion of checks that would be biometric andtherefore highest security. (Paragraph 125)25. It is not clear that Government departmentshave identified how the operation of their services,or entitlement to them, need to be changed to makebest use of an identity card system. (Paragraph 126)26. In most cases, identity cards will only be fullyeffective if complementary enforcement action canbe taken. (Paragraph 127)27. Finally, more could be done to check identitiestoday and there is a danger that action will bedelayed pending the introduction of an identity card.(Paragraph 128)Supported by research.Conditionally supported. Standardisation ofaccess to public services should not precludeorganisations from evolving uniqueauthentication measures suited to their individualcircumstances.Conditionally supported. See 20 above.Supported by research.Supported by research.Supported by research.Supported by research.Supported by research.Conditionally supported. A full risk andopportunity assessment is required.
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