Report - Guardian

296 The LSE Identity Project Report: June 2005Conclusions58. Identity cards should not be ruled out ongrounds of principle alone: the question is whetherthey are proportionate to the aims they are intendedto achieve. Identity cards could make a significantimpact on a range of problems, and could benefitindividuals through enabling easier use of a range ofpublic services. This justifies, in principle, theintroduction of the Government's scheme. But theGovernment's proposals are poorly thought out inkey respects: in relation to the card itself, toprocurement and to the relationship of the proposalsto other aspects of government, including theprovision of public services. These issues must beaddressed if the proposals are to be taken forward. Itis important that the Government clarifies thepurposes of the scheme and makes them clearthrough legislation. (Paragraph 219)The draft Bill59. The draft Bill gives the Government powers torequire and register a wide range of information notobviously needed to establish identity. It gives awide range of organisations access to thatinformation and to the audit record of when and bywhom the National Identity Register has beenaccessed, so giving information on key actions ofindividuals. While the draft Bill undoubtedlyenables these actions to be taken in the fight againstserious crime or terrorism, it allows for far wideraccess to the database than this justifies. Inparticular, given the lack of clarity about the aims ofthe identity card, to leave so much to secondarylegislation is unacceptable. (Paragraph 222)60. It is unacceptable that basic questions about thedegree of access to the National Identity Registershould be left to secondary legislation. TheGovernment must clarify what access will be givento public and private sector bodies, and under whatcircumstances. Once identity cards are compulsory,there is a significant danger that the concept ofconsent to disclosure of information will in practicebe eroded, unless there are clear statutorysafeguards against improper access to the Register.(Paragraph 224)61. We note that whilst a range of data might berequired to verify an application, it is not necessaryfor all that data to be retained on the NationalIdentity Register. They could either be returned or,if necessary for audit purposes, held on a separatedatabase. The Bill should be amended to restrictdata held on the register to that information requiredto establish identity once the card has been issued.(Paragraph 229)62. The one exception would be information aboutimmigration status. This is so central to thejustification for the Bill that it would be useful andconvenient to hold this on the central register.(Paragraph 230)Conditionally supported. See 4 above.Supported by research.Supported by research.Supported by research.Not applicable to this study.