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258 The LSE Identity Project <strong>Report</strong>: June 2005disclosure of a universal ID number. The forms of identification presented to theseentities either show proof of entitlement, or provide service-specific account details.The advantage of the existing situation is not just that it is privacy-protecting. Rather,existing systems are purpose built and necessarily proportionate in their demands forpersonal information. They support relationships that have formed over time. Peoplehave become accustomed to disclosing this level of information and the entities areaccustomed to managing this information.Consider the situation of a student travelling on public transportation. The student mayhave received a student-ID card issued by the transportation firm, which is not grantedto all people under 25, but merely to those who are students. The proposed ID-cardcould not be used in such a situation. Moreover, a rail-season ticket purchased by thisstudent is often bound to the personal identifier on the student’s travel-ID card. This isnot necessarily bound to the student’s school identification number, and it is certainlynot bound to the student’s bank account, NHS information, or other identifiers. It is anidentifier issued by the transportation firm, independent of all of these other identifiers.The card expires in accordance with the policy of the transportation firm. The student isassured that the card, when stolen, can only be used for transportation purposes. Thestudent also knows that the transportation firm is only collecting the necessary amountof personal information to issue her the card and to provide transportation.To appreciate the unlinked nature of today’s identifiers, consider the following popularidentification methods:Birth namesCredit and debit cardsLoyalty TokensSports club membership cardsNHS numberDriving license and numberUser identifiers with service providers(account numbers)Calling cardsEmployee BadgesNational insurance numberPassport and passport numberOn-line usernamesTable 10 - Popular Identification Methods and IdentifiersAs these examples illustrate, individuals today are represented by an abundance ofidentifiers that are designed to be relied on by a small number of service providers inspecific contexts. An Internet Service Provider does not record customers’ NHSnumbers (and has no knowledge or concern whether users have been issued such anidentifier, nor any means of linking to such a number). Sports club membership cardsare not linked with employment information, and are identifiers issued in accordancewith club membership policies and requirements. As a matter of design, the identifiersheld by the sports club are in essence useless to any other entity other than the sportsclub. It is also fair to say that in a number of these relationships, records are not even ina computerised form. The personal data that is collected for the issuance of an identifieris not even verified, nor is it required to be. 680Local identifiers enable service providers to identify individuals within their specifictransaction contexts, to create accounts for them, and to effectively deal with fraudsters.680 As an example, although we register our next of kin for emergency purposes under many circumstances, it is notthe responsibility of a sports club to verify that this person is in fact kin, nor to verify if the contact details given areaccurate, by checking against a national registry.
The LSE Identity Project <strong>Report</strong>: June 2005 259At the same time, local identifiers have the important benefit of limiting the capabilitiesof service providers to create profiles of an individual’s activities with other parties. Apub owner does not need to know a customer’s name, birth date or birthplace but merelywhether he is of the legal age to consume alcoholic beverages. Previously a relationshipof trust would be established between the publican and the clientele; or a form ofidentity would be verified to ensure that the individual’s birth year is prior to thethreshold year. These means of identification involved natural segmentation thatensures that identity thieves can only do damage with specific providers where theyhave gained information on users of those providers.The transformation and reduction of local relationshipsThe envisioned national ID card would replace today’s local non-electronic identifiersby universal identifiers that are processed fully electronically. This migration wouldremove the natural segmentation of traditional activities. In the case of a pub, ifadditional information was disclosed, say through a national ID card, malicious staffcould steal this information, or this information can be abused in other ways. As aconsequence, the damage that identity thieves can cause would no longer be confined tonarrow domains, nor would identity thieves be impaired any longer by the inherentslowdowns of today’s non-electronic identification infrastructure. Furthermore, serviceproviders and other parties would be able to electronically profile individuals acrossmultiple activities on the basis of the universal electronic identifiers that wouldinescapably be disclosed when individuals interact with service providers.Ironically, the currently envisioned ID card architecture therefore has severeimplications for the security and autonomy of service providers. When the sameuniversal electronic identifiers are relied on by a number of autonomous serviceproviders in different domains, the security and privacy threats for the service providersno longer come only from eavesdroppers and other traditional outsiders. A rogue systemadministrator, a hacker, a virus, or an identity thief with insider status would be able tocause massive damage to service providers, could electronically monitor the identitiesand visiting times of all clients of service providers, and could impersonate and falselydeny access to the clients of service providers.In sum, the national ID system as currently envisioned by government poses threats tothe privacy of UK citizens as well as to the autonomy and security of service providers.While the card may well be acceptable for the internal needs of businesses that engagein employee-related identity management within their own branches, the privacy andsecurity risks of adopting the card as a national ID card for citizens would be high.A constructive way forwardFar less intrusive means exist for achieving the publicly stated objectives of the UKnational ID card. Over the course of the past two decades, the cryptographic researchcommunity has developed an array of entirely practical privacy-preserving technologiesthat can readily be used to design a better national ID card. The system would not needto be centralised and could build on existing societal relationships, to better ensuresecurity and privacy.
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