ISSUE 14 : Jan/Feb - 1979 - Australian Defence Force Journal

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 11BASIC DEFENCE PLANNINGAt the end of his article "Basic DefencePlanning" (DF.I No. 12) Wing CommanderRusbridge promised a further article setting outhis views on how defence planning should beundertaken, but there are some aspects of hisfirst article, devoted essentially to a critique ofthe present practice, on which 1 would like tocomment.First, my understanding of the quotationfrom the Minister's statement of 22 September1977 is that because Australia's defenceproblems have some characteristics different inkind or degree from those of other countries,we should not be surprised if the solutions interms of defence force capabilities are notidentical to the solutions adopted by othercountries. This does not mean that we have toreject methods of analysis of the requirementsthat others have developed and found useful:all that the Minister has said is that because ourinputs to the analytical process are different,the outputs also are likely to be different. Thisis true even if the process we use is itselfidentical to that used by others.Secondly, and more importantly, there seemsto me to be some looseness in the terminologyused by Wing Commander Rusbridge, that hassomewhat confused the argument. This lack ofprecision has led to rather more emphasis thanis justified being given to the technique ofcontigency formulation and analysis, and a lackof clarity about the purpose of such analysis.The term "basic defence planning" is itselfambiguous. 1 suggest that there is a need tomake a clear and explicit separation betweenthe totality of defence policy formulation andthe formulation of policies concerning thestructure of the defence force and concerningthe doctrines relating to the use of that force incombat or otherwise. The latter seems to bewhat Wing Commander Rusbridge isdiscussing, but this is only part of the totalcompass of defence policy concern. In asituation where there is a low probability thatthe defence force will be required to engage inmajor military combat to protect Australianterritory or interests (which is what 1 take to bethe meaning of the term "low threat") theprimary objective of defence policy is tomaintain this situation. In these terms ouroverall foreign policies, including such things astrade and immigration policies as well as ourinternational political relationships, can be seenas part of our defence policy — as part of thecontinuing need to convince the governmentsand nationals of other countries that it is notnecessary or useful to mount a military attackon Australia or its interests.That Australia has only once in its history (in1942-3) faced unambiguously the kind ofmilitary threat that Israel, for example, hasfaced for every day of its existence does not, inmy view, in any way lessen the need for us tomaintain a defence force, but it does haveimplications for the structure of that force andfor the things the force should do. Part of theposture that contributes to the minimization ofthe likelihood of a threat to Australiadeveloping is the maintenance of an evidentmilitary capability and resolve to meet suchthreats if they should arise. Where there isroom for debate is not over this need, but overhow, and how far, it should be met.It is here that contingency analysis has animportant and, I suggest, an inescapable role.Australian defence force planners, as WingCommander Rusbridge pointed out, are in theunfortunate position of not having theexperience of regular military invasions ofAustralia to define the parameters of therequirement, so that 1 can see no alternative tothe process of postulating a variety of plausiblescenarios involving Australian forces incombat, and exploring the problems that wouldarise in dealing with the various situations todefine the force we need. Military exercises areone useful means of exploring somecontingencies, particularly as they permit apublic demonstration of capability to those thatwe would wish to impress, but the techniques ofanalysis on paper are a valuable adjunct whichpermit the examination of a much wider rangeof possible situations at minimal cost.It is true that to analyse any contingencymore than superficially a scenario must bedeveloped that is quite specific as to time,place, characteristics of the assumed enemyforce, etc., so that the solution cannot beassumed to be other than specific. However it ispossible to test the effects on the preferredsolution of varying the parameters of thescenario, and provided that a considerablenumber of contingencies are examined,covering a wide spectrum of situations and ofrequired force responses, it seems reasonable toassume that the common elements of thesolutions would indicate the universal