ISSUE 14 : Jan/Feb - 1979 - Australian Defence Force Journal

BOOK REVIEWS 57No Indian Army formations were used duringthe World War II in France or Germanyand even during the World War I the decisionto employ them in France had beenreversed. And the reasons—at least from theBritish point of view were part political, partmilitary. It is for this reason that an IndianArmy Ofliccr howsoever capable and promisinghad no long range future outside the IndianArmy. Auchinleck's employment during theSecond World War in Norway, as corps andarmy commander in England and his appointmentas Commander-in-Chief Middle East wasmost unusual and a tribute to his militaryreputation and ability.Secondly, in the two world wars the decisivetheatre of war was in Europe. Auchinleck hadno experience of—even if he had the knowledgeand understanding of—European war. And allhis colleagues and rivals had savoured thesmoke and cordite in Europe.But if Auchinleck started with such seriouspsychological and functional handicaps, he didlittle to improve the state of affairs while incommand. It is difficult to fault his selection ofCunningham as the 8th Army Commander,although Wilson, proposed by Churchill anddisregarded by Auchinleck, presumably becauseof personal reasons, would have been a betterchoice. But his subsequent choices are incomprehensible.Both Ritchie and Corbett werechiefs-of-staff and it is most unusual for themto have been appointed or selected to commandan active Army during operations. Even if theywere eminently suitable their selection andappointment would create an unsavoury effectof intrigue and jockeying. It will be noted howBrooke declined to step into the shoes of Auchinleckwhen offered and urged by Churchill.Auchinleck's handling of Ritchie — a subordinatearmy commander—is equally opento question. There is no shortage of writtennotes and memoranda which were sent andproffered in true Churchillian form and one istempted to remark perhaps in unconsciousimitation. In the strategic field, as a theatrecommander, Auchinleck showed more concernfor a battle yet to come than was necessary.Assuming that the Germans had broken throughthe Caucasus the primary responsibility at grandstrategic level lay with Churchill and the Chiefsof-Staff.In any case there would have beenenough warning and the time and space factor,as also the communications and movementproblems were not entirely unmanageable.Placed in more difficult environments, what wasRommel's worry: Malta? Northwest Africa?or the war in the desert? Therefore, Churchill'smoan that what mattered except Rommel'sdefeat, has much sense and substance.Some of Auchinleck's difficulties were institutional.He says in his preface to DesmondYoung's biography of Rommel that the Germanswere better grounded in minor tacticsand mobile warfare. The resilience and ripostemounted time and again by Rommel areapposite pointers. He recovered much morequickly from 'Crusader' to mount a "Crusaderin reverse". Churchill was impatient at what hethought was the slow regrouping, re-equippingand an operational response which showedlack of alacrity and bounce. Was it really anirrelevant criticism after all? The British Armytended to be slow as an institution.Roger Parkinson makes no mention of thefact that German codes had been broken andthe extent to which knowledge of German planswas known to Auchinleck. The Field Marshalis also silent, although this could, in part, bean explanation of Churchill's impatience. Heknew what the enemy was going to do andpresumably what he was capable of doing.It is interesting to reflect if the First Battleof Alamein would have acquired the controversyand reputation that it did, had it not beenfor the inept, anti-Auchinleck observationsmade by Montgomery.. After all how manydefensive battles and their commanders are thusvenerated? Is Rommel known for his defensivebattles? Auchinleck may have been more dignifiedbut he has not been entirely silent—notthat he should have remained silent againstsuch grave provocation caused by seriousaspersions on his military ability and capacity.Following the publication of Montgomery'smemoirs, which were serialised in the SundayTimes, he wrote, almost immediately a letterof protest to the newspaper, followed by contactwith the publishers of Montgomery andChurchill leading to amendments and revisionin books. He also tried, if unsuccessfully, to getthe 8th Army clasp for his period of commandfor the Middle East Medal.Auchinleck's reputation rests on his decisiveintervention in 'Crusader' and a late but