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ISSUE 14 : Jan/Feb - 1979 - Australian Defence Force Journal

ISSUE 14 : Jan/Feb - 1979 - Australian Defence Force Journal

ISSUE 14 : Jan/Feb - 1979 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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SOME THOUGHTS ON ADFA4^in the community at large as people capableof speaking authoratively on defencerelated matters.• I he service may select applicants withproven, not suspected academic ability, atsome financial saving, from suchinstitutions. In this situation officerqualities and potential, rather thansuspected ability to pass an academiccourse, becomes the main selection criteria.At a time when the university system is trainingmore graduates than can be employed withinthe community at large, the idea of building yetanother university and not using this existingresource seems pointless.THE MILITARY TRAININGREQUIREMENTThe service responsibility for officerproduction must be to train each aspirant in thetechniques and procedures he will use as anofficer. Army experience has shown thatcompetent officers can be produced regardlessof tertiary experience. Therefore the timing oftertiary training is not critical to officerproduction. ADFA will impose a sequence thatmay not be appropriate for all services,branches or individuals. It seems that at everyturn the introduction of ADFA serves to limitour options — rather than broaden them.It is of little long term consequence that anofficer aspirant is recruited with a tertiaryqualification, given the opportunity to gaintertiary qualification within the service prior tocommissioning or gains such qualificationsafter being commissioned by part or full timestudy. The present army system leaves thesethree options open to us. If, at great expense,ADFA is established, how could we justify therecruitment of tertiary qualified aspirants? Thenumber of tertiary qualified members in thearmed forces has steadily risen this century.The need for a significant number of postgraduatequalified personnel has not beenrecognised to any great extent yet. The lack of asignificant post-graduate requirement withinthe services may cause ADFA to lack academicdepth.The cost of ADFA may distort our outlookin regard to the proportion of tertiary qualifiedofficers required. When such facilities areavailable, are we not ignoring their potential,unless all officer aspirants enjoy their benefit?The question must then be asked again; inpreparation for war, what proportion of theofficer corps should be tertiary qualified?The integration of academic and militarytraining under military control will be criticisedby the academic and military communitiesalike. These two communities have successfullyco-existed in the past but marriage may be morethan each could tolerate.CONCLUSIONAlthough estimates exist for the cost ofestablishing ADFA, it is unlikely that these bearany true resemblance to the final cost ofestablishing it and upgrading the supportingservice colleges.The establishment of ADFA would representa failure of the defence department to use anexisting resource (Australia's university system)and would be an indictment on the educationdepartment who, at a time when it producesmore graduates than can be employed in thecommunity at large, cannot train graduates forone of the nation's largest employers.The strength of the corps of officers has beenderived in part from the diverse backgrounds ofits members. The creation on a single initialstream for the three services must reduce thesize of the population from which we draw ouraspirants.There is no doubt that most of the subjectsthat will be taught at ADFA will be the same asmost of those taught at other universities.Therefore we have very little to gain from itsestablishment and risk losing some of theperipheral advantage of attendance atuniversities within the community at large.Any subjects not presently taught in<strong>Australian</strong> universities but recognised withinthe existing system at a fraction of the costinvolved in building a new university.The prime responsibilities of the services is totrain for war. Failure to use existing resourcesto their fullest goes against that principle ofwar, economy of effort. Having committedourselves to such an ambitious project maylimit our options in the future selection ofofficer aspirants and this must be contrary tothe principle of flexibility, %f

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