ISSUE 14 : Jan/Feb - 1979 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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16 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN/FEB 79and had become quite knowledgeable aboutthe role of the Boer Commandos in the BoerWar and about the Germans' remarkable performancein World War I in East Africa undervon Lettow Vorbeck, in country and circumstancesnot unlike those which might face usin North Australia. Both had a considerableeffect on Stanner's outlook and thinking. Hewas also influenced by Lieutenant ColonelR (i. Henderson, IA, who befriended himwhile in Kenya.Learning of Stanner's interest in soldieringand of his certainty that war was coming,Henderson went to great pains to insist Stannershould 'see' large scale country in terms oftime, space, physical movement and supply.They saw an enormous amount of Africatogether, from Kenya to Uganda and theSudan.Shortly after the Intelligence conference,Stanner was asked by the then Deputy Chiefof the General Staff, Major General Rowell,to fly north to HO NT Force to be interviewedby Major General Herring, who, having returnedto Australia from the Middle East ascommander of the 6th Australian Division,had been appointed on 24 March 1942 asGOC NT Force.Herring and some of his staff officers hadleft Adelaide for Darwin on 27 March, a littleover a week since their return from the MiddleEast. On arrival at Darwin Herring found asomewhat dejected force, mainly deployed onthe coast in the immediate vicinity of Darwinitself. The deployment positions were tacticallyunsound and there was as well a disturbingsupply position.When Stanner arrived at NT Force, GeneralHerring and his BGS, Brigadier R. B. Sutherland,examined him closely on what he knewof the outlying country of Northern Australia.Stanner told Herring that he thought if theJapanese landed, they could gain tacticaladvantages from the use of the back bushcountry of Northern Australia. "WHAT tacticaladvantages?" Stanner was asked. Stannerwas asked to put his views on paper and hestopped up all that night to do so.It was realized that if the Japanese attacked,they would not come in 'by the front door butby the side windows or the back door' as theyhad done in Malaya. What Stanner proposedwas the formation of a new type of unit forthe Army, one so structured as to implementthe requirement of the decision of the Chiefsof Staff, which has already been referred to,and to carry out surveillance, reconnaissanceand scouting for the Commander, NT Force,of all the critical area of the north from theGulf country of Queensland to the north ofWestern Australia.Stanner was put through a grinder on everyaspect of the problem by Herring and Sutherlandand presently Herring said that it was hiswish that Stanner raise and command thespecial unit which he had suggested. "It isyour duty to do this," said Herring, or wordsto that effect. The BGS, Sutherland, told Stannerthat he must "get going", waste no timeand be back with his men in their positionswithin ten weeks. Actually it took Stannertwelve weeks but the aim was achieved.Formation of a Bush CommandoIt is a very rare flower in the history of anyarmy which can blossom in the face of dangeras readily as did Stanner's new unit. He conceivedand invented it, raised and organizedit, manned and equipped it, and put into thefield a unit of regimental size and specializedbeyond the then currents of military thought.It was a unit which fulfilled all the requirementsof the Chiefs of Staff and of the GOCNT Force.If Stanner had had his way, his new unitwould have been called the 'Bush Commando',which is what it was, or else the 'Bush Watch'or the 'Bush Scouts'. (The influence of Stanner'sstudies of the Boer War is apparent here.)Army Headquarters, however, had its way andin May 1942 issued a secret memorandum inconnection with the training of the new unit,which was called the 'North Australia ObserverUnit', The unit was approved by LHQ ashaving AIF status and hence, being an A IFunit raised prior to the cut-off date for AIFregimental titles (which was in September1942), it was entitled to the use of the prefix'2/ '. Quaintly, but correctly, it was the 2/1North Australia Observer Unit or 2/1 NAOU.At this stage the unit was regarded as beingin the nature of a special type of independentcompany and was allocated the coveted doublediamond shaped colour patch of the IndependentCompanies. The original colour patch
THE SURVEILLANCE OF NORTHERN AUSTRALIA 17worn in 1942 was a green and gold doublediamond; however, this was altered in late1943 to an orange and mid-green colour patch.The Role of the NAOUIt is customary in studying a particular unitto consider its allocation, role, organization,characteristics and tasks. In the case of theNAOU, the role as seen b> the Chiefs of Staffand the tasks as set by the GOC NT Forcewere decided first and the unit then built toachieve them. The implementation of thesesecret matters was given top priority by thenew Deputy Chief of the General Staff, MajorGeneral Vasey, who had succeeded Rowell,and who now stamped all aspects of the unitas 'MOST IMMEDIATE'. Shortly, Herring,who had so much to do with the formationof the NAOU and the setting of its tasks, waspromoted to Lieutenant General and givencommand of II Australian Corps. He was succeededas GOC NT Force by Major GeneralJ. Stevens who had been commanding the4th Division in Western Australia.The dramatic urgency of the role of the newunit is revealed on reading the terse wordingof the Operational Instruction received by thecommander of the NAOU from the Commander,Northern Territory Force, which was asfollows:"Your role will be to watch for and to reportto HO NT FORCE, by the quickest means,any landings of the enemy on the Australiancoast between NORM ANTON, Queensland,and YAMPI SOUND, West Australia, andyou will report any subsequent enemy movementincluding movement of his aircraft."Creating the North Australia Observer UnitStanner found raising his secret unit was nosimple job, with a dead-line of just over tenweeks and the risk of immediate action facinghim. General Vasey's 'MOST IMMEDIATE^stamp meant top priority, and opened manydoors which might otherwise have not openedat all or else opened very slowly and reluctantly.Stanner was aided by his service onthe staff of the Minister for the Army, whichhelped him considerably. Even so, he had tocut corners, especially as regards obtainingequipment in short supply and this tended toland him in trouble.He could not have succeeded in the assignmentwithout the enthusiastic help of JenningsTHE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITYNormanton?Cloncurry >
Page 1 and 2: JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1979No. 14HBDEFENC
Page 3 and 4: DEFENCEFORCEJOUR NALNo. 14ISSN 0314
Page 5 and 6: ^^\Editors Commentf DEFENCE]FORCE J
Page 7 and 8: LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 5applies to A
Page 9 and 10: LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 7armoured cru
Page 11 and 12: LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 9with the pri
Page 13 and 14: LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 11BASIC DEFEN
Page 15 and 16: LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 13that to arg
Page 17: The Surveillance ofnorthern-its his
Page 21 and 22: THE SURVEILLANCE OF NORTHERN AUSTRA
Page 33 and 34: THE CHALLENGE^MANAGEMENTColonel Joh
Page 35 and 36: THE CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT 33quant
Page 37 and 38: A PROGRAMME IN PROBLEM SOLVING 35be
Page 39 and 40: A PROGRAMME IN PROBLEM SOLVING 3713
Page 41 and 42: A PROGRAMME IN PROBLEM SOLVING 39Pe
Page 43 and 44: cA PROGRAMME IN PROBLEM SOLVING 41s
Page 45 and 46: 1^Some thoughts on AD FA •*H5F «
Page 47 and 48: SOME THOUGHTS ON ADFA4^in the commu
Page 49 and 50: NAPOLEON AND SPAIN 47proved intrans
Page 51 and 52: NAPOLEON AND SPAIN 49the occupation
Page 53 and 54: I fIfA THIRD DIMENSION TO TRAININGM
Page 55 and 56: TRAINING WAR GAMES — A THIRD DIME
Page 57 and 58: PARACHUTE FAMILIARISATION COURSES A
Page 59 and 60: BOOK REVIEWS 57No Indian Army forma
Page 61 and 62: BOOK REVIEWS 59is based on solid ac
Page 63 and 64: BOOK REVIEWS 61cant than others, no
Page 65 and 66: BOOK REVIEWS 63There is nothing new
Page 68:
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ISSUE 14 : Jan/Feb - 1979 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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