ISSUE 14 : Jan/Feb - 1979 - Australian Defence Force Journal

THE CHALLENGE^MANAGEMENTColonel John M. Hutcheson, MCAustralian Army ReserveThe Adversary"Loyalty was not to the President of the UnitedStates, to truth or integrity, or even to subordinateofficers risking their lives; loyalty was to uniform,and more specifically, to immediate superior andcareer. It was an insight into why the military inSaigon, despite all the contrary evidence in thefield, despite the arrival of as bright an officer asDick Stilwell, managed to retain their optimism."'THE CHALLENGE. It is often wise formanagers, of all industries and professionsto look at the criticism of their managementby outside observers. It may transpirethat such outside criticism has little foundation.However, an unbiased examination seemsto be warranted if management is to leadeffectively. This article challenges the professionof arms to look objectively at its management.The Criticism. The above quotation by DavidHalbertson might be justifiable on his reputationas the recipient of the Pulitzer Prize andseveral other awards. On its own, and despiteHalbertson's reputation, the critic may rightlyquestion the validity of the purport of thequotation, even after reading the whole of hisbook. A second critic of military managementin Vietnam is C. L. Sulzberg who as a journalistfor forty-four years saw many battles. Hewrote on his retirement from the New YorkTimes.". . . The American century's greatest accomplishmentwas the New Deal . . . And itsworst accomplishment was the Vietnam War,which, although its initial goals were by nomeans so sordid as current history proclaims,was a compound of mismanaged drift, badgeneralship, increasing lack of purpose andbefuddled leadership at all levels."-The Sample. There are those who wouldconsider the foregoing sample of two quotationsas inadequate evidence, despite theColonel Hutcheson's article 'A Management Gametor Professionals and Sub-Professionals' appeared inthe SeptemberlOctober 1978 issue (No. 12).eminence of the authors as journalists. However,we did lose the war in Vietnam. That isassuming that "we" means those who foughtfor South Vietnam. One might argue that someelements, such as Australia were too small toinfluence the higher military management ofthe war, although there can be no denial thatthese smaller elements participated actively inlower management. Despite the small and perhapsbiased nature of the sample and smallnessof Australia's military involvement comparedwith the USA it might be wise for Australianmilitary management, at all levels, to looksubjectively if not objectively at our ownexpertise — past, present and future.The AttackThe Aim. It has been traditional in militaryand in formalized business management tostart with an aim. What should be our aim?If we accept at least some of the criticism itmight be appropriate to start with the aim —"To improve military management". There areprobably many variations on this theme butfor this article let us accept the foregoingsimplistic aim.The Method. History is replete with militarymismanagement. History also contains manyexamples of successful military management.There has been some thought that at leastsome of the principles of business managementare directly or indirectly applicable to militarymanagement. There has been a world-wideexplosion of research into business managementand related disciplines. Therefore, theremight be some grounds for a comparativeanalysis to be made between business andmilitary management, in particular in comparingpast military and business successes andfailures. Anyway, such analysis is at least astarting point.Some Business ManagementGeneral Management. "The successful generalmanager does not spell out detailed objectivesfor his organization, nor does he make