ISSUE 14 : Jan/Feb - 1979 - Australian Defence Force Journal

NAPOLEON AND SPAIN 49the occupation by French armies brought realhardships. Spain's agriculture was barelysufficient to sustain the population in normaltimes. The French policy was to make warsupport itself; in an ally's country sustenancewas required as proof of allegiance, in anenemy's it was taken as a right of war.-''French armies foraged as they moved, layingwaste to the countryside as they went andturning the peasants into guerrillas, as in thecase of the peasants of the Valles who statedin a proclamation in April 1809 that:"They held it a great honour to form a part,though a small one, of the Spanish nation . . .their peaceful habitations had been invaded,their property plundered, their womenviolated, their brethren murdered in coldblood, and above all, the religion of theirfathers outraged and profaned; nothingremained for them to repel force by forceThe French armies committed many atrocitiesalthough in fairness, the British onoccasions did likewise, and these reboundedon them. On 26 April 1809 the SpanishGovernment published details in its gazette ofatrocities at Viles in January 1809 involvingthe rape of 300 women.- 7 In February 1809the French burned the villages of S. Miguel deZequelinos and S. Christobal de Mourentanleaving 2,000 homeless,- 8 and on 17 April 1809they summarily executed 24 inhabitants ofArnifara as a reprisal for an attack on aFrench patrol.-" In June 1809 the Frenchhanged 30 religious and 49 leading citizens ofLourizin. In return the Spanish executed 130French prisoners. 30If the French placed little value on friendlyrelations with the Spanish the same mistakewas not made by the British who supplied2 million pounds ' in gold per year to assistthe Spanish Government as well as enormousquantities of munitions much of which waslanded clandestinely at coastal rendezvous withthe guerrilla forces. 1 - Even more fundamentalto amicable relations was the British systemof supply, whereby a properly stocked supplyservice in the army's rear provided for theirneeds. Where local supplies were requiredthey were purchased.So powerful did the guerrillas become thatFrench deaths by their hand averaged morethan a hundred a day and not even a messengercould move in the country without anenormous escort. They menaced tax collectors,attacked grain convoys, causing shortages inthe capital and keeping troops on constantalert. M The guerrillas were encouraged by theSpanish clergy who Napoleon found quite unliketheir Italian counterparts. A catechismcirculated in Aragon read in part: "Are we atliberty to kill the French? ... It is our dutyto do so."" In May 1812 a strong convoyescorting Spanish prisoners on the way toFrance was attacked by guerrillas; 600-700French were killed, 500 wounded and 150 takenprisoner. The 400 Spanish prisoners were setfree." In June 1813 Joseph sent desperateorders from Burgos ordering Clausel to joinhim. 1,500 men escorted the message whichreached Clausel but his reply did not reachJoseph. 36From the beginning to end, the Peninsularcampaign swallowed up 600,000 French troops,of whom 300,000 became casualties. Neverafter 1808 were less than 200,000 French troopsinvolved at times this rose as high as 370,000.Even following his defeat in Russia, Napoleonwas forced to leave 200,000 troops in Spainwhile Wellington commanded a mixed British,Spanish and Portuguese force of about 70,000aided of course by the guerrillas.The numbers involved on the Peninsular aresignificant when compared with the period ofThe Terror when France had an effectivearmy of about 600,000 although its theoreticalstrength stood at 1,100,000. The Peninsulargreatly weakened Napoleon elsewhere as rarelyafter 1808 was he able to muster a decisivemajority at the point of battle. Thus at Ratisbonin April 1809 he was able to muster only172,700 troops compared with ArchdukeCharles' 161,500" and at Wagram on 4 July1809, 189,000 against 167,500 supported byTyrolese rebels in Napoleon's rear. 38 Whenforced to meet enemies on equal terms hesuffered much greater casualties and the resultswere often inconclusive. In any case it isimprobable that his enemies would have takento the field had they not been encouraged byevents in the Peninsular.The Peninsular proved to be expensive inother ways. It diverted Napoleon's most successfulgenerals, including Massena, Ney,