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Keewatin v. Minister of Natural Resources

Keewatin v. Minister of Natural Resources

Keewatin v. Minister of Natural Resources

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Part 10. Findings <strong>of</strong> Fact Part I 149Q. And that sort <strong>of</strong> understanding post-1867 that this is the federal government's responsibility,right?A. Yes, that's correct.Q. Part <strong>of</strong> their responsibility for Indians?A. Yes, that's correct.Q. And if we go over to page 58, to the opening <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fer. This is Morris' <strong>of</strong>fer. It's framed in thewords:"'I want to settle all matters both <strong>of</strong> the past and present, so that the white and red man willalways be friends.'"Again, he's framing the <strong>of</strong>fer squarely within that historic treaty-making role, correct?A. The treaty-making role, yes, certainly.Q. Which by this time Morris clearly understood was vested in the federal government?A. Well, since 1867.Q. So what he's alluding to here is the responsibility <strong>of</strong> the federal government to Indians, right?A. Correct.[731] I have earlier quoted portions from Morris' essays, speeches and book where hementioned Canada's responsibility to the Indians.2011 ONSC 4801 (CanLII)[732] On January 22, Chartrand agreed and I find that the Commissioners understood that at thetime they negotiated the Treaty, the Dominion Government had a responsibility to Indians unders. 91(24), which would continue under the Treaty, even within Ontario if Canada lost theBoundary Dispute.[733] I accept Milloy's evidence that while Canada's policy as <strong>of</strong> 1873 was generally toassimilate Indians, general policy considerations here gave way to other priorities. I accept thatCanada's biggest post-Confederation challenge was assimilating its huge new Empire to the Westand that its goal <strong>of</strong> assimilating Indians was manifestly less important. Given the precarioussecurity in the West involving First Nations threats, Canada, like the Imperial Government haddone much earlier, recognized the wisdom <strong>of</strong> continuing the policies and strategies that had beenbehind the Proclamation <strong>of</strong> 1763. Those responsible for Canadian Indian Affairs returned to thepolicy <strong>of</strong> "conciliation" and the making <strong>of</strong> promises <strong>of</strong> protection necessary to achieveconciliation.[734] While I do not doubt that Morris was aware <strong>of</strong> the federal policy <strong>of</strong> assimilating Indians,I accept Milloy's evidence that implementation <strong>of</strong> Indian policy prior to 1873 had not beenuniform. In this case, the Commissioners and the members <strong>of</strong> the Canadian Privy Council whoprovided their authority and approved the Treaty terms were weighing various national priorities.In the circumstances here, assimilation <strong>of</strong> the West required peace and friendship with the Treaty3 Ojibway.[735] I accept Milloy's evidence that, historically, the Department <strong>of</strong> Indian Affairs wasdirected from the top and Indians were insulated from local settlers and governments whom theImperial government had perceived could not be trusted to deal fairly with Indians. Part <strong>of</strong> therationale for the placement <strong>of</strong> s. 91(24) with the federal government was protection <strong>of</strong> theminority Indian interest. I accept Milloy's evidence that Treaty Commissioners intended tointerpose Canada between the Indians and settlers.

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