OneSteel Annual Report 201152In determining the level and composition of executive remuneration, OneSteel draws onindependent external advisers to ensure its practices are market competitive, flexible andin keeping with emerging trends and good corporate governance. These specifically wereEgan Associates and the Hay Group.Remuneration is reviewed annually towards the end of the financial year and changesare applied from 1 July for the Lead Team. The Human Resources Committee reviews theMD & CEO’s and Lead Team remuneration arrangements.The remuneration structure is designed to ensure that executives have a significantportion of remuneration at risk. A review of the market in 2010 further suggested thata greater weighting of at-risk remuneration would be appropriate. Accordingly, for thefinancial year ended 30 June 2011, the Lead Team STI target payment was reset from 40%to 50% of fixed annual reward. This excluded the MD & CEO’s target which was retained at60% of fixed annual reward. The following sets out the target mix of fixed andat-risk pay (as a proportion out of a total 100%) for the MD & CEO and Lead Team.MD & CEOLead TeamLong-Term Incentive 36% 25%Short-Term Incentive 24% 25%Fixed annual reward 40% 50%D. EXECUTIVE REMUNERATIONFor the Lead Team, remuneration consistsof fixed annual reward (incorporatingconsideration for a base salary and otherbenefits including superannuation, salarysacrifice items, employment benefits andappropriate tax) and at-risk components.The at-risk components comprise:• Short-Term Incentives (STI), givingexecutives the opportunity to earna cash bonus, contingent uponperformance against a combination ofGroup financial and safety targets, andindividual key performance indicators,and• Long-Term Incentives (LTI), givingexecutives the opportunity to acquireOneSteel shares where they succeedin achieving outcomes linked to thecreation of long-term sustainable growthfor shareholders over a three to five-yearperiod.Fixed annual rewardThe level of salary is set so as to providea level of remuneration that is bothappropriate to the executive’s skills,experience and performance as well ascompetitive in the market. Salaries arereviewed annually. The process entailsreview of the Group, division and individualperformance, comparative market andinternal remuneration information andindependent external advice on policiesand practices. In all cases, independentadvice received from Egan Associatesand the Hay Group is used to determinemarket movement and to provide input intorecommended changes to executives’ fixedannual reward.Members of the Lead Team are providedflexibility to receive their fixed annualreward in a variety of forms, including cash,superannuation and employment benefitssuch as motor vehicles.Short-Term Incentive (STI)The STI aims to reward participatingemployees for the achievement of agreedfinancial, safety, business and personalgoals. It is administered over the financialyear. In broad terms, OneSteel’s STI Planprinciples and structures for executives areas follows;• The performance conditions used forthe STI Plan are established annually bythe Board for the Lead Team and reflectstrategic business plans and budgets.• Payments under the STI Plan are basedon a set percentage of fixed annualreward for achievement of goals.Payments can range from nil to 200% ofthe target range. 200% is only paid ontruly outstanding “stretch” outcomes.• The principal weighting (between 70%and 80%) relates to achievement offinancial targets. In 2010–2011, thesetargets were to deliver set Net ProfitAfter Tax, Earnings Per Share andCash outcomes.• All executives have a 10% weighting onsafety performance improvements.• The balance of performance targets(between 10% and 20%) relates toachievement of personal goals.• In all cases, payments are intended toreward continuous improvement and notto reward maintenance of the status quo.• Satisfactory performance is a prerequisitefor participation in the STI.Participation may be suspended orreduced where a participant has fallenshort of performance expectations.• Lead Team members’ actual STIpayments are subject to approval bythe Board.• If an executive ceases employment withOneSteel before the STI targets areachieved for the relevant year, then theexecutive will generally not be entitled toreceive an STI payment.• OneSteel reserves the right to modify orcancel the STI Plan at any time. This mayoccur due to unsatisfactory businessperformance and/or other significantchanges in business operating conditionsor assumptions.Executives participate in an annualperformance review process that assessesperformance against key accountabilitiesand job goals. Performance against theseaccountabilities and goals impacts directlyon STI payments. In addition to an annualperformance review, regular performancediscussions with executives occur duringthe financial year. The process ensuresthere is clarity in the communication andunderstanding of key business drivers andtargets. These performance discussionsalso serve to provide feedback, to plandevelopment initiatives and to aidsuccession planning.MD & CEO and Lead Team STI paymentsfor outcomes achieved during the yearended 30 June 2011 averaged 42% oftarget. Financial target outcomes for theyear ended 30 June 2011 were not achievedprimarily as a result of the very challengingand volatile business environmentfacing the Company and accordingly noSTI payments were made in respect offinancial measures.STI safety payments were applied as aresult of a significant reduction in MedicalTreatment Injury Frequency Rate andan across the board improvement inthe identification and management ofsignificant safety risks.STI payments in respect of theachievement of individual executivepersonal goals included consideration ofacquisition projects, business restructuringand cost reductions, new businessdevelopments and major capital projects.Long-Term Incentive (LTI)The objective of the LTI Plan is toreward the participating executives forthe sustained creation of shareholderwealth. In broad terms, OneSteel’s LTI forexecutives is as follows:• The LTI Plan is an equity-based incentiveplan linked to the achievement ofspecific strategic objectives over at leasta three-year performance period.• Participation in the LTI Plan is onlyoffered to the Lead Team and selectedemployees who are able to significantlyinfluence OneSteel’s performance overthe long term and therefore the creationof shareholder wealth.• The LTI offers participants theopportunity to own OneSteel ordinaryshares if selected Board approvedperformance hurdles are met over athree-year period.During the year ended 30 June 2011, theCompany replaced the existing LTI SharePlan with a new Performance Rights Plan(PRP). The new PRP will apply from 1July 2011, with the existing LTI Share Planremaining in operation until all unvestedshares held in Trust have either vestedor the executive’s entitlement lapses.A summary of the key attributes of theexisting LTI Share Plan and new PRP areset out below.
Remuneration ReportAttribute LTI Share Plan (Former Scheme) LTI Performance Rights Plan (New Scheme)Award OneSteel shares held in Trust Rights to fully paid OneSteel ordinary sharesPerformance Period Three years Three yearsAccess to Retesting Yes, up to five years (see detailed explanation below) No retestingPerformance HurdlesVestingDividends50% of shares assessed against Relative TotalShareholder Return, measured against theS&P/ASX 200 index, excluding banks, mediaand telecommunications50% of rights assessed against RelativeTotal Shareholder Return, measured againstthe S&P/ASX 200 index, excluding consumerdiscretionary, consumer staples, financialservices, health, information technology andtelecommunications services sectors50% of shares assessed against CPI plus 5% 50% of shares assessed against compound annualgrowth in average earnings per share. Targetestablished by the Board for each allocationShares vest in proportion to the performancehurdles met (see table below)Paid from initial allocation irrespective of whethershares are vested or unvestedVoting Rights Yes NoRights vest in proportion to the performancehurdles met (see table below)No dividends payable until the rights vest andshares allotted53Performance Rights Plan (PRP) (New Scheme)Lead Team members and selected executives will be offered the opportunity to participate in an LTI which is delivered through aPerformance Rights Plan (PRP) from 1 July 2011. This replaces the previous LTI Share Plan with all future allocations to be made underthe PRP.There are two performance hurdles under the PRP with 50% of rights vesting against each hurdle. One hurdle is OneSteel’s TotalShareholder Return (TSR) relative to a Comparator Index. The second, which replaces the previous CPI-based hurdle, relates to OneSteel’sEarnings Per Share (EPS).The new LTI Plan is delivered in OneSteel performance rights (rights), over ordinary OneSteel shares, which are subject to performancehurdles over a three-year performance period. As executives are issued with rights rather than shares, there are no voting entitlementsattached, nor are any dividends paid until such time as the rights vest and the shares are allotted.These two complementary performance measures have been carefully and specifically determined by the Board so as to provideexecutives with an incentive to create shareholder wealth over a sustained period.OneSteel’s TSR performance relative to the Comparator IndexTSR measures the growth in the price of OneSteel’s ordinary shares plus dividends notionally reinvested. The relative TSR hurdle willmeasure OneSteel’s TSR ranking against entities in the TSR ranking group as at the start of the Performance Period for the TSR hurdle.The TSR ranking group will be all of the companies in the S&P/ASX 200 Index, excluding the consumer discretionary, consumer staples,financial services, health, information technology and telecommunications services sectors (approximately 115 companies in total).The benchmark companies chosen for the PRP for comparing OneSteel’s TSR are not dissimilar from the index which was adopted bythe Company under the Former Scheme (refer below). Having regard to the nature of OneSteel’s operations, its customer and supplierbase and its international reach, it was considered inappropriate for the Company’s relative TSR to be compared with local consumerfocusedbusinesses, those in financial services, healthcare, information technology or telecommunications. In adopting the balance ofthe S&P/ASX 200 index, the comparators contain all industrial companies, all materials and resources companies and significant otherswhich, in the Board’s judgement, represent a testing group of relevant comparators. For all rights to vest in respect of this performancehurdle, the Company’s TSR over the three-year period will have to out-perform more than 85 of the relevant companies (115) which theBoard believes represents an appropriate stretch performance target.For the 2011 offer, the performance period for the relative TSR hurdle will be the three-year period commencing from 1 July 2011 andending 30 June 2014 (Performance Period). For the purposes of this measurement, TSR will be calculated over a 10 consecutive tradingday period starting two months prior to the end date of the Performance Period and ending two months after the end date of thePerformance Period. The relevant 10 consecutive trading day period will be determined by that which gives the highest level of vestingachieved during the Performance Period.Fifty percent of the total rights awarded vest to participants at the end of the three-year Performance Period subject to the performanceof OneSteel’s TSR relative to the Comparator Index over the Performance Period according to the following table:TSR Performance relative to the Comparator IndexProportion of rights vesting as OneSteel ordinary sharesBelow the 50th percentileNilAt the 50th percentile 50%Between the 50th percentile and 75th percentile Pro-rata straight-line between 50% and 100%At or above the 75th percentile 100%OneSteel’s Earnings Per Share (EPS)EPS is the base EPS disclosed in OneSteel’s full year financial report. The EPS hurdle will measure OneSteel’s EPS growth (as an annualcompound percentage) between the final year of the performance period for the EPS hurdle (being the year ending 30 June 2014 forthe 2011 Offer) and the financial year ending immediately prior to the date of grant of the rights (being the year ended 30 June 2011 forthe 2011 Offer). EPS growth is then compared against the EPS targets for OneSteel as determined by the Board for the correspondingperiod. The EPS targets will comprise a minimum threshold EPS growth target and a maximum EPS growth target. For the 2011 Offer, thethreshold EPS growth target will be 5%. The maximum EPS growth target is 12%.