Benin report - Institut Africain de la Gouvernance

CHAPTER FOUR: ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT__________________________________________________________________________International ranking of 2004. As a result of the aggregated nature of thecorruption perception index, this ranking provides little information on therelationship between corruption and individual economic operators. Otherreferences noted in the additional readings concern the World Bank survey ona limited sampling of enterprises to analyse the investment climate in Benin.The activity report of the OLC quotes the statement by the minister of financeand economy in a lecture-discussion organised in January 2000 byTransparency International in Cotonou. This states that corruption in Beninreduces GDP and state revenue each year by three points. This represents theequivalent of about 50 billion CFA franc (page 16). The last OLC White Paperconsiders the issue but without the data that can give an accurate idea of theextent of the phenomenon. This shortage of data limits the government‟scapacity to adopt appropriate measures at the macroeconomic and sectorallevels to fight corruption effectively.488. The CRM also notes that the bill on the prevention of, and fight against,corruption and money laundering – initiated by the government in November2006 and tabled before the National Assembly – has not yet been discussed inorder that the law may be passed. According to discussions held with theBureau of the National Assembly, the delay is due to the fact that the billshould be examined by other judiciary authorities, particularly the SupremeCourt and the Constitutional Court, before it is considered by theparliamentarians and eventually passed.489. The CSAR emphasises the government‟s efforts to identify cases of corruptionand to impose sanctions on offenders. These efforts include the creation of theCMVP, FONAC and the OLC. However, no analysis is made on theeffectiveness of these mechanisms. The CRM noted that the CMVP no longerexists and that the efforts made by FONAC and OLC are, given the spread ofcorruption, ineffective. The limited efficiency of the two bodies could be dueto the fact that their services are not decentralised to other departments, andthat they do not have the power to sanction people identified as being involvedin corruption cases. Furthermore, the staff of these two institutions are notremunerated and there is a lack of incentive to do their work, although OLCstaff members are paid allowances for their transport and participation inmeetings. This may discourage staff from personally engaging ininvestigations and may make them susceptible to bribes by people involved invarious forms of corruption. Finally, staff members are threatened bygovernment employees identified as being involved in corruption cases. Theydo not have any protection against physical attack and their careers could bejeopardised.Good practice 4.1: The directory of reference prices and the Code on the PublicDeclaration of AssetsThe Ministry of Development, Economy and Finance drew up a directory of reference pricesfor the purchase of goods for public administration in May 2007. It is hoped that the directorywill optimise public expenditure. The directory of reference prices, which covers 2,840products, is an initiative in the fight against corruption. Its application will help to minimise173