Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

The Active Mediator93They agreed to negotiate a declaration of principles on the interim period without theinclusion of Jerusalem. Abu Ala had to give in again, just as he had been forced to doon the ‘Gaza first’ issue. However, this move had a tremendously positive effect onSavir and the rest of the team back in Israel. The PLO had shown that it was preparedto make concessions and be flexible. 33Another of Savir’s instructions was on the question of how disputes ought to besolved in the interim period. As the Israeli team saw it, the Palestinians had to droptheir traditional demand that all outstanding questions should be referred to binding internationalarbitration. Israel did not want to ‘introduce another Security Councilmechanism. The point is to learn to solve our problems on our own’. 34 The Israelis didnot want any interference from outside. The Israelis and the Palestinians were going tolive together, argued Savir and the Israeli negotiators. They therefore had to solve theirdifferences through dialogue. 35The different positions clearly reflected the asymmetry between the two sides. Israel,being the stronger party with a deep dislike and distrust of the UN, wanted the partiesto handle the problems themselves. 36 But the Israelis had little to fear. The Palestinians,on the other hand, wanted backing and help from the international community inone way or another. Ultimately, however, the Palestinians in Oslo would also have togive in on this point. 37Savir was instructed to indicate that Israel was willing to create autonomy in Gazafirst and to possibly move the PLO leadership there. However, Arafat pressed for theaddition of Jericho in order to secure a foothold on the West Bank. Abu Ala suggestedthat a joint Israeli–Palestinian police force could patrol the Allenby Bridge, but thatreal control of the bridge should stay in the hands of Israel. It is unclear how Savir respondedto the Jericho suggestion as such. However, in his report summarizing andanalysing his impressions after this first visit to Oslo, he recognized the importance ofthe Jericho idea for the Palestinians. Finally, according to his instructions, Savir was toseek to change, but not negotiate, the drafted statement of principles and to stress theissues of security and economic cooperation. 3833 Beilin 1999, pp. 85–88; Peres 1995, pp. 331–333; Savir 1998, pp. 5–28; Makovsky 1996, pp. 46–49; Corbin 1994a, 84–86; Heikal 1996, p 443. According to Makovsky 1996, pp. 42–43, AbuAla had already, during the weekend of 30 April–1 May, informed Hirschfeld that the PLO hadagreed to exclude Jerusalem. This was obviously just a verbal promise to Hirschfeld, not somethingput down in writing. According to Makovsky, the PLO had also agreed to finesse the issueof whether Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem could both stand as candidates and vote inelections for the interim self-rule authority. The final declaration of principles stated ambiguouslythat Palestinians from Jerusalem could ‘have the right to participate in the election process,according to an agreement between the two parties’. Declaration of Principles, Annex I.34 Savir 1998, p. 6.35 Beilin 1999, pp. 85–88; Peres 1995, pp. 331–333; Savir 1998, pp. 5–28; Makovsky 1996, pp. 46–49.36 However, among other important questions on which Israel wanted to ‘revise [its] position on ...basic ideas’, the question of trusteeship, also in the Sarpsborg DoP, seems not to have beenraised by Savir during this round. The trusteeship proposal was removed later.37 Beilin 1999, pp. 85–88; Peres 1995, pp. 331–333; Savir 1998, pp. 5–28; Makovsky 1996, pp. 46–49.38 Same references as above.