Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

90 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Business’JerichoWhy was not Jericho or another West Bank city included in the negotiating processfrom the very beginning? Why did the leaders of the PLO put forward the Gaza optionas a solution, with no reference whatsoever to Jericho or the West Bank? This questionpuzzled and worried the Israeli participants. Chairman Arafat knew that a Gaza–Jericho offer had been put on the table by Peres a couple of months earlier. 18Not least Peres himself was deeply surprised. Had the PLO now ‘given up on theidea, or were their envoys unaware that such an offer had been made, in which casethey were not as senior as we had been led to believe’, the Israeli team asked themselves.19 However, the Gaza-first-and-only-situation did not last for very long. At themeeting in Oslo on 30 April 1993, Abu Ala threw the Jericho idea into the ring again.It was Arafat who had asked Abu Ala to put Jericho firmly on the agenda. 20Both the Israelis and the Palestinians knew that Gaza was not the prize. That wouldhave to be the offer of a West Bank town. The PLO would then gain a foothold on thefar more important West Bank. The idea presented by Abu Ala was that Israel shouldwithdraw from Gaza and Jericho at the same time. The Palestinians on the West Bankwould not believe in any Israeli withdrawal from their territory if the withdrawal actuallytook place only in Gaza. To create confidence, there had to be a symbolic withdrawalfrom the West Bank too. Jericho was free from Jewish settlements, which usuallycomplicated the issue. From the PLO’s point of view, the purpose was very clear:the West Bank would be included in the interim agreement. If developments werepositive, other West Bank towns could be vacated by the Israeli army later. The obviousdanger of Gaza first and only would also be avoided. 21There was, however, one complicating factor linked to the Gaza-plus-Jericho proposal.In Oslo, Abu Ala had only mentioned Jericho. But Jericho had a wider significance,namely its proximity to the Jordan River, and consequently to Jordan itself.Peres had for years preferred a confederative arrangement between the Jordanians andthe Palestinians. For him, such an arrangement might be the basis for a permanent solutionto the Palestinian problem: ‘[Jericho’s] proximity to the Jordan River opened apreferred solution, in my eyes, for the future: a confederation between Jordanians andPalestinians.’ 22 Peres also believed that Rabin would agree to the Jericho idea becausewithdrawal from Jericho had long been envisaged in mainstream Labour Party thinking. 2318 Corbin 1994a, pp. 68–69; Peres 1995, pp. 330–331; Beilin 1999, pp. 74–75, 78, 82; Savir 1998, p.6; Makovsky 1996, pp. 34–38, 46, 48; Lundberg 1998, pp. 41–42; Abbas 1995, pp. 199–204, beinggenerally inaccurate on details, facts and context.19 Beilin 1999, p. 75.20 Corbin 1994a, pp. 68–69; Peres 1995, pp. 330–331; Beilin 1999, pp. 74–75, 78, 82; Savir 1998, p.6; Makovsky 1996, pp. 34–38, 46, 48; Lundberg 1998, pp. 41–42; Abbas 1995, pp. 199–204.21 Same references as above.22 Peres 1993, p. 23.23 Corbin 1994a, pp. 68–69; Peres 1995, pp. 330–331; Beilin 1999, pp. 74–75, 78, 82; Savir 1998, p.6; Makovsky 1996, pp. 34–38, 46, 48; Lundberg 1998, pp. 41–42; Abbas 1995, pp. 199–204.