Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

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6 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Business’the USA in the Middle East was used as an illustrative example. The USA was powerfulcompared to the other states of the region. The Americans also had a clear interestin how the disputes in the Middle East were settled. The Camp David Accords of 1978were mainly achieved because the USA offered substantial rewards to both parties.This view of mediation placed the ‘emphasis on powerful, interested mediators, whoaffect the negotiations in easily understood ways, by offering carrots and sticks to theparticipants to get them to agree’. 16The strong and unbiased mediator would perhaps be an ideal mediator, being capableof anything a weak mediator was but also able to come up with side-payments orencouragements to settle the dispute. But which disinterested strong third party wouldplay such a role? A dominant power with limited interest in a dispute could be interestedin the overall values of protecting peace, preventing a humanitarian disaster ordefending trade links. Such values could be threatened by civil war or internationalconflicts. The US mediation in Bosnia in the middle of the 1990s might be interpretedin this way. 17Finally, the last category, the biased yet powerless mediator, might seem a little odd.Could a weak and biased mediator have any positive influence on disputes? Would notsuch a mediator be rejected by at least one of the parties right from the start? This isnot necessarily the case. Indeed, a biased mediator can be helpful when it comes to informationand communication: ‘good relations between the mediator and one partymay in fact be an aid to communication, to developing creative proposals, and tobringing the two parties’ positions into convergence’. 18 ‘Closeness to one party impliesthe possibility of “delivering” it, thereby stimulating the other party’s cooperation.’19 Parties do not automatically reject mediators who are biased against them.Mediation will improve the welfare of both parties. Biased mediators may succeed ingetting ‘the side towards which they are biased to make concessions, or not make largedemands’. 20 Consequently, an effective mediator could be described as ‘one who is biasedtowards one side, but has information to contribute about the other side’. 21 In orderto be credible, a biased mediator needs to share the preferences of one of the partiesin the negotiations. ‘Such a mediator could be trusted to send the correct signal truthfullyregardless of whether it increases the likelihood of war or not. This provides support forthe idea that mediators do not need to be unbiased to have beneficial effects.’ 22Do these theories and attempts at generalizing bring us any further when it comes toexplaining the role of Norway? Are they useful tools? Norway had the rare combinationof being traditionally close to Israel while having more recently established a rela-16 Kydd 2000, p. 7.17 Kydd 2000, pp. 7–8.18 Kydd 2000, p. 8.19 Zartman 1996, p. 451.20 Kydd 2000, p. 29.21 Kydd 2000, p. 32.22 Kydd 2000, p. 33, see also pp. 2–5, 8, 26, 29–33.
Introduction7tionship with the Palestinians and the PLO. Did this place Norway, with its traditionalclose friendship to Israel and its asymmetrical relationship to the parties, in the powerlessand biased mediator category? Again, in order to answer such a question, the kindof intermediary role played by Norway must be analysed, as well as its room for manoeuvrewithin this setting. Furthermore, did Norway play only one role, or can wedistinguish between different actors, various roles and shifting phases during the Osloprocess? Did Norway pursue a variety of activities and roles? And finally, and notleast, did Norway have a mediating role at all?The Norwegian actors basically saw themselves as playing only a facilitating role inthe process. There seems to be little doubt that the Norwegian role in 1993, at least initially,was based on the facilitative model of third-party intervention. The Norwegiancontribution to the process consisted of getting the parties together, booking flightsand hotels, paying bills, arranging meetings and, not least, keeping the negotiationsgoing and secret. The Norwegians achieved virtually total secrecy for the talks, whichwere mainly held in isolated locations, where the participants were forced to spendmost of their time with each other. A warm, friendly, humorous atmosphere developed.There was also solidarity of purpose, with each side ready to engage in the kindof give and take necessary to reach a negotiated agreement, convinced that the otherside shared this outlook. The Norwegian actors emphasized the friendships that werecreated between the main players, the small-group setting and, above all, the secrecyand intimacy of the facilitative approach. The emphasis was on breaking down stereotypes,smoothing over existential obstacles, removing misunderstandings and overcominga lack of willingness to talk. 23Originally, the Oslo Back Channel was initiated as a supplement to the official negotiationsin Washington. The intention was to break out of the deadlocked Washingtonprocess and develop new concepts and formulations that could later be transferredback into the main track. In contrast to the intense media scrutiny in the US capital,playing the gallery was absent in the secret Oslo negotiations. But gradually the negotiationsin Norway replaced the process in Washington. How could a small, cosy andsecret setting in Norway in any way compete with and replace the huge and prestigiousone in Washington?One of the advantages of facilitation is that it uses an incremental approach. At theoutset, only minor issues are put on the negotiating table. Once some sort of compromisehas been reached on these, the parties move on to the more difficult problems.This idea underlay the Oslo process. The status of Gaza was to predate the status of Jerusalem.All difficult questions – such as the Palestinian refugee problem and issues ofborders, statehood or settlements – were deferred to future negotiations, with no guarantees.During the interim period, the Israelis and the Palestinians were going to learnto trust each other and to overcome mutual suspicion. ‘Thus, the facilitator, like thepsychoanalyst, does not attempt to impose a solution on the disputants. Like a magician,the facilitator only invokes the spectre of communicative power. The facilitator23 Jones 1999, pp. 129, 143–144; Pruitt 1997a, pp. 178–181.
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