Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

More documents

Recommendations

Info

210 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Business’set up, consisting of Uri Savir, Abu Ala and Jan Egeland. In order to strengthen theprogramme and to increase its capacity for implementation, a joint secretariat was establishedin Jerusalem in 1996, headed by Fafo. 283Norway was not the only operator in the peacebuilding market. After 1993, peacebuildingactivities had mushroomed. A range of US organizations placed huge advertisementsin Hebrew and Arabic newspapers, asking for peace- and confidencebuildingpartners. Many European countries did the same. Money was poured into theMiddle East in order to secure this big peace effort. The Palestinians understood thatthey could use the competitive element to secure as much donor money as possible. Ina letter to Jan Egeland, Hanssen-Bauer stressed that Norway was put under ‘mild pressurefrom the parties who are constantly telling us that the Americans and others areready to move in and that they plan to get rid of Norway by dollars’. Hanssen-Bauerbelieved that the P2P programme was important for securing Norway’s high profile inthe peace process. In order to ‘preserve the territory’, Norway should go in with moremoney than the Americans and be an active third party in the planning and implementationof the programme, he recommended. That this was also the only way to secureFafo’s interests is self-evident. 284Negative political developments in the peace process did not favour the P2P concept.Even if the structure of the programme was in place and the main points had beenagreed, the programme did not start up until late autumn 1996, and then on a muchless ambitious scale. By then, the emphasis was on the NGO sector. The P2P programmehad no chance of becoming a political ‘hotline’. Contrary to earlier thinking,the idea by then was that the entire P2P programme should be depoliticized and distancedfrom political developments. This was necessary if any projects were to be implementedat all. Interest in the programme was fading on the Palestinian side. Palestiniansupport of the programme had always been somewhat ambiguous and reluctant.The criticism from the Palestinian side was that the P2P programme was trying tonormalize a basically asymmetric situation. As early as 1997, the Palestinian leadersmade it clear that they were opposed to a relaunch of the programme. The P2P conceptdid not work as a Palestinian peace strategy. 285However, nor did the P2P project work as an Israeli peace strategy. The election ofLikud leader Binyamin Netanyahu in May 1996 definitely produced a changed attitude283 UD 385.32/42, 95/12028-24, Foreign Ministry to Tel Aviv, 21 February 1996; Jan Egeland’sprivate archive, Fafo to Foreign Ministry, 14 February 1996; memorandum of 20 February 1996,Wennesland; Berg 2002, pp. 39–51.284 UD 385.32/42, 95/12028-9, Hanssen-Bauer to Egeland 4 January 1996: ‘Vi blir satt under etmildt press fra partene ved at de stadig forteller oss at amerikanerne og andre står klare til å rykkeinn og at de planlegger å feie Norge av banen med dollar.... Jeg tror det vil være en fordel omNorge bestemmer seg for en pott øremerket til P2P, større enn den halve millionen dollar amerikanernefrister med, men ikke nødvendigvis stor.... Og Norge har et legitimt behov for involveringfor å sikre sine egne investeringer og saksbehandling i forhold til finansiering, og for å “holdereviret”.’; see also Rømming 2003, p. 46–47; Waage 2000b.285 UD 385.32/42, 95/12028-57, Tel Aviv to Foreign Ministry, 11 November 1996; Berg 2002, pp.42–51; Rømming 2003, pp. 47–48.
Implementing Peace211in the Israeli government and foreign ministry, with the new prime minister refusing toimplement substantial parts of the Interim Agreement. ‘It is by definition impossibleto run P2P when the Israelis close the borders. The idea, more wholeheartedly supportedby liberal Israelis than Palestinians, was to the largest extent sabotaged by Israel’,Jan Egeland explained. Norway repeatedly raised this paradox with Israel, but wasunable to do much more. As so many times before, Norway, the facilitator, was lefthelpless in the face of political developments. 286Once again, Norway had chosen its own role with regard to P2P. Egeland, perhapsoverenthusiastically, had seized upon the P2P idea and had worked hard for it. Norwayhad agreed to act as facilitator and financial benefactor even before the InterimAgreement had been signed. The P2P programme was a sign of Norway’s good intentionsin a somewhat overoptimistic peace strategy. The aim had been to use P2P tochange the ‘basic image of the other, in order [to] improve the [chances] for reachingan accord’, as Hanssen-Bauer put it. 287 According to Egeland, it had become ‘increasinglyclear that the understanding and trust reached between the political leaders andthe negotiators [had] not filtered down to the ordinary man and woman. The peopleto-peopleexercise [would] hopefully do away with some of the stereotyped ideas andfears that still [existed] as we move down the road to peace’. 288Norway’s TIPH engagement did not exactly turn out as expected either, although itdefinitely secured a role for the country. The Interim Agreement stated that there ‘willbe a Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH)’. The details were not fullyworked out, but both sides were to ‘agree on the modalities of the TIPH, including thenumber of its members and its area of operation’. 289 This agreement, reached on 9May 1996, asked ‘Norway to provide 50–60 persons, citizens of Norway, as TIPHpersonnel’. The modalities of the operation were to be ‘established by Norway withthe agreement of the two sides’. 290The TIPH was to have no military or police functions. The mission should ‘assist inpromoting stability and in monitoring and reporting the efforts to maintain normal life inthe city of Hebron’, thereby ‘creating a feeling of security among Palestinians’. However,unlike the previous operation in 1994, the new TIPH mission was linked directly tothe pending Israeli withdrawal from Hebron. According to the agreement, TIPH staffwere to be drawn from Norway alone, and the agreement would remain in force only286 Quoted after Berg 2002, p. 50: ‘Det øyeblikket israelerne stenger grensene, er det per definisjonumulig å drive P2P. Ideen som ble mer helhjerta støttet av liberale israelere enn palestinere, vardet Israel som i kanskje størst grad saboterte.’ See also Berg 2002, pp. 42–51; Rømming 2003,pp. 47–48.287 Quoted after Berg 2002, p. 36.288 Ibid.289 Interim Agreement, Annex 1, Article VII.290 See ‘Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron 9 May 1996’,available at http://www.ariga.com/treaties/tiph596.shtml (accessed 23 June 2003); see also308.882, 96/00265-52, Foreign Ministry to Tel Aviv, 13 May 1996, Egeland to Singer/Erakat, 13May 1996, enclosed. This exchange of letters confirmed the Norwegian participation in theTIPH.
Page 4:
Institutt for fredsforskningInterna
Page 7:
PREFACEIN JANUARY 2001, it was agre
Page 10 and 11:
2 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Busines
Page 12 and 13:
Page 14 and 15:
Page 16 and 17:
Page 18 and 19:
10 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Busine
Page 21 and 22:
Chapter 1THE ROAD TO OSLOIDEALLY, M
Page 23 and 24:
The Road to Oslo15Palestinians real
Page 25 and 26:
The Road to Oslo17new Israeli gover
Page 27 and 28:
The Road to Oslo19than ever. The Re
Page 29 and 30:
The Road to Oslo21acceptance of the
Page 31 and 32:
The Road to Oslo23After 1945, the i
Page 33 and 34:
The Road to Oslo25headway. The new
Page 35 and 36:
The Road to Oslo27The Madrid Confer
Page 37:
The Road to Oslo29cial framework of
Page 40 and 41:
Page 42 and 43:
Page 44 and 45:
Page 46 and 47:
Page 48 and 49:
Page 50 and 51:
Page 52 and 53:
Page 54 and 55:
Page 56 and 57:
Page 59 and 60:
Chapter 3THE MODEST FACILITATOR‘T
Page 61 and 62:
The Modest Facilitator53state. The
Page 63 and 64:
The Modest Facilitator55overcome. F
Page 65 and 66:
The Modest Facilitator57accident. I
Page 67 and 68:
The Modest Facilitator59The Oslo op
Page 69 and 70:
The Modest Facilitator61underground
Page 71 and 72:
The Modest Facilitator63kinds of st
Page 73 and 74:
The Modest Facilitator65and I will
Page 75 and 76:
The Modest Facilitator67ister Rabin
Page 77 and 78:
The Modest Facilitator69had been -
Page 79 and 80:
The Modest Facilitator71Rød Larsen
Page 81 and 82:
The Modest Facilitator7379 and in W
Page 83 and 84:
The Modest Facilitator75such an app
Page 85 and 86:
The Modest Facilitator77be accused
Page 87 and 88:
The Modest Facilitator79former US s
Page 89 and 90:
The Modest Facilitator81providing c
Page 91 and 92:
The Modest Facilitator83the importa
Page 93 and 94:
Chapter 4THE ACTIVE MEDIATORAFTER F
Page 95 and 96:
The Active Mediator87retary in the
Page 97 and 98:
The Active Mediator89of the session
Page 99 and 100:
The Active Mediator91But Rabin was
Page 101 and 102:
The Active Mediator93They agreed to
Page 103 and 104:
The Active Mediator95come first. At
Page 105 and 106:
The Active Mediator97Singer taking
Page 107 and 108:
The Active Mediator99A frustrated A
Page 109 and 110:
The Active Mediator101However, the
Page 111 and 112:
The Active Mediator103the second ph
Page 113 and 114:
The Active Mediator105areas. In fac
Page 115 and 116:
The Active Mediator107ings and emot
Page 117 and 118:
The Active Mediator109DoP. For the
Page 119 and 120:
The Active Mediator111Peres had pre
Page 121 and 122:
The Active Mediator113legitimacy fo
Page 123 and 124:
The Active Mediator115In Israel, R
Page 125 and 126:
The Active Mediator117Washington. 1
Page 127 and 128:
The Active Mediator119the changed I
Page 129 and 130:
The Active Mediator121an extra trip
Page 131 and 132:
The Active Mediator123Palestinians
Page 133 and 134:
The Active Mediator125The points of
Page 135 and 136:
The Active Mediator127point of view
Page 137 and 138:
The Active Mediator129Peres knew th
Page 139 and 140:
The Active Mediator131all Israelis
Page 141 and 142:
The Active Mediator133asleep, but w
Page 143 and 144:
The Active Mediator135Three major i
Page 145 and 146:
The Active Mediator137ment would be
Page 147 and 148:
The Active Mediator139ting guarante
Page 149 and 150:
The Active Mediator141Informing the
Page 151 and 152:
The Active Mediator143was willing t
Page 153 and 154:
The Active Mediator145At the meetin
Page 155 and 156:
The Active Mediator147demanded that
Page 157:
The Active Mediator149There were tw
Page 160 and 161:
152 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Busin
Page 162 and 163:
Page 164 and 165:
Page 166 and 167:
Page 168 and 169: 160 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Busin
show all

Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?