Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

142 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Business’implementation of the deal, travelling with Peres to California to present the fruits ofour labours to the Secretary of State, and immediately thereafter playing a centralrole in the negotiations over mutual recognition with the PLO.’ 291It was the middle of the summer vacation in the USA. Both Secretary of State WarrenChristopher and the head of the Middle East peace team Dennis Ross had to suddenlyinterrupt their holidays in order to meet the Israeli and Norwegian messengers ofpeace. After Peres informed them about the back channel and the signing of the declarationof principles, Holst wished to emphasize that Norway had in fact informed theUSA about the Oslo channel. Holst felt a natural and understandable need to justifywhat he had done. He emphasized that former foreign minister Stoltenberg and StateSecretary Egeland had submitted general briefings. In addition, both Stoltenberg andHolst had informed Christopher face to face about events, and the Sarpsborg DoP hadbeen handed over to the Americans. But Holst knew, of course, that after he had takenover as foreign minister nothing had been done by Norway to provide the Americanswith a complete picture. The US peace team, including Christopher, had been unawareof the developments in the talks after the Israeli upgrading in May. And Holst had alsobeen directly asked by Beilin to hide the fact that it was the director general of the Israeliministry of foreign affairs who was negotiating with the PLO. He had also beenasked by Peres to reveal nothing about the high-level representation. 292As a result, the Norwegians had given the Americans no information since the startof real negotiations. Israel wanted to have things its way, and the Norwegian team didwhat the Israelis told them to do. For the Norwegians, it was of overall importance toproceed with the peace negotiations. They were afraid of doing anything that might upsetthe Israelis and harm the process. By that stage, negotiations were difficult enoughand the prospect of succeeding seemed remote. In addition, the two leaks regarding thechannel, probably by the Americans, contributed to this reserved position. 293For the Norwegians, protecting the Norwegian channel was the most important goal.This strategy involved a calculated risk on the part of Holst, who was willing to ‘makea gamble that things would work out’. 294 If these considerations meant keeping theUSA in the dark because Israel wanted it that way, the Norwegian foreign minister291 Beilin 1999, p. 119; see also Christopher 1998, pp. 74–81; Corbin 1994a, pp. 172–178; Beilin1999, pp. 119–123; Savir 1998, pp. 66–67; Peres 1995, pp. 343–344, 350–354; Makovsky 1996,pp. 73–75.292 Interview with Terje Rød Larsen, 21 October 2002; interview with Jan Egeland, 11 March 1999;Corbin 1994a, pp. 172–178; Beilin 1999, pp. 119–123; Savir 1998, pp. 66–67; Peres 1995, pp.343–344, 350–354; Makovsky 1996, pp. 73–75. See also the section ‘The Norwegians – Helpingon Israel’s Premises?’ (above).293 During an interview on 11 March 1999, Jan Egeland strongly emphasized the two leaks as themain reason why the Norwegians stopped informing the United States. However, as Egeland alsoconfirms, nothing was transmitted to the Americans by the Norwegians until the deal was completedin August 1993. Although still state secretary, Egeland himself played no crucial role inthe negotiations from August 1993 to January 1994.294 Interview with Terje Rød Larsen, 21 October 2002: ‘Holst gamblet på at dette ville gå, [dette] varen kalkulert risiko.’