Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

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36 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Business’frictions between the two ‘best friends’. New information flowed into the foreign anddefence ministries. 16Norwegian–Palestinian contacts were developed within the old pro-Israeli bastion,the trade union LO. But, although Norway had started to move towards a more balancedMiddle East policy, it had become clear during the 1970s that Norway was isolatedin Europe as regards its restrictive policy towards the PLO. The heated debateover Arafat’s UN performance in the autumn of 1974 had taught Foreign MinisterFrydenlund a lesson when it came to experimenting with new approaches: changingNorwegian Middle East policy in a more pro-Palestinian direction was dangerous andshould only be attempted with great care. Still, Frydenlund wanted to make NorwegianMiddle East policy more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, though he continuedto meet severe opposition and was not able to modify the strong pro-Israelstance. 17Official Norwegian policy changed hardly at all after 1974. In the meantime, hugechanges had been going on internationally and Israel had become more isolated. TheJewish state still refused to negotiate with the PLO or to give up any of the land it hadconquered. This was becoming increasingly unacceptable for a growing majority ofthe world’s states. In fact, it would have been difficult to find a single pro-Israel countryin the whole of the European Community. Even the Netherlands, traditionally considereda pro-Israeli country, sharply criticized Israel for its line on the Palestinianquestion and voted against Israel in international forums. With its restrictive policy onPalestinian matters, Norway was isolated, a remote country – in every sense – in thisEuropean context. A decreasing number of countries were voting with Norway onMiddle East questions in the UN, while Norway had one of the most restrictive policiestowards the PLO in the whole world. 1816 UD 25.11/19, 152, memorandum of 10 July 1978, Rolf Trolle Andersen (Head of Division);25.11/19, 153, memorandum of 16 August 1978, Bjørnar Utheim (Head of Division); memorandumof 18 August 1978, Torbjørn Christiansen (Head of Department); 25.11/19, 154, memorandumof 5 September 1978, Trolle Andersen; 25.11/19, 165, memorandum of 21 July 1979, Holst(State Secretary, Ministry of Defence); Tamnes 1997, p. 379; Tveit 1996, pp. 685–690; Stoltenberg2001, pp. 260–264.17 UD 25.11/19, 168, minutes from meeting between Israel Gatt (Secretary General, Israeli LabourParty) and Odvar Nordli (Prime Minister), 18 October 1979; statement from Oslo Arbeidersamfund[Oslo Labour Society], 9 November 1979; 25.11/19, 178, travel report from MiddleEast journey, LO [trade union] delegation, 30 September 1980; 25.11/19, 182, Longva to Beirut,8 April 1981; resolution from Labour Party’s Annual Meeting, 8 April 1981; 25.11/19, 185, LOto Foreign Ministry, 24 July 1981; 25.11/19, 186, LO to unions, 2 August 1982; 25.11/19, 201,LO to unions, 11 October 1982; Beirut to Foreign Ministry, 18 October 1982; 25.11/19e, 3, ForeignMinistry to Beirut, 30 July 1979; Beirut to Foreign Ministry, 12 November 1979; Aftenposten,28 July 1979; VG, 30 July 1979; Stoltenberg 2001, pp. 260–264; Johansen 1980, pp.56–66; Jebsen 1997, pp. 20–23.18 Stoltenberg 2001, pp. 260–264; Johansen 1980, pp. 56–66; Tamnes 1997, pp 379–380; Jebsen1997, pp. 20–23.
Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East37Small BeginningsSurprisingly enough, it might seem, it was Norway’s traditional position as Israel’sbest friend that made the remote country suitable and attractive as a possible mediatingpartner. And, even more surprisingly, at least at first glance, it was neither Norway itselfnor Israel that drew Norway into this position; instead, it was PLO ChairmanYasser Arafat who took the initiative and brought Norway’s name forward. Arafatconsidered Norway important because of – rather than in spite of – its close relationswith Israel. He saw Norway as an important channel that could be used in possible negotiationsin the future, a serious and decent country that could not be accused of primarilywishing to promote its own national interests. In addition to its close links tothe adversary, Norway also had strong ties with the USA, something that was definitelyneeded. In one way or another, the USA would have a major role to play in anypeace negotiations in the Middle East. 19The idea of Norway as a suitable mediator was raised seriously for the first time in1979, in connection with the Camp David Accords. The US government asked Norwayto guarantee oil deliveries to Israel, to replace oil from Iran and Sinai. For theNorwegian government, this request created a dilemma. Norway’s UNIFIL engagementrequired closer contacts with the Palestinian side, and these contacts would haveto be built from scratch by Norway’s new chargé d’affaires in Beirut from March1978, Hans Wilhelm Longva. This relationship and confidence-building process wasLongva’s major task. However, the US request for an oil guarantee to Israel could easilyhave ruined this work, thought the Norwegians. 20It was during the process of sorting out this dilemma that Norway’s possible role asa future mediator was raised by Yasser Arafat. The Norwegian foreign ministry askedLongva to discuss the oil guarantee issue with Arafat and to find out whether he wasopposed to the idea. It came as a surprise, both to Longva and to the foreign ministryin Oslo, when Arafat replied that he found the deal unproblematic. Israel would get itsoil anyway. However, as a trade-off for his acceptance of a possible Norwegian–Israeli oil deal, Arafat wanted something in return. He wanted to come to Norwaysome time in the future if he needed a secret back channel to the Israelis. At the time,Israel was governed by the hawkish Likud and wanted nothing to do with the PLO.19 UD 25.11/19, 167, memorandum of 25 September 1979, Hans Willhelm Longva (Chargéd’Affaires); 25.11/19, 176, Longva to Foreign Ministry, 27 August 1980; 25.11/19, 185, Longvato Foreign Ministry, 3 July 1981; 25.11/19, 197, memorandum of 29 July 1982, Longva; interviewwith Hans Wilhelm Longva, 24 February 1999; Tamnes 1997, pp. 379–381; Johansen1980, pp. 62–66; Jebsen 1997, pp. 21–24.20 UD 52.4/87b, 1, memoranda of 22 and 25 January, 2, 12 and 14 February 1979, Olav Bucher-Johannessen (Special Adviser); memorandum of 26 March 1979, Georg Kristiansen (SecretaryGeneral); memoranda of 23 February, 28 March and 2 April 1979, Foreign Minister to membersof government; memorandum of 3 April 1979, Thorvald Stoltenberg (State Secretary); 44.1/71,2, memorandum of 1 April 1979, Jens Evensen (Special Adviser); S.tid 1977–78, pp. 3105–3106; Tamnes 1997, pp. 197–198, 379–380; Jebsen 1997, pp. 23–24; see also UD 25.11/19, 157,minutes from meeting between Nordli and Begin, 11 December 1978, Trolle Andersen, 12 December1978; Stoltenberg 2001, p. 264.
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