Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

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10 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Business’and systematic destruction of Palestinian physical and bureaucratic infrastructure fromAugust 2000 and onwards.The lack of access to documentary evidence is compensated for by extensive use ofinterviews. I have interviewed most of the key actors on the Israeli, US and Norwegiansides. However, here again the Palestinian side is a problem. It has been extremelyhard to get access to key Palestinian actors. Israel’s reoccupation of the West Bankand Gaza made this even more difficult. Palestinian leaders were hard to reach, buteven more seriously were reluctant to talk about their own and the PLO’s involvementin the Oslo process. Understandably, there are serious problems connected to speakingopenly on peace process issues, judging from the difficult internal situation for thePalestinian leaders and politicians. But whatever strong reasons that might exist, it isnevertheless a huge problem that crucial information is missing, information thatcould have contributed to a better understanding of the Palestinian reasoning and processes.The Norwegian actors involved in the Oslo process have not written extensivelythemselves. The only account that really covers the Norwegian perspective is a bookby British journalist Jane Corbin, and the Norwegian edition of this work contains anintroduction by the three leading Norwegian actors, Terje Rød Larsen, Mona Juul andJan Egeland. Although it would be to go too far to call Corbin’s book an authorizedversion, it seems clear that this book (and the subsequent BBC documentary) to alarge degree presents the perspectives and views held at the time by Terje Rød Larsenand Mona Juul. 30 Although criticism might be raised towards Corbin’s somewhatemotional approach to the Oslo process, the book gives a rather accurate and contemporaryaccount of events and assessments during the process. Corbin had privilegedaccess to the Norwegian actors at the very end of the process, and the book was writtenwhile everybody’s memory was fresh. It therefore provides valuable information.In addition, books written by the Israeli actors fill in the pieces in the Norwegian puzzle.Primarily, the Israelis have written their accounts in order to explain and justifythe Israeli contribution to the process. Intentionally or not, they provide valuable informationon the role of Norway. 3130 This has also been confirmed by all three in interviews with me. As will be shown later, Jan Egelandplayed a crucial role only at the setup and start of the Oslo Back Channel. Corbin’s book,therefore, does not cover his views and perspectives to any significant extent.31 In all that has been written, surprisingly little emphasis has been placed on Norway’s relationshipto the Middle East conflict throughout the postwar period and the very special relationship thatexisted between Norway and Israel long before the exciting days of the secret Norwegian BackChannel. This history is very important for understanding how Norway became involved as amediating country. My own research has focused on this background, particularly two bookspublished in Norwegian: Da staten Israel ble til. Et stridsspørsmål i norsk politikk 194549[When the State of Israel Was Born: A Matter of Political Conflict in Norwegian Policy194549] (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1989); and Norge – Israels beste venn. Norsk Midtøsten-politikk194956 [Norway Israel’s Best Friend: Norwegian Middle East Policy 194956] (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget,1996). Both of these works were based on recently declassified and still partlyclassified documents (to which I was granted access) at the archives of the Norwegian foreign
Introduction11Norway has very liberal declassification procedures. Since the 1980s, many archives,in particular those of the ministry of foreign affairs, have been made availablefor research. For the period covered here (1993–96), Norwegian archives and documentsare not generally available for research. However, for this study, which wasgenerously funded by the Norwegian ministry for foreign affairs, I was given privilegedaccess to all relevant, still classified, ministry files. The documents in the ministryare important, especially for the period after the signing of the Oslo Agreement inSeptember 1993. However, I was faced with two major problems. Absolutely no documentswere found in the ministry’s files on the negotiations in the Oslo Back Channel.No minutes, no memos, no letters seemed to have been filed. When, for instance,the Norwegian foreign minister had meetings to discuss the negotiations in Norwaywith the Israeli foreign minister, the US secretary of state or the chairman of the PLO,not a single word seems to have been recorded on official paper. Furthermore, whileextracts from letters written by the Norwegian foreign minister have been quoted inbooks, 32 these letters cannot be found in the archives of the Norwegian ministry offoreign affairs. Nor have these letters been found among the private papers of the lateNorwegian foreign minister Johan Jørgen Holst. 33 However, despite inadequate andmissing documents, difficulties with gaining access to and information from somecrucial players, this analysis will provide significant new evidence and information,document previously unnoticed connections and present new perspectives. With thepieces in the puzzle put together, this analysis sheds new light on Norway’s role in anintractable conflict.ministry, as well as the verbatim records of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, the archivesof the Norwegian Labour Party and documents from the US State Department and theBritish Foreign and Commonwealth Office – to mention the most important. Two articles basedon these books have been published in English: ‘Norway and a Major International Crisis: Suez– The Very Difficult Case’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 9(3): 211–241; and ‘How Norway BecameOne of Israel’s Best Friends’, Journal of Peace Research 37(2): 189–211. In addition, I have alsopublished the report ‘Norwegians? Who Needs Norwegians?’ Explaining the Oslo Back Channel:Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign AffairsEvaluation Report 9/2000 (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000). Based on thislatter report, a further article has been published in English: ‘Explaining the Oslo Backchannel:Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East’, Middle East Journal 56(4): 597–615.32 In particular, I am referring to the three books written by Peres, Beilin and Savir.33 Interview with Marianne Heiberg, 13 May 2002. In connection with this interview, I was shownthe very few of her late husband’s documents that Heiberg possessed.
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