Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

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18 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Business’friend of Israel, was never put to the test on how far it might have been willing to pushfor the Palestinian case. 16Camp David had been deliberately vague and ambiguous with regard to the ultimatestatus of the Palestinians after the five-year transitional period. The final status talkswere made dependent on a prior agreement on transitional arrangements. The Egyptians,acting as representatives for the Palestinians, and the Israelis had very differentviews on what they were actually negotiating about. Sadat believed that the autonomytalks would gradually prepare the way for Palestinian self-government, with restrictionsonly on foreign and defence policy. Begin, on the other hand, who even dislikedthe term ‘self-governing authority’ and preferred to refer to Palestinian ‘autonomy’,had a very different notion. However, he approved the postponement of Israel’sclaim to sovereignty during the five-year interim period, though he would not renounceit. After five years, Israel would assert its claim to sovereignty. If the Palestiniansand the other Arab states agreed, the issue would be resolved. If not, autonomywould be maintained for the foreseeable future. During the same period, Israel wouldcontinue to build settlements on the West Bank and in Gaza. East Jerusalem was noteven a part of the autonomy plan. The solution to the Palestinian refugee problem andthe practical implementation of Palestinian self-rule remained very vague. In addition,the Palestinian self-governing authority would not automatically take control over landand water resources. Autonomy, according to Begin, only applied to persons, not to territory.17After being driven out of Jordan in 1970, the PLO rebuilt its infrastructure in Lebanon,particularly in the refugee camps in the south. The Palestinians also beganlaunching rocket attacks and raids on northern Israel from southern Lebanon. Israel reactedstrongly and responded with air attacks, at times with simultaneous military actionsbeing carried out on the ground. In 1978, it invaded southern Lebanon. Likudleaders like Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon, a right-wing hardliner with a militaryand intelligence background, believed that eliminating the PLO bases in Lebanonwould force the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories to reach an agreement with Israelthat would not involve Palestinian national claims. Consequently, the most importantthing to do was to get rid of the most powerful expression of the Palestinians’claims against Israel, the PLO. The PLO, with increasing international recognition,was regarded in Israel as the main threat to Israeli claims to all of Palestine. 18In June 1982 Israel launched a full-scale war against Lebanon to crush the PLO onceand for all, and at the same time to destroy the ability of the Palestinian refugee communityin Lebanon to pose any threat to Israel. The invading Israeli army easily sweptover the weak Lebanese and Palestinian defences. Thousands were killed and wounded.Arafat and his men were forced out, this time to Tunis, more remote from Palestine16 Neff 1995, p. 119; see also references above.17 Same references as above.18 Quandt 2001, pp. 250–256; Shlaim 2001, pp. 369–370, 395–423; Neff 1995, pp. 120–121; Makovsky1996, p. 6; Butenschøn 1998, p. 32.
The Road to Oslo19than ever. The Reagan Plan, which came in the wake of the Israeli invasion, offered anew vision of Palestinian autonomy, but was quickly rejected – by Israel, by the Palestinians,and by the Arab states. 19The PLO was never so far away from Palestine as during the organization’s exile inTunis. The war in Lebanon proved costly and divisive, and the PLO was weakened. InFebruary 1985, Arafat signed an agreement with King Hussein, acknowledging a Jordanianrole in a future peace process. The PLO wanted to participate in a joint peacedelegation with Jordan, but the king demanded, in return for the PLO’s inclusion, acceptanceof Resolution 242, renunciation of terrorism and explicit recognition of Israel’sright to exist. Arafat backed out. 20As a result of the Israeli elections in 1984, Labour and Likud formed a joint government.In April 1987, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres managed to reach an agreementwith King Hussein. Meeting secretly in London, Peres and Hussein agreed to an internationalconference that was to serve as an umbrella for bilateral talks between Israeland the Arab states. As so many times before, the Israeli government, headed by anotherof Likud’s warriors, Yitzhak Shamir, rejected any kind of multilateral negotiations.Shamir favoured a setting in which the superpowers would play an importantrole and where King Hussein would be the basis for direct negotiations between Jordanand Israel. King Hussein, however, did not approve the idea of bilateral talks, andthe whole agreement faded away. Once again, the Palestinian issue seemed to vanishfrom the agenda, not least as a result of the Arab world’s increased preoccupation withthe Iran–Iraq War. 21For once in the turbulent history of the Middle East, it was the local Palestinians,those actually living under Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, who tookmatters into their own hands and permanently changed the conflict with Israel. In December1987, a series of riots quickly erupted into a general uprising that spread fromGaza to the West Bank. This was originally triggered by a traffic accident in thenorthern part of the Gaza Strip, where four local Palestinians were killed in a crashwith an Israeli military vehicle. In the beginning, the Israelis thought that the disturbanceswere simply another in the series of violent clashes that occurred from time totime in the Occupied Territories. Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin ordered harshtreatment of the Palestinian youngsters, who mainly threw stones at the Israeli soldiers.But, to his big surprise – and that of Israelis in general – these military methodsfailed to subdue the rebels. This time, the Israelis had fundamentally misjudged thedepth of Palestinian anger and desperation. 22The intifada, as the Palestinian uprising was called, challenged the legitimacy of Israel’soccupation and drew attention to its cost, both in moral and in financial terms. TVstations broadcasted worldwide how Israeli soldiers retaliated against stone-throwing19 Same references as above.20 Quandt 2001, pp. 260–265; Shlaim 2001, pp. 424–439; Makovsky 1996, pp. 6–7.21 Quandt 2001, pp. 270–273; Shlaim 2001, pp. 442–450; Makovsky 1996, pp. 6–7.22 Quandt 2001, pp. 274–277; Shlaim 2001, pp. 450–462; Makovsky 1996, pp. 7–8.
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