Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

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48 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Business’and asked whether he had any information about Abu Ala, and whether he had anyadvice as to how such a secret meeting could be set up. 55Rød Larsen immediately realized the importance of such direct contact and seizedthe opportunity that had presented itself. He suggested that Hirschfeld and Abu Alashould meet the next morning at his hotel. It seems as though, even at this early stage,Rød Larsen had proposed a follow-up meeting, of any kind and level, to be held inNorway. Although he made it clear to Hirschfeld that he was not acting on behalf ofthe Norwegian government, Rød Larsen stressed his close contacts with both the foreignministry and the governing Labour Party, of which Hirschfeld was alreadyaware. 56While Terje Rød Larsen and most of the other Oslo players were in London, Arafat’sold friend, Hans Wilhelm Longva, was visiting the PLO headquarters in Tunis.Longva was sent to Tunis as a direct consequence of two meetings he had had withForeign Minister Stoltenberg and State Secretary Egeland in late November. As always,Longva got immediate and trouble-free access to Arafat and his close advisers.The purpose of Longva’s visit seems to have been multi-faceted: all of his politicalconversations were centred around the peace process and the lack of progress. DuringLongva’s meeting with Arafat on 27 November, the PLO chairman became deeplypessimistic over what he described as a serious crisis. Also internally on the Palestinianside, Arafat felt threatened by the rise and progress of Hamas, the growing lack ofsupport for and trust in the PLO from Palestinians living on the West Bank and in Gaza,and the threats of resignation by some of the Palestinian negotiating team. Again,Arafat pleaded for help from a third party – Norway. There would be no progress inthe negotiations without third-party intervention, he maintained. Since Norway was asuitable third party, he hoped that the country would be willing to take on such a roleif – or rather when – it became necessary. 57Abu Ala had not informed the PLO leaders in Tunis about the London meeting inadvance. Beilin knew nothing of what was going on, nor had he been informed in advance.Two weeks later, Rød Larsen travelled to Tunis to meet the PLO leaders for thefirst time. He met with Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, at this time mostly knownby his nom de guerre Abu Mazen. Abu Mazen was head of the PLO’s Department forNational and International Relations. The two PLO leaders had in the meantime beeninformed about the talks in London. Longva had also urged the chairman to receiveTerje Rød Larsen. What was by then clear to Rød Larsen and the other Norwegians55 Interviews with Yair Hirschfeld, 7 May 1998 and 22 March 1999; interview with Hanan Ashrawi,23 March 1999; interview with Yossi Beilin, 23 March 1999; interview with Terje Rød Larsen,16 June 1999; Ashrawi 1995, pp. 218–221; Corbin 1994a, pp. 29–32; Beilin 1999, pp. 58–62;Stoltenberg 2001, pp. 270–272. Yair Hirschfeld had already scheduled a meeting with Terje RødLarsen to discuss the economic foundation of his research projects in the Palestinian areas.Hirschfeld had hoped that the Norwegian academic would help him get a research grant.56 Same references as above.57 UD 25.11/19s, 1, two cables, Foreign Ministry to various embassies, 10 December 1992; memorandumof 23 December 1992, Rolf Willy Hansen (Head of Division); interview with Hans WilhelmLongva, 30 June 2000; Stoltenberg 2001, p. 270.
Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East49involved was that the leaders in the Palestinian areas would not or could not do anythingwithout the approval of Arafat. Faisal Husseini had made this very clear: Arafatexercised sole power. Whatever the Norwegians might think or feel about the dogmatic,old-fashioned and undemocratic leaders in Tunis, there would be no solution withoutthe PLO. 58Back in Oslo, Rød Larsen, Juul and Egeland called Beilin in Jerusalem to persuadehim to continue to work on the back channel option and the meetings in London.Beilin assured Egeland that Hirschfeld had his approval and blessing. However, if anysecret meeting should transpire, he – because of his position as deputy foreign minister– would exercise his right to deny any knowledge of it. If Hirschfeld as an Israeli citizenwas willing to meet a PLO representative to sort out the many sensitive questions,that was a good thing. However, no one should know that Israel’s deputy foreign ministerwas involved. Beilin’s conditions were crystal clear: Hirschfeld was not speakingon behalf of the Israeli government. There existed no secret negotiations, only a discussionof central items. In January, the back channel option was finally given a careful‘yes’ from Beilin. On 20 January 1993, the two enemies met in the small Norwegiantown of Sarpsborg. 5958 Interviews with Yair Hirschfeld, 7 May 1998 and 22 March 1999; interview with Yossi Beilin,23 March 1999; interview with Terje Rød Larsen and Mona Juul, 16 June 1999; interview withHans Wilhelm Longva, 30 June 2000; Beilin 1999, pp. 58–64; Corbin 1994a, pp. 28, 34–35; Abbas1995, pp. 112–115.59 Interviews with Yair Hirschfeld, 7 May 1998 and 22 March 1999; interview with Yossi Beilin,23 March 1999; interview with Terje Rød Larsen and Mona Juul, 16 June 1999; interview withHans Wilhelm Longva, 30 June 2000; Corbin 1994a, p. 35; Egeland 1994.
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