Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

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160 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Business’approximately 21,000 Palestinians as teachers, as healthcare and social service workers,and as low- and middle-ranking civil servants. 45The Palestinian response to the Israeli occupation also affected the context for political,social and economic development. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Palestinians’economic strategy was intended to increase the ability of Palestinian institutionsand infrastructure to resist Israeli expansionist policies. It was ‘largely directed tomaintaining, not transforming economic conditions’. 46 The goal was to maintain aPalestinian presence on the land. This was seen as more important than restructuringPalestinian production and enterprise. As a result, no fundamental restructuring of theeconomy took place. 47Another important aspect of the pre-Oslo period was the critical role played by theNGO sector. Approximately 1,200–1,500 Palestinian NGOs existed in the West Bankand Gaza Strip, employing around 20,000–30,000 people. These organizations provideda substantial share of education, healthcare and other social services, and a largepart of the growing Palestinian middle class worked in this sector. In the absence of aPalestinian state, and with the Israeli authorities reluctant to engage in public sectorinstitution-building, the delivery of many key social services depended on PalestinianNGOs. 48On the West Bank and in Gaza, the formal apparatus of the PLO was nonexistent.The PLO leadership was far away, in exile either in Beirut or in Tunis. Israel allowedno PLO activity. However, nationalist leadership was provided in other ways. Duringthe 1970s, nationalist mayors and other well-known public figures were both highlyvisible and highly vulnerable to arrest, deportation and other countermeasures by Israel.In order to ensure effective continuation of leadership under such circumstances,Palestinian nationalist groups emphasized having a large number of groups, organizationsand institutions. For many NGOs, political solidarity was more important thaneffective development. This resulted in weak systems for evaluation and a lack oftransparency and quality control within many organizations. The same tendenciescould be seen among religious charitable organizations, clinics, schools and social institutions.Many of these were linked to the various Islamist groups that began toemerge and grow from the late 1980s onwards – most notably Hamas, but also themuch smaller Islamic Jihad. 49Political factionalism shaped much of the associational life. The Palestinian politicalspectrum consisted of three main political groupings. First, there was Fatah, headed byYasser Arafat. This was the largest Palestinian nationalist organization, dominatingthe PLO. Second, there was the Palestinian Left, which consisted of many smaller partiessuch as the PFLP, the DFLP, FIDA and the PPP and had a strong, but declining,45 Same references as above.46 Roy 1995, p. 151.47 Brynen 2000, pp. 48–54; Roy 1995, pp. 150–153; Robinson 1997, pp. 38–65.48 Same references as above; see also Sullivan 1996, pp. 94–95. The channelling of Western and Arabdonor support through NGOs was undoubtedly a major factor in their growth.49 Brynen 2000, pp. 50–54; Robinson 1997, pp. 132–173.
Implementing Peace161influence both on the evolution of Palestinian politics and on the PLO. The Left hadstrong support among intellectuals and NGO organizers. 50 Third, during the late1980s, the Islamist movement emerged, initially with the support of Israel. Thismovement was the main opposition to Fatah and the nationalist mainstream, and wasfar stronger in Gaza than on the West Bank. 51Unlike the inhabitants of the West Bank under Jordan, the Gazans had been unableto develop their own political culture, leadership and institutions. Political activity hadbeen forbidden. The repressive Egyptian legacy, combined with a large refugee population– rural, uneducated, poor and dependent – ‘shaped a political culture that sawviolence, not debate, as its primary form of mediation and political action’. 52 This culturechanged little when the Israeli occupation replaced the Egyptian one. On the WestBank, by contrast, Jordan allowed the growth of a differentiated political class structure.A variety of political, economic and social interests were represented. The traditionallanded elite and a new class of urban merchants and traders wielded economicand political power. The political socialization of West Bank Palestinians divergedsharply from that of Gazans. They developed a range of political skills and institutionalmechanisms that the Gazans never did. 53Within and between these various political groups, considerable factional competition,suspicion and discouragement took place. The result was a myriad of organizations,parties and movements – split from and linked to other political parties and incompetition with each other. In addition, the flow of financial resources to alliedNGOs served the purpose of consolidating party apparatus and ensuring political control.The PLO offered financial compensation to victims of the struggle against Israel,support for families of prisoners, student scholarships, projects in areas such as housing,agriculture and education, and substantial amounts of patronage money to nationalistinstitutions and personalities. In this process, corruption was not infrequent. 54The use of such neopatrimonial mechanisms of political management had a long historyamong the Palestinians. The Ottomans, the British, the Jordanians and the Israelishad all used patronage to consolidate their political position. Within the PLO, patronagehad been used to cement both the organization as a whole and Fatah’s leading positionwithin it. Fealty and loyalty were more important than competence. Corruptionwas overlooked in the interest of power. Arafat’s political style, using patronage as aruling mechanism, grew out of this traditional Palestinian culture. 5550 The acronyms stand for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the DemocraticFront for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA) and thePalestinian People’s Party (PPP, formerly the Palestinian Communist party); see Brynen 2000,p. 52.51 Brynen 2000, pp. 50–54; Roy 1995, pp. 19–26; Robinson 1997, pp. 132–173.52 Roy 1995, p. 24.53 Roy 2001, pp. 7–9 ; Roy 1995, pp. 23–26; Robinson 1997, pp. 11–65.54 Brynen 1995; Brynen 2000, pp. 50–54; Robinson 1997, pp. 11–65; Roy 1994, pp. 94–95; Roy2001, pp. 7–9.55 Same references as above.
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Institutt for fredsforskningInterna
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PREFACEIN JANUARY 2001, it was agre
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2 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Busines
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10 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Busine
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Chapter 1THE ROAD TO OSLOIDEALLY, M
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The Road to Oslo15Palestinians real
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The Road to Oslo17new Israeli gover
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The Road to Oslo19than ever. The Re
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The Road to Oslo21acceptance of the
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The Road to Oslo23After 1945, the i
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The Road to Oslo25headway. The new
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The Road to Oslo27The Madrid Confer
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The Road to Oslo29cial framework of
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Chapter 3THE MODEST FACILITATOR‘T
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The Modest Facilitator53state. The
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The Modest Facilitator55overcome. F
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The Modest Facilitator57accident. I
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The Modest Facilitator59The Oslo op
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The Modest Facilitator61underground
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The Modest Facilitator63kinds of st
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The Modest Facilitator65and I will
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The Modest Facilitator67ister Rabin
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The Modest Facilitator69had been -
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The Modest Facilitator71Rød Larsen
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The Modest Facilitator7379 and in W
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The Modest Facilitator75such an app
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The Modest Facilitator77be accused
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The Modest Facilitator79former US s
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The Modest Facilitator81providing c
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The Modest Facilitator83the importa
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Chapter 4THE ACTIVE MEDIATORAFTER F
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The Active Mediator87retary in the
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The Active Mediator89of the session
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The Active Mediator91But Rabin was
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The Active Mediator93They agreed to
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The Active Mediator95come first. At
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The Active Mediator97Singer taking
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The Active Mediator99A frustrated A
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The Active Mediator101However, the
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The Active Mediator103the second ph
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The Active Mediator105areas. In fac
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The Active Mediator107ings and emot
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