Peacemaking Is a Risky Business - PRIO

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38 ‘Peacemaking Is a Risky Business’Foreign Minister Frydenlund was positive and willing to serve as a possible backchannel option. 21In the coming years this option resurfaced on a number of occasions. Knut Frydenlundwas the driving force in Norway, while Longva, his representative on the ground,was becoming increasingly and extraordinary close to Arafat. Frydenlund and Longvaacknowledged that a future solution could only be found in a two-state solution, a partition.However, nothing concrete came out of the Norwegian talks with the PLO atthis time. 22The Crucial Role of the Norwegian Labour PartyIn 1981, the Labour Party lost power in Norway. From the beginning of the 1980s, itwas the Labour Party in opposition that forced through the profound changes in attitudestowards the PLO. ‘Norway is today one of the most restrictive countries in theworld in relation to, for instance, the Palestinian problem. This is not said as a criticismof others; it is more a criticism of myself.... I believe that neither Israel, Norwaynor the Middle East conflict will profit from a continuation of this restrictive line’,said Knut Frydenlund from the opposition benches. 23 The Norwegian Labour Partywas following in the footsteps of other social democratic parties in Europe. There – inparticular in Austria and Sweden – the pro-Palestinian process had been going on foryears and was far ahead of the small steps taken in Norway. 24From the autumn of 1981, several Labour Party leaders met with Arafat. Just bymeeting the ‘symbol of terrorism’ themselves, they were crossing a threshold. The LabourParty leader from 1975–81, Reiulf Steen, was the first to meet with the Palestinianleader. In December 1982, Steen went to Tunis to interview Arafat for the newspa-21 Tamnes 1997, pp. 379–380; Stoltenberg 2001, p. 264; Jebsen 1997, pp. 23–24.22 UD 25.11/19, 167, memorandum of 25 September 1979, Longva; 25.11/19, 176, Longva to ForeignMinistry, 27 August and 1 September 1980; 25.11/19, 180, Longva to Foreign Ministry, 23February 1981; 25.11/19, 185, Longva to Foreign Ministry, 3 July 1981; 25.11/19, 192, memorandumof 8 February 1982, Longva; 25.11/19, 197, memorandum of 29 July 1982, Longva;25.11/19, 201, memorandum of 25 October 1982, Longva; interview with Hans WilhelmLongva, 24 February 1999; Tamnes 1997, pp. 379–381; Stoltenberg 2001, pp. 260–264; Johansen1980, pp. 62–66; Jebsen 1997, pp. 21–24.23 S.tid 1981–82, p. 1660: ‘Norge er i dag et av de land i verden som fører den mest restriktive linjenår det gjelder f.eks Palestina-problemet. Jeg konstanterer dette ikke som noen kritikk av andre;det er mer som selvkritikk.... Jeg tror verken Israel, Norge eller Midtøsten-konflikten er tjent meden fortsettelse av denne restriktive linje.’24 Lie 1983, p. 135; Jebsen 1997, p. 22. The pro-Palestinian process among the social democraticparties in Europe is observable in the debates of the Socialist International (SI). From the establishmentof the State of Israel in 1948 until the war in 1967, the debate in this international forumwas totally dominated by the Israeli perspective. From the beginning of the 1970s, the socialdemocratic parties in Europe, with the exception of the Norwegian, became increasingly interestedin the political aspects of the Palestinian issue. Socialist International (hereafter SI), records,1946–83, International Institute of Social History (IISH), Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Devin1993, pp. 127–151.
Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East39per Verdens Gang (VG). The interview appeared on the front page of the newspaper’s20 December edition, and Arafat was quoted as saying to Steen that Norway was especiallyqualified to play a key role in the work for peace in the Middle East. The PLOleader particularly emphasized Norway’s close relations with the USA. However,Steen’s interview was partly a cover. He had been asked by an old friend, Abba Eban,Israel’s ambassador to the UN in 1948–59, ambassador to the USA in 1950–59, deputyprime minister in 1963–66 and foreign minister in 1966–74, to act in his place at ameeting with Yasser Arafat and Issam Sartawi, a moderate Palestinian who representedthe PLO at meetings of the Socialist International. With the help of Reiulf Steen,Eban wanted to try to establish a direct channel between himself and the PLO chairman.However, nothing concrete came out of Steen’s efforts. 25Two weeks later, on New Year`s Eve 1982, an ‘official’ Labour Party delegation(sent to the Middle East after approval by Labour’s board) visited Arafat in Tunis. Thedelegation consisted of Knut Frydenlund, his close adviser Bernt Bull, Thorvald Stoltenberg,parliamentarian Liv Aasen and, from Denmark, the former foreign ministerKjeld Olesen and parliamentarian Lasse Bundtz. Again, Arafat raised the question of aNorwegian and/or Scandinavian role in a future peace process. As Arafat saw it, Norwayand the other Scandinavian countries could help establish contacts between the USA andthe PLO. But, even more important and useful, the Norwegian Labour Party could helpto establish direct contact between the Israeli Labour Party and the PLO. Arafat askedhis Norwegian guests to deliver this message to the Israeli Labour Party. 26Arafat’s initiative was enthusiastically followed up by Thorvald Stoltenberg. He wasanxious on behalf of the Norwegian Labour Party to make a Norwegian contributionto peace in the Middle East. He believed that the building of a personal relationshipwith Yasser Arafat and the PLO was an important part of the Norwegian peacebuildingefforts, and he considered Norway’s close friendship with the Israeli Labour Partyas its main asset. The Labour Party network was the obvious one to use. Stoltenbergcalled an acquaintance in Israel, but received a negative response. Arafat, however,wanted to continue the contacts established with the Norwegians. During the winter of1983, he called Stoltenberg and told him that he wanted to send Issam Sartawi to Osloto discuss further progress. However, while participating at a Congress of the SocialistInternational, Sartawi was shot dead by the Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal. The murderof Sartawi came as a serious blow to the Norwegian hopes of setting up a directchannel between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The loss of Sartawi also meant that25 VG, 20 December 1982; Aftenposten, 29 November 1989; Tamnes 1997, pp. 379–380; Jebsen1997, pp. 23–24; Salvesen 1994, pp. 332–353; Lie 1983, pp. 133–134.26 Bernt Bull’s private archive, PLO to Frydenlund, 2 February 1982; Frydenlund to Arafat, 30 July1982; memorandum of 4 January 1983, Lasse Budtz; Bull to Labour Party, 14 January 1983,Board Meeting; Bull’s handwritten notes from the meeting with Arafat, 31 December 1982;Budtz 1983; Aftenposten, 3 January 1983; VG, 4 January 1983; Morgenbladet, 4 January 1983;Arbeiderbladet, 3 and 4 January 1983; interviews with Thorvald Stoltenberg, 26 February and 9March 1999; interview with Bernt Bull, 21 June 1999; Tamnes 1997, pp. 379–380; Stoltenberg2001, pp. 264–266; Jebsen 1997, pp. 23–24; Salvesen 1994, pp. 332–335; Lie 1983, pp. 133–137.
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